



**AGEOD BIOGRAPHIES FOR THE 1755
SCENARIO CAMPAIGN PART II**



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General Edward Braddock (January 1695 – 13 July 1755) was a British soldier and commander-in-chief for the 13 colonies during the actions at the start of the French and Indian War (1754–1763). He is generally best remembered for his command of a disastrous expedition against the French-occupied Ohio Country in 1755, in which he lost his life.

Braddock was born in Perthshire, Scotland circa 1695. Braddock was commissioned into the Coldstream Guards in 1710.

In 1747 as a Lieutenant-colonel he served under the Prince of Orange in Holland during the Siege of Bergen op Zoom.

In 1753 he was given the colonelcy of the 14th (Buckinghamshire) Prince of Wales Own Regiment of foot (now known as the West Yorkshire Regiment),^[1] and in 1754 he became a major-general.

Appointed shortly afterwards to command against the French in America, he landed in Virginia on 20 February 1755^[1] with two regiments of British regulars.^[1] He met with several of the colonial governors at the Congress of Alexandria on 14 April and was persuaded to undertake vigorous actions against the French.^[1] A general from Massachusetts would attack at Fort Niagara, General Johnson at Crown Point, Colonel Monckton at Fort

Beausejour on the Bay of Fundy. He would lead an Expedition against Fort Duquesne at the Forks of the Ohio.

After some months of preparation, in which he was hampered by administrative confusion and want of resources previously promised by the colonials, the Braddock expedition took the field with a picked column, in which George Washington served as a volunteer officer.^[2] The column crossed the Monongahela River on 9 July 1755, and shortly afterwards collided head-on with an Indian and French force who were rushing from Fort Duquesne to oppose the river crossing.^[1] Although the initial exchange of musketry favored the British, felling the French commander and causing some Canadian militia to flee, the remaining Indian/French force reacted quickly, running down the flanks of the column and putting it under a murderous crossfire. Braddock's troops reacted poorly and became disordered. Braddock, rallying his men time after time, fell at last, mortally wounded by a shot through the chest.

Braddock was borne off the field by Washington and an other officer, and died on 13 July 1755, just four days after the battle. Before he died Braddock left Washington his ceremonial sash that he wore with his battle uniform. Reportedly, Washington never went anywhere without this sash for the rest of his life, be it as the Commander of the Colonial Army or with His presidential duties.

He was buried just west of Great Meadows, where the remnants of the column halted on its retreat to reorganize.^[1] Braddock was buried in the middle of the road and wagons were rolled over top of the grave site to prevent his body from being discovered and desecrated.^[2] George Washington presided at the burial service,^[2] as the chaplain had been severely wounded.

- Benjamin Franklin's *Autobiography* (1791) includes an account of helping General Braddock garner supplies and carriages for the general's troops. He also describes a conversation with Braddock in which he explicitly warned the General that his plan to march troops to the fort through a narrow valley would be dangerous because of the possibility of an ambush. This is sometimes cited as advice against the disastrous eventual outcome, but the fact remains that Braddock was not ambushed in that final action, and the battle site was not in any case, a narrow valley. Braddock had in fact taken great precautions against abuscade, and had crossed the Monongahela an additional time to avoid the narrow Turtle Creek defile.
- In 1804, human remains believed to be Braddock's were found buried in the roadway about 1.5 miles (2.4 km) west of Great Meadows by a crew of road workers. The remains were exhumed and reburied. A marble monument was erected over the new grave site in 1913 by the Coldstream Guards. The grave site is considered to be British territory.^[citation needed]
- General Braddock is the namesake of Braddock, Braddock Hills, and North Braddock in Pennsylvania; Braddock Heights near Frederick,

Maryland; and, in Virginia, Braddock Road in Alexandria and Braddock Street in Winchester.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1755

Part 1 Embarking for Glory

On January 8, 1755 in the cold, wet winter of Ireland, troops of two British Regiments of Foot, the 44th commanded by Sir Peter Halkett and the 48th commanded by Col. Thomas Dunbar, began the process of embarking on troop ships at Cove near Cork, Ireland. It was several days before everyone was on board and the tide and weather were right. Finally, on January 13th the ships raised anchor and began the long, uncomfortable trip to America. Their commander, Major General Edward Braddock, had sailed just before Christmas to get to Virginia in time to arrange for the troops' arrival.

The planning and preparation for this expedition had been going on for some time. Ever since the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, France and Britain had been suspicious of each other's moves and motives. The French advances into the Ohio River Valley were one of the major causes for concern in America. When news reached England in August, 1754, about a small colonial force under a young Virginia Colonel that was defeated at Fort Necessity and forced by French arms from the Ohio country, the leaders in London decided it was time to take action. They would send British professional soldiers to do what the colonials seemed incapable of doing.

The Plan is Formed

By late September, 1754, the plan was formed and the participants were chosen. Major General Edward Braddock, aged 60, had long been associated with the Coldstream Guards, but in early 1753 he became Colonel of the Fourteenth Regiment of Foot and acting governor of Gibraltar where the 14th was stationed. His good work there and his earlier role in the Coldstream Guard in London had brought him to the attention of the Duke of Cumberland, King George II's third son and Captain General of the British army. Braddock was chosen to be the commander of British forces in North America and was given two regiments with which to force the French from British land.

The 44th and 48th Regiments of Foot had been formed in 1741. Both regiments had seen action during the second Jacobite rebellion in Scotland,

the 44th having been at Preston Pans with Peter Halkett as its commander and the 48th seeing action at Culloden. But now they were on duty scattered over part of Ireland; neither was at full strength. They would be supplemented by soldiers from several nearby regiments, but these transfers were always the worst that the sending regiment could offer. The rest of the strength would be raised in America in jails, taverns and other nefarious establishments where idle men could be found.

Braddock's Subordinates

Sir Peter Halkett of Pitfirrane, near Fife, Scotland, was the commander of the 44th Regiment of Foot. He had been a Lt.Colonel with several companies of the Regiment at Preston Pans and had distinguished himself when many others had failed. Sir Peter was a member of Parliament from Inverkeithen.

The 48th Regiment was commanded by Col. Thomas Dunbar. Before becoming Colonel he had been in the Royal Irish Regiment. In the upcoming campaign he would be the 48th Regiment's commander and second in command to Gen. Braddock. One of the lucky officers, he would serve in the British army for 30 years and die in 1777.

On October 15, 1754, Sir John St. Clair had been appointed Deputy Quartermaster General for the British army in America. He sailed as soon as he could and was in America by January 9, 1755. He set about inspecting the country and assessing its resources.

The plan proposed by the Duke of Cumberland was that Gen. Braddock should attack the French fort at the Forks of the Ohio River (Fort Duquesne) while two other locally raised forces under Gov. William Shirley of Massachusetts and Sir William Pepperell would attack the French strongholds at Niagara on the Great Lakes and Crown Point on Lake Champlain. Brig. Gen Robert Monckton would capture Fort Beausejour and secure other parts of Nova Scotia. The British Navy would keep French supplies and fresh troops from reaching America. This campaign would effectively cut off French access to the portages that afforded travel between Quebec and New Orleans. The French would then no longer be able to contain British expansion at the Allegheny Mountains and stop British advances into the Ohio country and all lands east of the Mississippi River.



base map courtesy N.P.S.

It was an ambitious undertaking, but it was very difficult for the planners in London to see from their maps (particularly the Fry and Jefferson Map of Virginia, 1751) the innumerable obstacles that lay in the path of such a great and complex campaign. Nor could they imagine the resources and methods that their enemies would use against them. Lord Halifax had

suggested first advancing against the French northern strongholds because they were nearer British supply posts and easier to get to. However, the Duke of Cumberland apparently wished to have Braddock start early in the spring before the ice thawed on the Great Lakes to take the more southern fort at the Forks of the Ohio. Then, he reasoned, the campaign could move northward.

The Reality of the Situation

In America Sir John St. Clair was getting a firsthand look at the problems that would plague the campaign. He had traveled into the wilderness to Wills Creek by January 16, 1755. Here he found that British Independent companies from New York and South Carolina had been working at the site of the Ohio Company's storehouse on the construction of what would become a King's fort named for the Duke of Cumberland. The New York troops were so old and infirm that St. Clair sent many of them home. The South Carolina soldiers, many of whom had been with Washington at Fort Mifflin, proved to be more capable. Later some Maryland troops arrived and constructed huts so they could winter at the fort. St. Clair met Maryland Governor Horatio Sharpe at the site and then traveled down the Potomac in a canoe to see if this waterway would accommodate the transportation of men and arms. It proved to be unsuitable for the task. This first look at the troops, roads, forts, country and military resources caused St. Clair some concern. But matters would get worse.

Next Time: The Grand Assembly: Braddock calls a meeting of colonial Governors to outline his plan and request support. (Check back in April.)

Timeline:

- July 3, 1754 Col. George Washington is forced to surrender Fort Mifflin to the French and evacuate the Ohio country.
- Sept 24, 1754 Orders signed appointing Edward Braddock commander of all British forces in North America.
- October 1754 orders sent to officers; magazines carry story; French learn of expedition.
- Dec 21, 1754 Gen. Braddock on the H.M.S. Norwich and Adm. Keppel on Centurion sail for America.

- Jan 9, 1755 Sir John St. Clair, Deputy Quartermaster for Gen. Braddock, arrived at Hampton Roads aboard HMS Gibraltar
- Jan 13 Troop ships with the 44th and the 48th sail for America.
- Jan 16 Sir John St. Clair arrives at Fort Cumberland.

Part II The Grand Assembly

The sea journey aboard the Norwich was rather “troublesome” and Gen. Edward Braddock had suffered some slight sickness during the voyage. After a few days at Hampton and the arrival of Commodore Keppel, the naval commander, Braddock rode with Keppel to Williamsburg to meet with Gov. Dinwiddie. The General took rooms at the Raleigh Tavern. Upon his arrival in Williamsburg he was told that St. Clair had just left for Winchester, so a messenger was sent to recall the Quartermaster. Then Braddock proceeded to question Dinwiddie. The General wanted to know how arrangements were going.

The frustrations and disappointments that Gen. Braddock’s Quartermaster was feeling were nothing compared to what the General himself was about to experience. Sir John St. Clair was finding poorly trained troops, terrible roads and few supplies. Braddock, on the other hand was beginning to delve into the intricacies of colonial politics and the settler’s mindset. He was about to have a rude awakening.

One of the first orders in his correspondence was to write to the colonial governors reminding them of the instructions from London and requesting their presence at a meeting in Annapolis in early April. Although London had sent a letter to all colonial governors telling them to supply Braddock with the necessities he needed and to create a general fund of money for him to draw upon, little had been accomplished. The planners had forgotten that Governors could only set up funds if money was appropriated by the colonial legislatures. As usual, the Burgesses and Assemblies of the various colonies were not happy about appropriating money for a British army. Several, including the Virginia Burgesses, had put up some funds, but others, most notably Pennsylvania, were very reluctant to offer financial assistance.

A Smuggled Map

Among all the bad news about money and supplies there was one unexpected treasure. Gov. Dinwiddie gave Gen. Braddock a drawing of the French fort at the Forks of the Ohio, Fort Duquesne. It had been smuggled out of the fort by Robert Stobo who was there as a hostage waiting to be transferred back to the Virginia Regiment after the release of the French

captives Col. Washington had taken in the skirmish with Jumonville. It seemed to be a wonderful piece of luck, although its capture later by the French would cause hardship for Stobo.

After his initial conference with Dinwiddie and a meeting with St. Clair, Braddock and Keppel decided to bring the ships to Alexandria to unload the troops and supplies. It would place the army a bit closer to the frontier where several roads existed. After some problems unloading supplies, Keppel suggested that Braddock should take a contingent of sailor knowledgeable in the use of block & tackle and also in construction and use of small ferryboats. The general agreed they would be valuable in winching the large guns over steep mountain roads and in ferrying troops across the numerous rivers that lay in his path. He also accepted the loan of several more large guns.



Gen. Braddock used the home of John Carlyle as his headquarters while he was in Alexandria

Mr. Washington Sends Greetings

Amidst all the correspondence concerning assembling troops, other personnel and supplies, there arrived a very important letter. George Washington, recently retired from the Virginia Regiment after its reorganization by Gov. Dinwiddie, wrote to congratulate Gen. Braddock upon his appointment and offered his assistance in the coming campaign. Braddock had heard of the young officer and knew that he was one of the

few British men who had ever been over the Alleghenies to see the Forks of the Ohio. The general ordered his aide, Robert Orme, to reply to Washington and invite him to join the campaign as an aide to the Commander.

By this time, Braddock was impatient to meet the governors of the major colonies and to set them straight on the need for their cooperation in the campaign. After all, he had been sent to protect their interests against the encroaching French. After some delay, a meeting was scheduled to be held at Braddock's Alexandria headquarters, the home of John Carlyle.

The Troops Head West

When the governors assembled in mid-April the army has already begun to leave Alexandria in groups heading for Fort Cumberland which would be the final staging point before the push into the western wilderness. Since the roads were bad and forage was limited for the animals, the army did not want to travel in one body. Col. Thomas Dunbar's 48th Regiment crossed the Potomac at Rock Creek and headed for Frederick, Maryland thinking they would stay on the Maryland side of the Potomac for the march to Fort Cumberland. Col. Peter Halkett's 44th and the Virginia troops took the Virginia route toward Vestal's Gap and Winchester. Finally, Col. Thomas Gage would follow Halkett with the artillery if enough horses could be found.



On April 15th the grand assembly (Mr. Carlyle in his letter to his brother termed it the "Grandest Congress" ever held in America) got underway in the "Blue Room" of John Carlyle's new home overlooking the Potomac in Alexandria. Present were Governors Dinwiddie of Virginia, Sharpe of Maryland, Morris of Pennsylvania, Shirley of Massachusetts and De Lancey of New York; also present was Col. William Johnson, the experienced Indian Agent for New York. General Braddock presented his credentials to the Governors and then immediately brought up the subject of a common war fund. The governors unanimously rejected the suggestion saying their assemblies would not approve such a fund without explicit assistance from Parliament. Braddock turned to other matters. The council was in

agreement with the war plan for the four pronged attacks against the French, and they also approved the appointment of Johnson as the




agent to meet with the Iroquois to keep them neutral in the conflict. Braddock had won the point of strategy, but had made no progress in getting the money and supplies he desperately needed.

Many of the problems Braddock faced were caused by the nature of society and the economy of the colonies. Virginia was not the best place to begin his campaign. Its location on the tidewater meant that there were few wagons to be used for transport; people used boats on the many rivers. The fact that tobacco was the main "cash" crop meant that there was not much extra corn and wheat to feed the army or forage to feed the animals. Finally, the efforts of his recruiters to fill the two Regiments' manpower needs among the tidewater common folk meant that his army would be supplemented by men who knew little of the mountains or of the Indians they would face.

The March Begins

But it was too late to do much about these problems. The army was already on the march westward. The artillery was still in Alexandria waiting for horses to haul the wagons. Even the weather was uncooperative; the early spring suddenly disappeared and Dunbar's Regiment awoke to 18 inches of

snow on the road to Frederick. But Braddock had to press on. On Monday, April 21st he departed for Frederick, Maryland where his luck would change in the form of a balding postmaster from Pennsylvania.



Excerpt from the Fry & Jefferson Map of 1754
showing the roads west from Alexandria.
Winchester is just off the map to the upper left.

Next Time: Fort Cumberland, Frontier Outpost. The army gets to the frontier outpost and makes final preparations for the wilderness campaign.


Timeline:

- January 7, 1755 Sir John St. Clair, Braddock's Quartermaster, arrives in Virginia to prepare for the army's arrival.
- Feb. 19, 1755 Gen. Braddock's ship, the Norwich, sights Virginia.
- Feb. 23rd Gen. Braddock, Commodore Keppel and their aides drive to Williamsburg to meet Gov. Dinwiddie.
- March 2nd First of the troop transports arrives; Braddock goes to Hampton to meet it.
- March 15th George Washington responds to Orme's letter inviting him to join the campaign as an aide to the General.
- March 18th Last of the troop ships lands.
- March 26th Braddock & Keppel arrive in Alexandria; the troops are already encamped there.

- April 4th Advance detail of the 48th leaves Alexandria for Frederick, Maryland.
- April 15th five Governors meet with Braddock at Carlyle House.
- April 21st Braddock leaves for Frederick with a small troop of Virginia light horse.

Part III Fort Cumberland, Frontier Outpost

Believing that there was a decent road in Maryland to Fort Cumberland, Gen. Braddock left Alexandria on April 20th and rode to Frederick to meet up with Col. Dunbar's Regiment. Only when he got to Frederick did it become clear that there really was no wagon road to Fort Cumberland. This part of the army would have to cross the Potomac River again and meet Col. Halkett's 44th near Winchester and then take the Virginia route to Will's Creek. Another big disappointment was the fact that Gov. Sharpe of Maryland had no wagons and horses waiting to join the army in Frederick. The General was beginning to wonder if these colonials could get anything done right. Then he had the good fortune to meet Benjamin Franklin.



Mr. Franklin to the Rescue

Mr. Franklin, the Pennsylvania postmaster, had come to Frederick supposedly on the business of setting up a postal express to forward the army's mail as it traveled west. His ulterior motive was to placate the General and try to find a way in which Pennsylvania could overcome its failure to

appropriate money for the campaign. In the course of conversation Mr. Franklin learned that Braddock was desperately in need of wagons and horses. He also learned that the officers had no ready supply of food since they could not purchase any on the frontier.

Mr. Franklin seized the opportunity to ingratiate himself to the General and better the standing of Pennsylvania. He explained that Pennsylvania did not have a shortage of farm wagons like Virginia and Maryland, and he arranged to send 150 to Fort Cumberland within two weeks. He also arranged for an ample supply of food for the officers. For this he received the General's thanks and a recommendation from Braddock to his superiors that Mr. Franklin was a man of his word and of great abilities. This would be remembered when Franklin represented the colonies in London before the Revolution.

A Virginia Volunteer

The next individual who met the General in Frederick was the young Virginian who had earlier offered his services to the campaign. George Washington arrived in response to the General's invitation to join his military "family" as an unpaid aide. It was the beginning of a most fruitful association that would bring fame to the young Virginian even though the General's name would instead be ever associated with disastrous defeat.

Having finished his business in Frederick and hoping to meet some friendly Cherokee Indians whom Gov. Dinwiddie had summoned to Winchester, Braddock and Washington left Maryland for Virginia on May 1st. The General's carriage did not follow Dunbar's Regiment but took a shortcut to Swearingen's ferry at present Shepherdstown and crossed the Potomac into Virginia. Then they traveled by John Evan's (just south of present Martinsburg) to Winchester. Washington stayed at Cocke's in Winchester; it is not known for certain if Braddock stayed in the town or in the army camp north of the small town. Much to Braddock's disappointment there were no friendly Indians waiting for him. It seems that colonial politics had stifled Dinwiddie's plan when North Carolina persuaded the Indians to stay out of Virginia. Braddock waited until May 7th and then left for Will's Creek – Fort Cumberland.

Leaving the Last Town on the Frontier



When Braddock's army moved northwest out of the camp at Pott's near Gainesboro it was actually beginning its trek into the wilderness. Up to this point it had traveled on existing wagon roads. From this point it was taking a route along a trader's path or packhorse trail that had to be widened for the troops and wagons. The beginning of the wilderness mountains was just ahead.

Leaving Pott's the army moved in stages north of present Lake Summit through Whitacre and down Bloomery Run through Bloomery Gap. Then it turned north of the present Rt. 127 and crossed the Cacapon just downstream of its junction with the North River. The area at the Forks of

Capon belonged to Henry Enoch; the army camped here. By this time the next year Enoch would have a fort here for his and his neighbors' protection.

The Prodigious Mountains


The next days march would take the army up the first difficult mountain (called in one journal, "prodigious") to camp atop Spring Gap Mountain aptly named because in the small "saddle" or gap on the mountain top there is a spring to supply water for a camp. From here it was downhill to the Little Cacapon River. It is in the area of Bloomery Gap and the Little Cacapon that the army had its first experience following the meanders of a rocky streambed. One of the journals says that they crossed a stream 20 times in three miles.



Below the west side of Spring Gap Mountain looking toward the area where the army headed down to the Little Cacapon River.

It was downhill from the Gap to join the Little Cacapon River about six miles upstream of its junction with the Potomac where Friend Cox lived. When the army got to Cox's at the mouth of the Little Cacapon (called Ferry Field), the advance party and the sailors had built small flats or boats to ferry the army across to the Maryland side. From this point the army marched on the Maryland shore to Thomas Cresap's at present Oldtown and then on to

Will's Creek and Fort Cumberland where the Ohio Company had built a storehouse a few years before.




Excerpt from the Fry and Jefferson Map of 1754 showing roads leading west from Winchester to Fort Cumberland. #1-Pott's; #2-Bloomery Gap; #3-Enoch's at Forks of Capon; #4-Spring Gap Mountain; #5-Cox's or Ferry Field; #6-Fort Cumberland.

Braddock's army stayed at [Fort Cumberland](#) for several weeks waiting for supplies and taking time to train the new recruits before the march to Fort Duquesne would begin. It was at Fort Cumberland that Braddock had his first encounter with a large group of Indians. Although the friendly Cherokees had declined to accompany the army, there were several natives from the Ohio area present and George Croghan, the Pennsylvania trader, brought a large contingent from his home. Gen. Braddock made an effort to impress the Indians with a show of military might and splendor. That did impress the natives, but when it came to actual talks on the strategy of the campaign and plans for the future, Braddock got everything wrong.

A Serious Blunder

Not understanding native culture and economy, Braddock demanded that the warriors' families return to Pennsylvania; that blunder lost him all of Croghan's Indians. The next misstep was even



worse. When Shingas, a Delaware sachem, asked what would happen to the land that Braddock's victory would secure from the French, the General declared that the British would secure it and that no Indian would inherit it. The chief was incredulous. If he and his people were asked to help the British oust the French from the Indian's ancestral land, they should certainly be able to live in it. But he realized that the General thought it would be British land. The chief and his warriors departed in disgust. Only eight Indians were left to accompany the army as scouts and warriors.

Gen. Braddock designed a line of march to reflect the harshness of the country, the possibility of Indian attack and the problem of moving the supplies. He divided the army into three segments with Halkett leading the first with his 44th Regiment. The second was under Lt. Col. Burton and consisted of the Independent Companies, the Virginia and Maryland soldiers and most of the artillery. Col. Dunbar's 48th would bring the major portion of the supplies and the remaining artillery. The first group moved out of camp on May 29th and began the passage over the mountain behind the camp. Three of their wagons were smashed on the steep incline. Braddock decided to find another way. It was not a good start. It would get worse.

Next Time: Through the Wilderness to Disaster. The army wins the battle against the mountains, but not against the enemy.

To the Honorable Robert Dinwiddie Esq. His majesty's Lieutenant Governor, and Commander in Chief of the Colony and Dominion of Virginia:

The humble ADDRESS of the COUNCIL SIR,

WE, His Majesty's loyal and faithful Subjects, the Council of Virginia, now met in General Assembly, beg leave to return your Honor our sincere Thanks for your affectionate Speech in the Opening of this Session; and from a just Sense of the inestimable Blessing of his Majesty's Reign, and the many repeated Marks of his Goodness, to assure your Honor of our Zeal, upon all occasions, to give the strongest and most substantial Evidence, of our Duty and Gratitude to his Majesty, for every instance of his paternal Regard.

The Forces which his Majesty has been graciously pleased to send over to our Assistance, is a fresh Instance of his Royal Care; and from the Plan of Operations that has been wisely concerted, and the known bravery and Experience of the Gentleman who is appointed to command, we may reasonably hope to see the Peace of America settled upon a Foundation, that will not be shaken for Ages yet to come.

To drive the French from our Borders, to maintain the just Rights of the Crown, and to reestablish the Tranquillity of the British Empire in North America, are Views that must warm the patriot's Breast. With these Views, Sir, You have been animated, upon these Motives you have acted with that Ardor, zeal, and Vigilance, as cannot fail of reflecting the most lasting Honor upon your Name, and Character.

The great and important Business of the Ohio, we have always considered in a nationally Light, not as Virginians, but as Britons and what Difficulties will not a Briton surmount, what Dangers will he not encounter, when he is engaged in the glorious Cause of his King and Country.

As these, Sir, are our Sentiments, we hope your Honor will be persuaded of our ready and cheerful Concurrence, and of our hearty Endeavors to do every Thing on our part, to promote his Majesty's Services, the Prosperity of this Colony, and the Welfare of America.

The Virginia Gazette May 5, 1755

Timeline:

- April 21st Braddock arrives at Frederick with a small troop of Virginia light horse.
- April 29th Dunbar leaves Frederick for Virginia
- May 1st Braddock and G.W. leave Frederick for Winchester
- May 7th Braddock and G.W. leave Pott's for Fort Cumberland
- May 10th Braddock arrives at Fort Cumberland.
- May 29th First advance from camp over the mountain unsuccessful.
- June 8th Finally, the army leaves Fort Cumberland through the Narrows.

Part IV Running into Disaster

Once the army left Fort Cumberland the real test began. If they thought that the creeks and rivers and forests of Frederick and Hampshire Counties were troublesome, they found the western wilderness had those aplenty and far more challenging terrains with names like "Shades of Death." If they thought that Spring Gap Mountain was difficult, it paled in comparison with the Allegheny front and ridge after ridge of unmapped mountains that often made splinters of the wagons. If they thought that their security plans had been proved earlier, they were dismayed that any day in this wilderness home to Indians they could loose a few stragglers and scouts. And if they thought that they had plans to best utilize the small number of horses and wagons to move their vast train, they found that often they could move only three or four miles a day with the end of their line just leaving camp as the front was just arriving at the next one.

Conquering the Wilderness

But here is where General Braddock managed to overcome nature's difficulties in the most challenging military effort America had seen since the

travels of the conquistadors in the early south and west. Where the planners in London were totally unaware of what those lines on their maps meant, Braddock faced and overcame the reality on the ground. It was a great victory especially when one considers the army he was moving.

There was a core of trained British regulars (admittedly not the best that Britain had to offer), but the rest of the army were recruits mostly from the American tidewater who had never faced such terrain and wagoneers who had never tasted discipline. It is amazing that Braddock did as much as he did given what he had to work with.

Advancing with a Flying Column

The real test of an army, however, is battle, and that was almost upon them. When it became apparent that the slow progress put the army in danger of finding reinforcements at Fort Duquesne, Braddock took council and divided the army into two sections. He moved with the advance part composed of the best regular troops, his few Indian scouts, the frontier scouts, the colonial soldiers and part of the artillery - about 1400 men. This flying column was designed to be the "fast attack force" while Col. Dunbar was left with the bulk of the supplies and enough soldiers to guard his section that was the slowest to advance.



Fort Duquesne was an imposing fortification that would require siege works with cannons to destroy. Gen. Braddock needed a substantial force for the task.

Photo of model at Fort Pitt Museum, Pittsburgh, PA

As the flying column approached the objective, Braddock cautiously scouted the terrain and planned a route best suited to keep his army from the possibility of ambush. On July 9th he crossed the Monongahela River twice, each time sending the Grenadiers first to clear and protect the crossing. When the second crossing was complete, the army thought the prize was theirs since they knew the French could not withstand an artillery siege of the wooden fort. The band struck up a tune, and the final march of about seven miles began with Col. Gage's men in the advance.

The French Review Their Options


The French, of course, had been well aware of Braddock's every move. Their scouts had closely followed the enemy's advance. Capt. Claude-Pierre Pecundy, seigneur de Contrecoeur, the fort's commander who had accepted Ensign Ward's surrender of the small British fort at the Forks on April 17, 1754, was now preparing to surrender this strategic location back to the British. Although he had a force equal to Braddock's, he knew that a wooden fort was no match for Braddock's artillery. He also knew that Indians would never stay for a siege. But there was another option.

One of Contrecoeur's subordinates, Capt. Daniel Lienard de Beaujeu, offered to lead an ambush of the British, hoping that this might discourage the enemy or at least give the French more time to await additional men. Contrecoeur, without much other hope, gave Beaujeu half of his force, just over 250 French and Canadians and some six hundred Indians. Beaujeu had to spend much valuable time convincing the Indians, who only took to the battlefield when the odds were in their favor, that this was an opportunity for victory and plunder. Finally, Beaujeu's eloquence won the Indians, and they started out to try to beat the British to the final ford of the river. They were too late.

The Battle Begins

At just past one o'clock in the afternoon, Lt. Col. Gage's men first spotted the French. The armies had literally run into each other in the forest. The British were marching in good order with the advance party on the lookout and scouts guarding the flanks. The French and their Indian allies were running through the woods hoping to get to the river before the British had completed their crossing.

There were a few war whoops and some shots before the British managed to form up into their standard firing order and deliver a volley. The effect was immediate. Beaujeu fell dead, shot through the head. The Indians scattered. The British brought up a cannon and delivered another volley from the infantry. The enemy was in disarray. After three volleys from Lt. Col. Gage's men the field seemed to belong to the British.



Facing the Enemy

But now both armies did what they did best. That would determine the victor. The French officers were each trained differently than the British. They had lived among the Indians in the wilderness until it was their home. They knew their allies and held their respect. They could easily command in such a situation. Capt. Dumas, the second in command, immediately stepped forward and ordered his men to flank the British line.

The Indians for their part took to the trees and natural defenses. Unfortunately for the British, the point of battle was a ridge with small ravines on each side and a hill to the front right. The Indians and Canadians ran along the ravines safe from fire until they could find a tree or other natural cover and began to pick off the British, especially the officers.

Compressed Confusion

"...the front was attacked; and by the unusual hallooing and whooping of the enemy, whom they could not see, were so disconcerted and confused as soon to fall into irretrievable disorder. The rear was forced forward to support them, but

seeing no enemy, and themselves falling every moment from the fire, a general panic took place among the troops, from which no exertions of the officers could recover them."

George Washington

Col. Gage tried several times to take the hill to the right, but was rebuffed. Finally, his forward column had to move back. This is when the British lost the day. As Gage and the forward companies moved back they ran into the troops that Braddock was ordering forward to support Gage. All these men were confined to the twelve foot wide road or perhaps to areas a bit larger where the openness of the forest allowed. However, even this was insufficient for the trained British soldiers to be able to form their lines of fire and effectively engage the enemy. The British simply huddled in masses and fired indiscriminately, their fire often killing the colonials who had taken to the trees or other British who happened to be in the way although hidden by smoke.

Braddock and his officers displayed the best that could be expected of them, but this turned to their disadvantage. With their bright uniforms, their gleaming gorgets, often mounted on horses, they made perfect targets. Their courage was acknowledged by all, but it cost dearly. Out of 82 officers, 63 were killed or wounded. Braddock himself had five horses shot from under him before he was mortally wounded, and George Washington had two horses killed under him and four bullet holes through his uniform.

Fear Defeats an Army

With their general wounded, most officers killed or incapacitated, and the whoops of the Indians all around them, the soldiers gave way to panic. Amazingly, they had withstood the onslaught for almost three hours, but now nothing could stop their flight. Leaving not only the wounded on the field, but even their guns and food, the men took to flight that lasted through the night.

"This [forward] guard being disordered, the general hurried the troops up to their assistance, which was done in great confusion through wagons, baggage, and cattle, and presently the fire came upon their flank. The officers being on horseback were more easily distinguished, picked out as marks, and fell very fast; and the soldiers were crowded together in a huddle, having or hearing no orders and standing to be shot at till two thirds of them were killed and then, being seized with a panic, the remainder fled with precipitation."

Benjamin Franklin

Next Time: Winter in August - the retreating army leaves the frontier open to enemy attacks.

Timeline:

- June 8th Finally, the army leaves Fort Cumberland through the Narrows.
- June 24 First camp after the Great Crossing of the Youghiogheny
- June 27 Army reaches Gist's Plantation, burned by the French the previous year
- July 9 The Battle of the Monongohela
- July 13 General Edward Braddock dies of his wounds and is buried in the road to obscure all trace of his grave from scavaging Indians.

Part 5 Winter in August

When General Braddock was gravely wounded at the Battle of the Monongahela, the panic began to spread among the remaining soldiers. For over two hours the army had huddled in small groups firing indiscriminately in the direction of the war whoops of the Indians and often hitting their own comrades. Now they began to throw down their weapons and whatever equipment encumbered them and run wildly along the only avenue of escape – the route they had just traversed a few hours ago.

Nothing that the few remaining officers could do would halt the panic. Finally, even the officers realized that if they remained they would become prey of the savages lurking just beyond the clouds of smoke in the trees and ravines. Those who still had a grip on their senses did their best to help the wounded in an orderly retreat. George Washington and a few others managed to get Gen. Braddock into a small cart and begin their retreat. The Virginians, about the only soldiers left, although they had suffered severe casualties, did their best to cover the retreat.

"Our poor Virginians behaved like men and died like soldiers, for I believe that out of three companies that were there that day scarce 30 were left alive."

George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie
July 18, 1755

The remnant of the army made it across the Monongahela River where small groups of soldiers had managed to make a stand to cover the crossing. When they realized that the Indians were not going to follow across the river, they tried to make somewhat of an organized retreat. They marched through the night amidst the cries of the wounded and the dying laying along the road. Washington described it as a most pitiful experience that he would remember the rest of his life.

Notifying Col. Dunbar

General Braddock, though gravely wounded, had given orders for the retreat. Washington was ordered to take scouts and make for Dunbar's camp to alert the other part of the army of the situation and summon aid for the fleeing troops. Riding through the dark night that at times necessitated dismounting and groping for the trail with bare hands on the ground they eventually covered the many miles to Dunbar and alerted the remainder to the defeat. Almost immediately the same fear that drove the survivors seemed to grip the supply camp. Col. Dunbar, following Braddock's orders, began to prepare a company to take supplies to the

fleeing troops while the rest of the camp prepared to destroy the many supplies that the limited wagons and horses could not carry and await orders to proceed back to Fort Cumberland.

No one knew at that time that there was no need for hurry, for the French and their Indian allies had no intention of mounting an attack. They believed that the remaining British army was too big to attack. Besides, the Indians were too busy collecting the booty on the battlefield and preparing to return to their homes with their trophies. It was reported that the British left 4 field pieces (6 pounders), 3 howitzers, several cohorn mortars, 51 wagons of provisions, about 200 horses and over 200 head of cattle on the field of battle not to mention the arms and personal effects of the dead, the wounded and the fleeing.

By the time the wounded Gen. Braddock and the remnant of the army got to Dunbar's, camp preparations were underway to make a hasty retreat. The fleeing wagoneers and camp followers had already given a report of the defeat that fanned the fear in the camp. Because there were not enough horses to haul the supplies and the wounded much of the munitions and military supplies were destroyed at the camp.

"Who Would Have Thought?"

On the evening of July 13th as the army was preparing to depart for Fort Cumberland from Dunbar's camp near Jumonville glen where George Washington had fired the first shots of the French and Indian War, Gen. Edward Braddock died of his wound. Among his last words were, "Who would have thought?" Later he murmured "We shall know better how to deal with them another time!" Apparently, he had forgotten the several words of warning given to him weeks before.

Early the next morning, before the army broke camp, George Washington read the burial service and the General was laid to rest in the middle of the road he had constructed and passed over about 10 days before. After the interment the army marched over the spot to obliterate all traces of the grave so the Indians could not discover and desecrate the remains. Here the body remained until the turn of the nineteenth century when a road crew discovered the grave and moved the remains to a safer, more prominent place where they remain today marked by a monument.



The army continued the long trek back to Fort Cumberland leaving food and supplies along the way for any survivors who might be following. By July 17 the remnant arrived at Fort Cumberland. Here an official count was taken showing 385 killed or missing, 328 wounded and 532 not wounded of the original column that engaged in the battle.

The food that had been left along the route for stragglers served its purpose. On July 26 the last recorded survivor arrived at Fort Cumberland. He told the story of traveling with six other wounded comrades. They had found the food left for them, but, unfortunately, only one lived to make it to Fort Cumberland. On that day, George Washington, still suffering from the malady that had plagued him before the battle, arrived at Mount Vernon to recuperate. His volunteer service to the British had ended, but his reputation as a fearless and dependable soldier had been established. He would soon be called upon again to serve the colony of Virginia when the House of Burgesses realized the consequences of Braddock's defeat.

The army remained at Fort Cumberland while the wounded were tended and arrangements were made for further disposition of Col. Dunbar's command. Gov. Dinwiddie of Virginia urged Dunbar to regroup and with the assistance of fresh Virginia troops he hoped to raise and quickly advance to Fort Duquesne and finish what Gen. Braddock had begun. Gov. Sharpe of Maryland urged Dunbar to leave his troops at Cumberland to protect the frontiers from an expected attack by the French and Indians. Dunbar considered the appeals and rejected them.

Going to Winter Quarters in August

In spite of all the pleas, Col. Dunbar marched his troops (except for those still too ill to travel) out of Fort Cumberland on August 2nd. The next afternoon they crossed the Potomac River into Hampshire County; they arrived in the vicinity of Winchester on August 5th. They then turned northeast and traveled into Pennsylvania. The route took them to Pawling's

Tavern and on to Shippensburg. They arrived in Philadelphia on August 28th. In October they would move up the Hudson into New York. The central frontier was now left without any regular British troops to protect it. Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia would have to protect themselves.

War on the Frontier

It soon became obvious that the frontier needed protection. One of the most famous captivity incidents of the war happened before the month of July was over. In southwestern Virginia at a place called Draper's Meadow, Mary Draper Ingles was captured in an Indian raid by Shawnee Indians.



She was carried with other members of her community across the Ohio River to a Shawnee town. Months later she was able to escape and make her way home by following the rivers she knew would lead her back to Virginia. This was just one of the many incidents of Indian attacks on the frontier to occur following Braddock's defeat. But it would get worse. In October there was a rash of attacks and many captives were carried off.

"I tremble at the consequences that this defeat may have upon our back settlers, who I suppose will all leave their habitation's unless there are proper measures taken for their security. Col. Dunbar, who commands at present, intends as soon as his Men are recruited at this place, to continue his March to Philadelphia for Winter Quarter's; consequently there will be no Men left here unless it is the shattered remains of the Virginia Troops; who are totally inadequate to the protection of the Frontiers."

G. Washington
Fort Cumberland, Maryland

The cold of winter brought a respite from war. However spring would come and with it renewed attacks. In April 1756 the fury of the Indians would devastate the settlements; these attacks would go unabated for two years –

the bloody years of the war on the frontier. This would continue until the next British army under Gen. John Forbes arrived to complete in 1758 the task that Gen. Braddock had begun. The years 1756-57 were a trying time for the settlers – a time of terror. Some left the frontier for safer areas; others stayed to fight for what little they had. Some died trying; others lived through it. For those who survived this time, it would deeply affect their lives. The experience of the defeat of a great British army and the years of struggle on the frontier played a great part in the rising spirit of independence that would change the course of history in 1776. But that is another story.



Timeline:

- July 9 The Battle of the Monongohela
- July 26 Last recorded survivor arrives at Ft. Cumberland; G.W. arrives home at Mount Vernon.
- July 30, 1755 Draper's Meadow attack; Mary Ingles carried to Ohio
- August 3 Army remnant crosses Potomac at Cox's (mouth of Little Cacapon)
- August 4 remnant arrives at Enoch's at Forks of Capon
- August 29, 1755 Remnant arrives at Philadelphia and encamps at Society Hill.
- Aug. 15, 1755 George Washington commissioned Commander of the Virginia Regiment
- April 1756 French and Indians begin savage campaign against soldiers and settlers on Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania frontiers.

Reference:

<http://www.fortedwards.org/braddock/braddock.htm>



John Campbell, the Fourth Earl of Loudon was a Scottish soldier in the British Army who was involved in the later stages of the Jacobite Rebellion. Described as incompetent, arrogant and tyrannical he nevertheless managed to make a career as a soldier and rose to the rank of Major General. His name will crop in several 'On this Day' posts on the blog over the next few weeks so it's worth giving some background to the man here.

Born in 1705 in Loudon Castle in Ayrshire. At 22 he joined the Royal Scots Greys and by 1737 he had purchased his way up to Captain. By then his father had died and he had become 4th Earl. 1741 saw him in the important post of governor of Stirling Castle and only a couple of years later he followed the army to Flanders. After service at Dettingen in 1743 he was appointed Aide-de-Camp to George II.

In 1745 Britain was at war with France. Extra troops were needed to fight in Flanders and the Independent Companies of the 43rd Highlanders of the Black Watch were assembled for overseas service. Their gendarme role in

the highlands was to be filled with a new regiment raised by Loudon.

Twelve companies of highlanders were raised in June 1745 but unfortunately for Loudon his regiment was to be put to the test sooner than he hoped.

The first blow came at Prestonpans in September 1745 when three companies were lost in the rout of Cope's army. Loudoun was serving as adjutant-general to Sir John Cope and was also at Prestonpans. He managed to escape capture and in October 1745 he was sent to Inverness to take command of the remaining companies of his 64th Highlanders scattered in barracks across the Highlands.

By early 1746 the Jacobites had [retreated from Derby](#) and were heading north to rendezvous at Inverness, which just happened to be Loudon's base.



The Royal Americans

A Reconnaissance from Raystown

Loudon gathered together his remaining companies of the 64th Highlanders at Inverness except for garrisons at Ruthven, Fort Augustus and Fort William. He also gathered some companies of loyal clans from the Northwest of Scotland. In all he had about 2,000 men under his command.

He failed in a disastrous attempt to intercept Prince Charles Edward south of

Inverness where his large force was routed by a small number of determined Jacobites. He realised his force of untrained regulars and hastily raised loyal clansmen were no match for the Jacobites. The clansmen who had seen off government forces at Prestonpans and Falkirk were left to march into Inverness virtually unopposed as Loudon retreated further north.

He was then outflanked at Dornoch by an amphibious landing of Jacobites and decided the North was too hot for him. He scattered his force and headed west, away from Cumberland's army. He saw the end of the Jacobite Rebellion whilst in Skye.

Although he had failed to stop any Jacobite force sent against him during his time in the North he had distracted large numbers of Jacobites away from the main force opposing Cumberland, and his presence at Inverness between October 1745 and February 1746 impeded Jacobites attempts to raise new recruits for their army.

After Culloden he was involved in pacifying the Highlands. Unlike the harsh treatment generally meted out by the Hanoverians, Loudon seems to have been relatively fair to his fellow countrymen.

His regiment was disbanded in 1748 after service in France, and in 1749 took command of the 30th Foot. In 1755 he was promoted to Major General.

His next major command was in North America where in 1756 he was sent to take over as Governor General of Virginia. Loudon had loyally served the Duke of Cumberland for many years and Cumberland repayed his loyalty with this important command.

This was during the Seven Years War against France and he was also given command of British forces in North America. Unfortunately for Loudon he often ignored the advice of local soldiers such as George Washington. He was outwitted by the French, and whilst his troops failed in their attack on the French-Canadian fort and town of Louisburg, it allowed Montcalm to take his army to capture the strategic British position of Fort William Henry.

Although Loudon was a good administrator and put in place many of the logistics needed to fight a war in such harsh conditions, he had overseen a string of reverses and was replaced by another Scot, James Abercrombie.

Britain was at war with France and Spain, and Major Generals were still needed so he was entrusted to garrisoning the captured French island of Belle Île. France had pretty much given up on recapturing the island so it should have been a safe posting for Loudon.

Events overtook the best plans of the War Office to keep Loudon out of

trouble. In 1762 Spain invaded Portugal. Loudon was the nearest spare British commander and he was sent from Belle Île. Luckily a more senior officer was there to take command of the combined Portuguese and British Army. William, Count of Schaumburg-Lippe who just happened to be one of the best commanders on either side during the war, repeatedly beat off Spanish attacks and eventually forced the Spanish back.

Loudon acted in Lippe's shadow until the Spanish were beaten, and once the Portuguese Army was rebuilt Lippe felt it safe to leave and Loudon took over as Commander in 1763.

That was pretty much the end of Loudon's less than glittering military career. The Seven Years War came to an end shortly after Loudon's promotion to Commander in Portugal. He returned home to the position of Governor of Edinburgh Castle and was made Colonel of the Scots Guards. He retired as General in 1770 and went home to improve his estate in Ayrshire where he took a notion to plant lots of willow trees.

He died unmarried aged 76 in 1782. He lived long enough to see some of his former Jacobite foes back in the fold raising regiments to fight against rebellious Americans. I wonder what he thought of his former enemies, now Hanoverians, fighting his former friends, now rebels.

Reference: <http://scottishmilitary.blogspot.com/2011/02/whos-who-in-scottish-military-history.html>



ABERCROMBIE (Abercromby), JAMES, army officer; b. 1732, probably in Scotland; d. 23 June 1775 at Boston, Mass.

James Abercrombie's family origins are uncertain but he may have been a relative of James Abercromby. On 11 June 1744 he was made lieutenant in the 1st Foot, which served in Flanders during the War of the Austrian Succession and in Scotland during the 1745 rebellion; this may have been his first commission. He was promoted captain in the 42nd Foot on 16 Feb. 1756, and in April of that year his regiment reached North America. By May 1757 Abercrombie was aide-de-camp to the Earl of Loudoun, commander-in-chief in America, and that summer he took part in Loudoun's abortive campaign against Louisbourg, Île Royale (Cape Breton Island) [see Charles Hay*].

After the army returned to New York Abercrombie went on reconnaissance and raiding missions with Robert Rogers' rangers; his knowledge of French was used in interrogating enemy deserters. In his reports to Loudoun he consistently urged aggressive tactics. By March 1758 he was aide-de-camp to Major-General Abercromby, who had succeeded Loudoun, and he reconnoitred Fort Carillon (Ticonderoga, N.Y.) before the unsuccessful attack that July. By December, with Jeffery Amherst the new commander-in-chief, young Abercrombie was in New York awaiting a new assignment; Amherst appointed him his aide-de-camp on 5 May 1759. His duties included examining and reporting on preparations for the coming campaign against Canada. Abercrombie was exasperated by the lack of aggressiveness of Amherst and Brigadier-General Thomas Gage, and he complained to Loudoun that by not taking Montreal they were missing a fine opportunity to relieve the pressure on Wolfe*'s army at Quebec. He was clearly a man of strong opinions and considerable self-confidence. His craving for action was partially satisfied by his participation in Joshua Loring's successful naval foray on Lake Champlain following the capture of forts Carillon and Saint-Frédéric (near Crown Point, N.Y.).



In the winter Abercrombie was summoned to London to testify at the court martial Lord Charles Hay had demanded to clear his name after the Loudoun expedition. While in London he secured the recommendation of General Sir John Ligonier, principal military adviser to William Pitt, that Amherst promote him major. Loudoun was likely influential in obtaining Ligonier's support. Abercrombie rejoined the army at Oswego, New York, in July 1760 and was soon commissioned major; on 7–8 September he was Amherst's emissary to Vaudreuil [Rigaud] in negotiating the capitulation of Montreal. His new commission was in the 78th Foot and he apparently joined the regiment after the surrender. It may have served in the Quebec area until disbanded in 1763. Major Abercrombie was placed on half pay.

On 27 March 1770 James Abercrombie returned to duty as lieutenant-colonel of the 22nd Foot, which was stationed in Britain. He took his unit to Ireland in late October 1773 and became acting commandant of the Dublin garrison. His letters to his friend and former patron, Loudoun, reveal Abercrombie as a man of refreshing candour and wry wit. Much as he disliked Dublin, he hoped that he would not be ordered to America where he believed Gage, the commander-in-chief, faced a most difficult situation. Nevertheless he was directed there on 3 March 1775.

Abercrombie reached Boston on 23 April and was immediately appointed adjutant general. He was as critical as ever of Gage's lack of initiative and of the low morale and lack of supplies in the besieged British force. By the end of May major-generals William Howe, John Burgoyne, and Henry Clinton had arrived to replace Frederick Haldimand on Gage's staff, and Abercrombie was shortly afterwards appointed to head a battalion of grenadiers. On 17 June he was wounded leading his men against the American positions near Bunker Hill; he died on 23 June and was buried at

King's Chapel, Boston. Abercrombie was later commended by Gage for his performance at Bunker Hill.

Peter E. Russell

[Secondary sources contain numerous unsupported references to the existence and nature of a family relationship between the subject of this biography and Major-General James Abercromby, commander-in-chief in America in 1758. He is described as the general's son in: *The national cyclopaedia of American biography* (57 v. to date, New York, 1892–), I; Wallace, *Macmillan dictionary*; Le Jeune, *Dictionnaire*, I; Amherst, *Journal* (Webster), 85. Two modern works refer to him as a nephew of his commander: Shy, *Toward Lexington*; J. R. Cuneo, *Robert Rogers of the rangers* (New York, 1959).

The general did have a son, James Abercromby, in the 42nd Foot during the Seven Years' War, but this young man was an ensign at the time that the subject was a captain; see the "List of commissions," *Military affairs in North America, 1748–65* (Pargellis), 332, and *Officers of the Black Watch, 1725–1952*, comp. Neil McMicking (rev. ed., Perth, Scot., 1953), 16. The subject's correspondence never refers to the general as his father and he consistently spells their names differently (he was a good speller for his time). Contemporary sources do not refer to him as the general's son or as James Abercromby Jr, and the ensign is explicitly designated as a son in the list cited above (Pargellis). It is therefore unlikely that the subject was the son of his famous near-namesake.

He may have been a relative. Two capable historians believe him to be a nephew, although his own correspondence makes no mention of such a relationship, nor does that of any contemporary. If he were a younger relative of the general, he may have been the "Jemmy Abercromby" of the 1st Foot who did an errand for and wrote to the famous Scottish philosopher David Hume in London in 1747: [David Hume], *The letters of David Hume*, ed. J. Y. T. Greig (2v., Oxford, 1932; repr. 1969). Hume was a friend of the general, then a colonel (*ibid.*, I, 102–8, 146–48, 190, 204; *DAB*, I, 28–29).

A third possibility has been advanced in T. N. Dupuy and G. M. Hammerman, *People and events of the American revolution* (New York, 1974), 279, and Boatner, *Encyclopedia of American revolution*, 1. These sources allege that the subject was not the son of Major-General James Abercromby but the brother of the future General Sir Ralph Abercromby; the latter was also a young officer in the Seven Years' War (European theatre) and became famous for successful campaigns in the West Indies in 1796 and Egypt in 1801. His biography is in the *DNB*, I, especially pp.43–44. He did have a brother James, but this officer was killed in action at Brooklyn in 1776 (*ibid.*). Their family, Abercrombie of Birkenbog, was related to that of the 1758 general, Abercromby of Glassaugh (*DAB*, I, 28–29; *DNB*, I, 43–44). p.e.r.]

THE CAMPAIGN OF TICONDEROGA 1758

BY FRANCIS PARKMAN

Ticonderoga

In the last year London called on the colonists for four thousand men. This year Pitt asked them for twenty thousand, and promised that the King would supply arms, ammunition, tents, and provisions, leaving to the provinces only the raising, clothing, and pay of their soldiers; and he added the assurance that Parliament would be asked to make some compensation even for these.[597] Thus encouraged, cheered by the removal of Loudon, and animated by the unwonted vigor of British military preparation, the several provincial assemblies voted men in abundance, though the usual vexatious delays took place in raising, equipping, and sending them to the field. In this connection, an able English writer has brought against the colonies, and especially against Massachusetts, charges which deserve attention. Viscount Bury says: "Of all the colonies, Massachusetts was the first which discovered the designs of the French and remonstrated against their aggressions; of all the colonies she most zealously promoted measures of union for the common defence, and made the greatest exertions in furtherance of her views." But he adds that there is a reverse to the picture, and that "this colony, so high-spirited, so warlike, and apparently so loyal, would never move hand or foot in her own defence till certain of repayment by the mother country." [598] The groundlessness of this charge is shown by abundant proofs, one of which will be enough. The Englishman Pownall, who had succeeded Shirley as royal governor of the province, made this year a report of its condition to Pitt. Massachusetts, he says, "has been the frontier and advanced guard of all the colonies against the enemy in Canada," and has always taken the lead in military affairs. In the three past years she has spent on the expeditions of Johnson, Winslow, and Loudon £242,356, besides about £45,000 a year to support the provincial government, at the same time maintaining a number of forts and garrisons, keeping up scouting-parties, and building, equipping, and manning a ship of twenty guns for the service of the King. In the first two months of the present year, 1758, she made a further military outlay of £172,239. Of all these sums she has received from Parliament a reimbursement of only £70,117, and hence she is deep in debt; yet, in addition, she has this year raised, paid, maintained, and clothed seven thousand soldiers placed under the command of General Abercromby, besides above twenty-five hundred more serving the King by land or sea; amounting in all to about one in four of her able-bodied men.

Massachusetts was extremely poor by the standards of the present day, living by fishing, farming, and a trade sorely hampered by the British navigation laws. Her contributions of money and men were not ordained by an absolute king, but made by the voluntary act of a free people. Pownall goes on to say that her present war-debt, due within three years, is 366,698 pounds sterling, and that to meet it she has imposed on herself taxes amounting, in the town of Boston, to thirteen shillings and twopence to every pound of income from real and personal estate; that her people are in distress, that she is anxious to continue her efforts in the public cause, but that without some further reimbursement she is exhausted and helpless.[599] Yet in the next year she incurred a new and heavy debt. In 1760 Parliament repaid her £59,575.[600] Far from being fully reimbursed, the end of the war found her on the brink of bankruptcy. Connecticut made equal sacrifices in the common cause,—highly to her honor, for she was little exposed to danger, being covered by the neighboring provinces; while impoverished New Hampshire put one in three of her able-bodied men into the field.[601]



In June the combined British and provincial force which Abercromby was to lead against Ticonderoga was gathered at the head of Lake George; while Montcalm lay at its outlet around the walls of the French stronghold, with an army not one fourth so numerous. Vaudreuil had devised a plan for saving Ticonderoga by a diversion into the valley of the Mohawk under Lévis, Rigaud, and Longueuil, with sixteen hundred men, who were to be joined by as many Indians. The English forts of that region were to be attacked, Schenectady threatened, and the Five Nations compelled to declare for France.[602] Thus, as the Governor gave out, the English would be forced to cease from aggression, leave Montcalm in peace, and think only of defending themselves.[603] "This," writes Bougainville on the fifteenth of June, "is what M. de Vaudreuil thinks will happen, because he never doubts anything. Ticonderoga, which is the point really threatened, is abandoned without support to the troops of the line and their general. It

would even be wished that they might meet a reverse, if the consequences to the colony would not be too disastrous."

The proposed movement promised, no doubt, great advantages; but it was not destined to take effect. Some rangers taken on Lake George by a partisan officer named Langy declared with pardonable exaggeration that twenty-five or thirty thousand men would attack Ticonderoga in less than a fortnight. Vaudreuil saw himself forced to abandon his Mohawk expedition, and to order Lévis and his followers, who had not yet left Montreal, to reinforce Montcalm.[604] Why they did not go at once is not clear. The Governor declares that there were not boats enough. From whatever cause, there was a long delay, and Montcalm was left to defend himself as he could.



Fort Ticonderoga and Lake Champlain from Mt. Defiance

He hesitated whether he should not fall back to Crown Point. The engineer, Lotbinière, opposed the plan, as did also Le Mercier.[605] It was but a choice of difficulties, and he stayed at Ticonderoga. His troops were disposed as they had been in the summer before; one battalion, that of Berry, being left near the fort, while the main body, under Montcalm himself, was encamped by the saw-mill at the Falls, and the rest, under

Bourlamaque, occupied the head of the portage, with a small advanced force at the landing-place on Lake George. It remained to determine at which of these points he should concentrate them and make his stand against the English. Ruin threatened him in any case; each position had its fatal weakness or its peculiar danger, and his best hope was in the ignorance or blundering of his enemy. He seems to have been several days in a state of indecision.



In the afternoon of the fifth of July the partisan Langy, who had again gone out to reconnoitre towards the head of Lake George, came back in haste with the report that the English were embarked in great force. Montcalm sent a canoe down Lake Champlain to hasten Lévis to his aid, and

ordered the battalion of Berry to begin a breastwork and abattis on the high ground in front of the fort. That they were not begun before shows that he was in doubt as to his plan of defence; and that his whole army was not now set to work at them shows that his doubt was still unsolved.

It was nearly a month since Abercromby had begun his camp at the head of Lake George. Here, on the ground where Johnson had beaten Dieskau, where Montcalm had planted his batteries, and Monro vainly defended the wooden ramparts of Fort William Henry, were now assembled more than fifteen thousand men; and the shores, the foot of the mountains, and the broken plains between them were studded thick with tents. Of regulars there were six thousand three hundred and sixty-seven, officers and soldiers, and of provincials nine thousand and thirty-four.[606] To the New England levies, or at least to their chaplains, the expedition seemed a crusade against the abomination of Babylon; and they discoursed in their sermons of Moses sending forth Joshua against Amalek. Abercromby, raised to his place by political influence, was little but the nominal commander. "A heavy man," said Wolfe in a letter to his father; "an aged gentleman, infirm in body and mind," wrote William Parkman, a boy of seventeen, who carried a musket in a Massachusetts regiment, and kept in his knapsack a dingy little notebook, in which he jotted down what passed each day.[607] The age of the aged gentleman was fifty-two.

Pitt meant that the actual command of the army should be in the hands of Brigadier Lord Howe,[608] and he was in fact its real chief; "the noblest Englishman that has appeared in my time, and the best soldier in the British army," says Wolfe.[609] And he elsewhere speaks of him as "that great man." Abercromby testifies to the universal respect and love with which officers and men regarded him, and Pitt calls him "a character of ancient times; a complete model of military virtue." [610] High as this praise is, it seems to have been deserved. The young nobleman, who was then in his thirty-fourth year, had the qualities of a leader of men. The army felt him, from general to drummer-boy. He was its soul; and while breathing into it his own energy and ardor, and bracing it by stringent discipline, he broke through the traditions of the service and gave it new shapes to suit the time and place. During the past year he had studied the art of forest warfare, and joined Rogers and his rangers in their scouting-parties, sharing all their hardships and making himself one of them. Perhaps the reforms that he introduced were fruits of this rough self-imposed schooling. He made officers and men throw off all useless incumbrances, cut their hair close, wear leggings to protect them from briars, brown the barrels of their muskets, and carry in their knapsacks thirty pounds of meal, which they cooked for themselves; so that, according to an admiring Frenchman, they could live a month without their supply-

trains.[611] "You would laugh to see the droll figure we all make," writes an officer. "Regulars as well as provincials have cut their coats so as scarcely to reach their waists. No officer or private is allowed to carry more than one blanket and a bearskin. A small portmanteau is allowed each officer. No women follow the camp to wash our linen. Lord Howe has already shown an example by going to the brook and washing his own."[612]



Lake George

Here, as in all things, he shared the lot of the soldier, and required his officers to share it. A story is told of him that before the army embarked he invited some of them to dinner in his tent, where they found no seats but logs, and no carpet but bear-skins. A servant presently placed on the ground a large dish of pork and peas, on which his lordship took from his pocket a sheath containing a knife and fork and began to cut the meat. The guests looked on in some embarrassment; upon which he said: "Is it possible, gentlemen, that you have come on this campaign without providing yourselves with what is necessary?" And he gave each of them a sheath, with a knife and fork, like his own.

Yet this Lycurgus of the camp, as a contemporary calls him, is described as a man of social accomplishments rare even in his rank. He

made himself greatly beloved by the provincial officers, with many of whom he was on terms of intimacy, and he did what he could to break down the barriers between the colonial soldiers and the British regulars. When he was at Alban, sharing with other high officers the kindly hospitalities of Mrs. Schuyler, he so won the heart of that excellent matron that she loved him like a son; and, though not given to such effusion, embraced him with tears on the morning when he left her to lead his division to the lake.[613] In Westminster Abbey may be seen the tablet on which Massachusetts pays grateful tribute to his virtues, and commemorates "the affection her officers and soldiers bore to his command."



On the evening of the fourth of July, baggage, stores, and ammunition were all on board the boats, and the whole army embarked on the morning of the fifth. The arrangements were perfect. Each corps marched without confusion to its appointed station on the beach, and the sun was scarcely above the ridge of French Mountain when all were afloat. A spectator watching them from the shore says that when the fleet was three miles on its way, the surface of the lake at that distance was completely hidden from sight.[614] There were nine hundred bateaux, a hundred and thirty-five whaleboats, and a large number of heavy flatboats carrying the artillery. The whole advanced in three divisions, the regulars in the centre, and the provincials on the flanks. Each corps had its flags and its music. The day was fair and men and officers were in the highest spirits.

Before ten o'clock they began to enter the Narrows; and the boats of the three divisions extended themselves into long files as the mountains closed on either hand upon the contracted lake. From front to rear the line was six miles long. The spectacle was superb: the brightness of the summer day; the romantic beauty of the scenery; the sheen and sparkle of those crystal waters; the countless islets, tufted with pine, birch, and fir; the bordering mountains, with their green summits and sunny crags; the flash of oars and glitter of weapons; the banners, the varied uniforms, and the notes of bugle, trumpet, bagpipe, and drum, answered and prolonged by a hundred woodland echoes. "I never beheld so delightful a prospect," wrote a wounded officer at Albany a fortnight after.



Fort Carillon Battlefield

Rogers with the rangers, and Gage with the light infantry, led the way in whaleboats, followed by Bradstreet with his corps of boatmen, armed and drilled as soldiers. Then came the main body. The central column of regulars was commanded by Lord Howe, his own regiment, the fifty-fifth, in the van, followed by the Royal Americans, the twenty-seventh, forty-fourth, forty-sixth, and eightieth infantry, and the Highlanders of the forty-second, with their major, Duncan Campbell of Inverawe, silent and gloomy amid the general cheer, for his soul was dark with foreshadowings of death.[615] With this central column came what are described as two floating castles, which were no doubt batteries to cover the landing of the troops. On the right hand and the left were the provincials, uniformed in blue, regiment after regiment, from Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Rhode Island. Behind them all came the bateaux, loaded with stores and baggage, and the heavy flatboats that carried the artillery, while a rear-guard of provincials and regulars closed the long procession.[616]

At five in the afternoon they reached Sabbath-Day Point, twenty-five miles down the lake, where they stopped till late in the evening, waiting for the baggage and artillery, which had lagged behind; and here Lord Howe, lying on a bearskin by the side of the ranger, John Stark, questioned him as to the position of Ticonderoga and its best points of approach. At about eleven o'clock they set out again, and at daybreak entered what was then called the Second Narrows; that is to say, the contraction of the lake where it approaches its outlet. Close on their left, ruddy in the warm sunrise, rose the vast bare face of Rogers Rock, whence a French advanced party, under Langy and an officer named Trepezec, was watching their movements. Lord Howe, with Rogers and Bradstreet, went in whaleboats to reconnoitre the landing. At the place which the French called the Burnt Camp, where Montcalm had embarked the summer before, they saw a detachment of the enemy too weak to oppose them. Their men landed and drove them off. At noon the whole army was on shore. Rogers, with a party of rangers, was ordered forward to reconnoitre, and the troops were formed for the march.




From this part of the shore[617] a plain covered with forest stretched northwestward half a mile or more to the mountains behind which lay the valley of Trout Brook. On this plain the army began its march in four columns, with the intention of passing round the western bank of the river of the outlet, since the bridge over it had been destroyed. Rogers, with the provincial regiments of Fitch and Lyman, led the way, at some distance before the rest. The forest was extremely dense and heavy, and so obstructed with undergrowth that it was impossible to see more than a few yards in any direction, while the ground was encumbered with fallen trees in

every stage of decay. The ranks were broken, and the men struggled on as they could in dampness and shade, under a canopy of boughs that the sun could scarcely pierce. The difficulty increased when, after advancing about a mile, they came upon undulating and broken ground. They were now not far from the upper rapids of the outlet. The guides became bewildered in the maze of trunks and boughs; the marching columns were confused, and fell in one upon the other. They were in the strange situation of an army lost in the woods.

The advanced party of French under Langy and Trepezec, about three hundred and fifty in all, regulars and Canadians, had tried to retreat; but before they could do so, the whole English army had passed them, landed, and placed itself between them and their countrymen. They had no resource but to take to the woods. They seem to have climbed the steep gorge at the side of Rogers Rock and followed the Indian path that led to the valley of Trout Brook, thinking to descend it, and, by circling along the outskirts of the valley of Ticonderoga, reach Montcalm's camp at the saw-mill. Langy was used to bushranging; but he too became perplexed in the blind intricacies of the forest. Towards the close of the day he and his men had come out from the valley of Trout Brook, and were near the junction of that stream with the river of the outlet, in a state of some anxiety, for they could see nothing but brown trunks and green boughs. Could any of them have climbed one of the great pines that here and there reared their shaggy spires high above the surrounding forest, they would have discovered where they were, but would have gained not the faintest knowledge of the enemy. Out of the woods on the right they would have seen a smoke rising from the burning huts of the French camp at the head of the portage, which Bourslamaque had set on fire and abandoned. At a mile or more in front, the saw-mill at the Falls might perhaps have been descried, and, by glimpses between the trees, the tents of the neighboring camp where Montcalm still lay with his main force. All the rest seemed lonely as the grave; mountain and valley lay wrapped in primeval woods, and none could have dreamed that, not far distant, an army was groping its way, buried in foliage; no rumbling of wagons and artillery trains, for none were there; all silent but the cawing of some crow flapping his black wings over the sea of tree-tops.

Lord Howe, with Major Israel Putnam and two hundred rangers, was at the head of the principal column, which was a little in advance of the three others. Suddenly the challenge, *Qui vive!* rang sharply from the thickets in front. *Français!* was the reply. Langy's men were not deceived; they fired out of the bushes. The shots were returned; a hot skirmish followed; and Lord Howe dropped dead, shot through the breast. All was confusion. The dull, vicious reports of musketry in thick woods, at first few and scattering,

then in fierce and rapid volleys, reached the troops behind. They could hear, but see nothing. Already harassed and perplexed, they became perturbed. For all they knew, Montcalm's whole army was upon them. Nothing prevented a panic but the steadiness of the rangers, who maintained the fight alone till the rest came back to their senses. Rogers, with his reconnoitring party, and the regiments of Fitch and Lyman, were at no great distance in front. They all turned on hearing the musketry, and thus the French were caught between two fires. They fought with desperation. About fifty of them at length escaped; a hundred and forty-eight were captured, and the rest killed or drowned in trying to cross the rapids. The loss of the English was small in numbers, but immeasurable in the death of Howe. "The fall of this noble and brave officer," says Rogers, "seemed to produce an almost general languor and consternation through the whole army." "In Lord Howe," writes another contemporary, Major Thomas Mante, "the soul of General Abercromby's army seemed to expire. From the unhappy moment the General was deprived of his advice, neither order nor discipline was observed, and a strange kind of infatuation usurped the place of resolution." The death of one man was the ruin of fifteen thousand.



The evil news was despatched to Albany, and in two or three days the messenger who bore it passed the house of Mrs. Schuyler on the meadows above the town. "In the afternoon," says her biographer, "a man was seen coming from the north galloping violently without his hat. Pedrom, as he was familiarly called, Colonel Schuyler's only surviving brother, was with her, and ran instantly to inquire, well knowing that he rode express. The

man galloped on, crying out that Lord Howe was killed. The mind of our good aunt had been so engrossed by her anxiety and fears for the event impending, and so impressed with the merit and magnanimity of her favorite hero, that her wonted firmness sank under the stroke, and she broke out into bitter lamentations. This had such an effect on her friends and domestics that shrieks and sobs of anguish echoed through every part of the house."

The effect of the loss was seen at once. The army was needlessly kept under arms all night in the forest, and in the morning was ordered back to the landing whence it came.[618] Towards noon, however, Bradstreet was sent with a detachment of regulars and provincials to take possession of the saw-mill at the Falls, which Montcalm had abandoned the evening before. Bradstreet rebuilt the bridges destroyed by the retiring enemy, and sent word to his commander that the way was open; on which Abercromby again put his army in motion, reached the Falls late in the afternoon, and occupied the deserted encampment of the French.



Montcalm with his main force had held this position at the Falls through most of the preceding day, doubtful, it seems, to the last whether he should not make his final stand there. Bourlamaque was for doing so; but two old officers, Bernès and Montguy, pointed out the danger that the English would occupy the neighboring heights;[619] whereupon Montcalm

at length resolved to fall back. The camp was broken up at five o'clock. Some of the troops embarked in bateaux, while others marched a mile and a half along the forest road, passed the place where the battalion of Berry was still at work on the breastwork begun in the morning, and made their bivouac a little farther on, upon the cleared ground that surrounded the fort.



The peninsula of Ticonderoga consists of a rocky plateau, with low grounds on each side, bordering Lake Champlain on the one hand, and the outlet of Lake George on the other. The fort stood near the end of the peninsula, which points towards the southeast. Thence, as one goes westward, the ground declines a little, and then slowly rises, till, about half a mile from the fort, it reaches its greatest elevation, and begins still more gradually to decline again. Thus a ridge is formed across the plateau between the steep declivities that sink to the low grounds on right and left. Some weeks before, a French officer named Hugues had suggested the defence of this ridge by means of an abattis.[620] Montcalm approved his plan; and now, at the eleventh hour, he resolved to make his stand here. The two engineers, Pontleroy and Desandrouin, had already traced the outline of the works, and the soldiers of the battalion of Berry had made some progress in constructing them. At dawn of the seventh, while Abercromby, fortunately for his enemy, was drawing his troops back to the landing-place, the whole French army fell to their task.

The regimental colors were planted along the line, and the officers, stripped to the shirt, took axe in hand and labored with their men. The trees that covered the ground were hewn down by thousands, the tops lopped off, and the trunks piled one upon another to form a massive breastwork. The line followed the top of the ridge, along which it zig-zagged in such a manner that the whole front could be swept by flank-fires of musketry and grape. Abercromby describes the wall of logs as between eight and nine feet high;[621] in which case there must have been a rude *banquette*, or platform to fire from, on the inner side. It was certainly so high that nothing could be seen over it but the crowns of the soldiers' hats. The upper tier was formed of single logs, in which notches were cut to serve as loopholes; and in some places sods and bags of sand were piled along the top, with narrow spaces to fire through.[622] From the central part of the line the ground sloped away like a natural glacis; while at the sides, and especially on the left, it was undulating and broken. Over this whole space, to the distance of a musket-shot from the works, the forest was cut down, and the trees left lying where they fell among the stumps, with tops turned outwards, forming one vast abattis, which, as a Massachusetts officer says, looked like a forest laid flat by a hurricane.[623] But the most formidable obstruction was immediately along the front of the breastwork, where the ground was covered with heavy boughs, overlapping and interlaced, with sharpened points bristling into the face of the assailant like the quills of a porcupine. As these works were all of wood, no vestige of them remains. The earthworks now shown to tourists as the lines of Montcalm are of later construction; and though on the same ground, are not on the same plan.[624]

Here, then, was a position which, if attacked in front with musketry alone, might be called impregnable. But would Abercromby so attack it? He had several alternatives. He might attempt the flank and rear of his enemy by way of the low grounds on the right and left of the plateau, a movement which the precautions of Montcalm had made difficult, but not impossible. Or, instead of leaving his artillery idle on the strand of Lake George, he might bring it to the front and batter the breastwork, which, though impervious to musketry, was worthless against heavy cannon. Or he might do what Burgoyne did with success a score of years later, and plant a battery on the heights of Rattlesnake Hill, now called Mount Defiance, which commanded the position of the French, and whence the inside of their breastwork could be scoured with round-shot from end to end. Or, while threatening the French front with a part of his army, he could march the rest a short distance through the woods on his left to the road which led from Ticonderoga to Crown Point, and which would soon have brought him to the place called Five-Mile Point, where Lake Champlain

narrows to the width of an easy rifle-shot, and where a battery of field-pieces would have cut off all Montcalm's supplies and closed his only way of retreat. As the French were provisioned for but eight days, their position would thus have been desperate. They plainly saw the danger; and Doreil declares that had the movement been made, their whole army must have surrendered.[625] Montcalm had done what he could; but the danger of his position was inevitable and extreme. His hope lay in Abercromby; and it was a hope well founded. The action of the English general answered the utmost wishes of his enemy.



The French Lines at Fort Ticonderoga

Abercromby had been told by his prisoners that Montcalm had six thousand men, and that three thousand more were expected every hour. Therefore he was in haste to attack before these succors could arrive. As was the general, so was the army. "I believe," writes an officer, "we were one and all infatuated by a notion of carrying every obstacle by a mere *coup de mousqueterie*."[626] Leadership perished with Lord Howe, and nothing was left but blind, headlong valor.

Clerk, chief engineer, was sent to reconnoitre the French works from Mount Defiance; and came back with the report that, to judge from what he could see, they might be carried by assault. Then, without waiting to bring up his cannon, Abercromby prepared to storm the lines.

The French finished their breastwork and abattis on the evening of the seventh, encamped behind them, slung their kettles, and rested after their heavy toil. Lévis had not yet appeared; but at twilight one of his officers, Captain Pouchot, arrived with three hundred regulars, and announced that his commander would come before morning with a hundred more. The reinforcement, though small, was welcome, and Lévis was a host in himself. Pouchot was told that the army was half a mile off. Thither he repaired, made his report to Montcalm, and looked with amazement at the prodigious amount of work accomplished in one day.[627] Lévis himself arrived in the course of the night, and approved the arrangement of the troops. They lay behind their lines till daybreak; then the drums beat, and they formed in order of battle.[628] The battalions of La Sarre and Languedoc were posted on the left, under Bourlamaque, the first battalion of Berry with that of Royal Roussillon in the centre, under Montcalm, and those of La Reine, Béarn, and Guienne on the right, under Lévis. A detachment of volunteers occupied the low grounds between the breastwork and the outlet of Lake George; while, at the foot of the declivity on the side towards Lake Champlain, were stationed four hundred and fifty colony regulars and Canadians, behind an abattis which they had made for themselves; and as they were covered by the cannon of the fort, there was some hope that they would check any flank movement which the English might attempt on that side. Their posts being thus assigned, the men fell to work again to strengthen their defences. Including those who came with Lévis, the total force of effective soldiers was now thirty-six hundred.[629]

Soon after nine o'clock a distant and harmless fire of small-arms began on the slopes of Mount Defiance. It came from a party of Indians who had just arrived with Sir William Johnson, and who, after amusing themselves in this manner for a time, remained for the rest of the day safe spectators of the fight. The soldiers worked undisturbed till noon, when volleys of musketry were heard from the forest in front. It was the English light troops driving in the French pickets. A cannon was fired as a signal to drop tools and form for battle. The white uniforms lined the breastwork in a triple row, with the grenadiers behind them as a reserve, and the second battalion of Berry watching the flanks and rear.

Meanwhile the English army had moved forward from its camp by the saw-mill. First came the rangers, the light infantry, and Bradstreet's armed boatmen, who, emerging into the open space, began a spattering fire. Some of the provincial troops followed, extending from left to right, and opening fire in turn; then the regulars, who had formed in columns of attack under cover of the forest, advanced their solid red masses into the sunlight, and passing through the intervals between the provincial regiments, pushed forward to the assault. Across the rough ground, with its maze of fallen

trees whose leaves hung withering in the July sun, they could see the top of the breastwork, but not the men behind it; when, in an instant, all the line was obscured by a gush of smoke, a crash of exploding firearms tore the air, and grapeshot and musket-balls swept the whole space like a tempest; "a damnable fire," says an officer who heard them screaming about his ears. The English had been ordered to carry the works with the bayonet; but their ranks were broken by the obstructions through which they struggled in vain to force their way, and they soon began to fire in turn. The storm raged in full fury for an hour. The assailants pushed close to the breastwork; but there they were stopped by the bristling mass of sharpened branches, which they could not pass under the murderous cross-fires that swept them from front and flank. At length they fell back, exclaiming that the works were impregnable. Abercromby, who was at the saw-mill, a mile and a half in the rear, sent order to attack again, and again they came on as before.



View of the fort after the Battle of Ticonderoga

The scene was frightful: masses of infuriated men who could not go forward and would not go back; straining for an enemy they could not reach, and firing on an enemy they could not see; caught in the entanglement of fallen trees; tripped by briers, stumbling over logs, tearing through boughs; shouting, yelling, cursing, and pelted all the while with bullets that killed them by scores, stretched them on the ground, or hung them on jagged branches in strange attitudes of death. The provincials supported the regulars with spirit, and some of them forced their way to the foot of the wooden wall.

The French fought with the intrepid gayety of their nation, and shouts of *Vive le Roi!* and *Vive notre General!* mingled with the din of musketry.

Montcalm, with his coat off, for the day was hot, directed the defence of the centre, and repaired to any part of the line where the danger for the time seemed greatest. He is warm in praise of his enemy, and declares that between one and seven o'clock they attacked him six successive times.

Early in the action Abercromby tried to turn the French left by sending twenty bateaux, filled with troops, down the outlet of Lake George. They were met by the fire of the volunteers stationed to defend the low grounds on that side, and, still advancing, came within range of the cannon of the fort, which sank two of them and drove back the rest.

A curious incident happened during one of the attacks. De Bassignac, a captain in the battalion of Royal Roussillon, tied his handkerchief to the end of a musket and waved it over the breastwork in defiance. The English mistook it for a sign of surrender, and came forward with all possible speed, holding their muskets crossed over their heads in both hands, and crying *Quarter*. The French made the same mistake; and thinking that their enemies were giving themselves up as prisoners, ceased firing, and mounted on the top of the breastwork to receive them. Captain Pouchot, astonished, as he says, to see them perched there, looked out to learn the cause, and saw that the enemy meant anything but surrender. Whereupon he shouted with all his might: "*Tirez! Tirez! Ne voyez-vous pas que ces gens-là vont vous enlever?*" The soldiers, still standing on the breastwork, instantly gave the English a volley, which killed some of them, and sent back the rest discomfited.[630]

This was set to the account of Gallic treachery. "Another deceit the enemy put upon us," says a military letter-writer: "they raised their hats above the breastwork, which our people fired at; they, having loopholes to fire through, and being covered by the sods, we did them little damage, except shooting their hats to pieces." [631] In one of the last assaults a soldier of the Rhode Island regiment, William Smith, managed to get through all obstructions and ensconce himself close under the breastwork, where in the confusion he remained for a time unnoticed, improving his advantages meanwhile by shooting several Frenchmen. Being at length observed, a soldier fired vertically down upon him and wounded him severely, but not enough to prevent his springing up, striking at one of his enemies over the top of the wall, and braining him with his hatchet. A British officer who saw the feat, and was struck by the reckless daring of the man, ordered two regulars to bring him off; which, covered by a brisk fire of musketry, they succeeded in doing. A letter from the camp two or three weeks later reports him as in a fair way to recover, being, says the writer, much braced and invigorated by his anger against the French, on whom he was swearing to have his revenge.[632]

Toward five o'clock two English columns joined in a most determined assault on the extreme right of the French, defended by the battalions of Guienne and Béarn. The danger for a time was imminent. Montcalm hastened to the spot with the reserves. The assailants hewed their way to the foot of the breastwork; and though again and again repulsed, they again and again renewed the attack. The Highlanders fought with stubborn and unconquerable fury. "Even those who were mortally wounded," writes one of their lieutenants, "cried to their companions not to lose a thought upon them, but to follow their officers and mind the honor of their country. Their ardor was such that it was difficult to bring them off." [633] Their major, Campbell of Inverawe, found his foreboding true. He received a mortal shot, and his clansmen bore him from the field. Twenty-five of their officers were killed or wounded, and half the men fell under the deadly fire that poured from the loopholes. Captain John Campbell and a few followers tore their way through the abattis, climbed the breastwork, leaped down among the French, and were bayoneted there. [634]



As the colony troops and Canadians on the low ground were left undisturbed, Lévis sent them an order to make a sortie and attack the left flank of the charging columns. They accordingly posted themselves among the trees along the declivity, and fired upwards at the enemy, who presently shifted their position to the right, out of the line of shot. The assault still continued, but in vain; and at six there was another effort, equally fruitless. From this time till half-past seven a lingering fight was

kept up by the rangers and other provincials, firing from the edge of the woods and from behind the stumps, bushes, and fallen trees in front of the lines. Its only objects were to cover their comrades, who were collecting and bringing off the wounded, and to protect the retreat of the regulars, who fell back in disorder to the Falls. As twilight came on, the last combatant withdrew, and none were left but the dead. Abercromby had lost in killed, wounded, and missing, nineteen hundred and forty-four officers and men.[635] The loss of the French, not counting that of Langy's detachment, was three hundred and seventy-seven. Bourlamaque was dangerously wounded; Bougainville slightly; and the hat of Lévis was twice shot through.[636]

Montcalm, with a mighty load lifted from his soul, passed along the lines, and gave the tired soldiers the thanks they nobly deserved. Beer, wine, and food were served out to them, and they bivouacked for the night on the level ground between the breastwork and the fort. The enemy had met a terrible rebuff; yet the danger was not over. Abercromby still had more than thirteen thousand men, and he might renew the attack with cannon. But, on the morning of the ninth, a band of volunteers who had gone out to watch him brought back the report that he was in full retreat. The saw-mill at the Falls was on fire, and the last English soldier was gone. On the morning of the tenth, Lévis, with a strong detachment, followed the road to the landing-place, and found signs that a panic had overtaken the defeated troops. They had left behind several hundred barrels of provisions and a large quantity of baggage; while in a marshy place that they had crossed was found a considerable number of their shoes, which had stuck in the mud, and which they had not stopped to recover. They had embarked on the morning after the battle, and retreated to the head of the lake in a disorder and dejection wofully contrasted with the pomp of their advance. A gallant army was sacrificed by the blunders of its chief.

Montcalm announced his victory to his wife in a strain of exaggeration that marks the exaltation of his mind. "Without Indians, almost without Canadians or colony troops,—I had only four hundred,—alone with Lévis and Bourlamaque and the troops of the line, thirty-one hundred fighting men, I have beaten an army of twenty-five thousand. They repassed the lake precipitately, with a loss of at least five thousand. This glorious day does infinite honor to the valor of our battalions. I have no time to write more. I am well, my dearest, and I embrace you." And he wrote to his friend Doreil: "The army, the too-small army of the King, has beaten the enemy. What a day for France! If I had had two hundred Indians to send out at the head of a thousand picked men under the Chevalier de Lévis, not many would have escaped. Ah, my dear Doreil, what soldiers are ours! I never saw the like. Why were they not at Louisbourg?"

On the morrow of his victory he caused a great cross to be planted on the battle-field, inscribed with these lines, composed by the soldier-scholar himself,—

"Quid dux? quid miles? quid strata ingentia ligna?
En Signum! en victor! Deus hîc, Deus ipse triumphat."

"Soldier and chief and rampart's strength are nought;
Behold the conquering Cross! 'T is God the triumph wrought."[637]

[Footnote 637: Along with the above paraphrase I may give that of Montcalm himself, which was also inscribed on the cross:—

"Chrétien! ce ne fut point Montcalm et la prudence,
Ces arbres renversés, ces héros, leurs exploits,
Qui des Anglais confus ont brisé l'espérance;
C'est le bras de ton Dieu, vainqueur sur cette croix."

In the same letter in which Montcalm sent these lines to his mother he says: "Je vous envoie, pour vous amuser, deux chansons sur le combat du 8 Juillet, dont l'une est en style des poissardes de Paris." One of these songs, which were written by soldiers after the battle, begins,—

"Je chante des François
La valeur et la gloire,
Qui toujours sur l'Anglois
Remportent la victoire.
Ce sont des héros,
Tous nos généraux,
Et Montcalm et Lévis,
Et Bourlamaque aussi."

"Mars, qui les engendra
Pour l'honneur de la France,
D'abord les anima
De sa haute vaillance,
Et les transporta
Dans le Canada,
Où l'on voit les François
Culbuter les Anglois."

The other effusion of the military muse is in a different strain, "en style des poissardes de Paris." The following a specimen, given *literatim*:—

"L'aumônier fit l'exhortation,

Puis il donnit l'absolution;
Aisément cela se peut croire.
Enfants, dit-il, animez-vous!
L'bon Dieu, sa mère, tout est pour vous.
S—é! j'sommes catholiques. Les Anglois sont des hérétiques.

"Ce sont des chiens; à coups d'pieds, a coups d'poings faut leur casser la
gueule et la mâchoire."

"Soldats, officiers, généraux,
Chacun en ce jour fut héros.
Aisément cela se peut croire.
Montcalm, comme défunt Annibal,
S'montroit soldat et général.
S—é! sil y avoit quelqu'un qui ne l'aimit point!"

"Je veux être un chien; à coups d'pieds, a coups d'poings, j'lui cass'rai la
gueule et la mâchoire."

This is an allusion to Vaudreuil. On the battle of Ticonderoga, see



MURRAY, JAMES, army officer and colonial administrator; b. 21 Jan. 1721/22 at Ballencrieff (Lothian), the family seat in Scotland, fifth son and 14th child of Alexander Murray, 4th Baron Elibank, and Elizabeth Stirling; m. 17 Dec. 1748 Cordelia Collier, d. 26 June 1779; m. secondly on 14 March 1780 on Minorca, Anne Witham (Whitham), d. 2 Aug. 1784, and they had six children, four of whom reached maturity; d. 18 June 1794 at Beauport House, near Battle, Sussex, England.

On 6 Dec. 1736, fresh from the schooling of William Dyce in Selkirk, James Murray enrolled as a cadet in Colyear's regiment, part of the Scots brigade of the Dutch army, then stationed at Ypres (Belgium). In February 1739/40 he joined the British army as a second lieutenant with the 4th Marines (Wynyard's) but in November 1741 transferred as a captain to the 15th Foot, with which he remained till 1759. In January 1749/50 he purchased the majority, and a year later the lieutenant-colonelcy, of his regiment. From October 1759 he was colonel commandant of the 2nd battalion of the Royal Americans (60th Foot), and in July 1762 he was promoted major-general. Appointed governor of the garrison of Quebec on 12 Oct. 1759, he became governor of the District of Quebec on 27 Oct. 1760 and governor of the province on 21 Nov. 1763.

During these years as a professional soldier, Murray saw a fair amount of active service. From November 1740 to December 1742 he was in the West Indies, where he took part in the attack on Cartagena (Colombia) and the Cuban operations; from July to October 1745 he fought in Flanders,

being seriously wounded in the defence of Ostend (Belgium), and in September 1746 he participated in the Lorient expedition. During the Seven Years' War he was with the 15th for the attempt on Rochefort, France, in September 1757, and from 1758 to 1760 he was in North America. He served under James [Wolfe*](#) at the siege of Louisbourg, Île Royale (Cape Breton Island), in 1758, and the following year at the siege of Quebec, where he commanded the left wing of the battle line on the Plains of Abraham. Left in charge of Quebec during the winter of 1759–60, he was forced to retreat inside the walls after the battle of Sainte-Foy on 28 April 1760; however, he managed to hold the city until the arrival of a British squadron in May [see Robert [Swanton*](#)]. The next month he set off up the St Lawrence to rendezvous with William [Haviland](#) and Jeffery [Amherst](#) and force the capitulation of Montreal in September.



Raid on Miramichi Bay

As a military commander Murray has been criticized as "hot-headed and impetuous, inclined to underrate the offensive power of his opponents"; he has also been acclaimed as "a man of the most ardent and intrepid courage, passionately desirous of glory." Wolfe held him in high regard, commending his "infinite spirit" and "great services" during the Louisbourg campaign, and personally selecting him as the junior brigadier at the siege of Quebec. For Murray, however, the latter was not an unqualified success. Although he joined Robert [Monckton](#) and George [Townshend*](#), the other brigadiers, in urging the establishment of a force above the city, he did not, as he later claimed, recommend "the very place" where Wolfe landed; and if he maintained that a "superior authority" checked his pursuit of the French right flank, no evidence has been found to support this disclaimer of a costly tactical error. In any event, Murray was dissatisfied with both the

reporting of his conduct and the amount of credit he was given for the victory.

Still more controversy surrounds his defence of Quebec. Lacking sufficient funds, adequate supplies of fuel, and fresh provisions, and with a garrison of some 6,000 able-bodied men, whom illness reduced to fewer than 4,000 during the winter, when confronted in late April by a force almost twice his strength, he decided, characteristically, to attack. The resulting battle has generally been considered a British defeat, though again Murray defended not only his conduct but his decision to fight. At any rate, from a strategic viewpoint, judgements range from the opinion that his losses might have incited [Lévis](#) to assault the city if the British fleet had not arrived in time, through the conviction that Lévis would not have chanced an assault unless the French fleet had arrived first, to the view that Lévis suffered a mauling that left him incapable of preventing Murray's advance to Montreal and that the battle of Sainte-Foy thus played a crucial part in the conquest.



Raid on Gaspé

Following the capitulation of Montreal on 8 Sept. 1760, Canada was subjected to a military régime. The colony was divided into three independently administered districts – Quebec, Trois-Rivières, and Montreal – which were placed under Murray, Ralph [Burton*](#), and Thomas [Gage](#) respectively, each of them being in turn responsible to Amherst, the commander-in-chief, in New York. On the establishment of civil government, proclaimed in Britain on 7 Nov. 1763 and inaugurated in Canada on 10 Aug. 1764, the districts were united into the province of Quebec. Provision was made for Murray, as governor, to be assisted by two lieutenant governors, but these positions were discontinued after both Gage and Burton declined to fill them.


However, Murray did not enjoy unbridled authority. On his proclamation as governor the civil and military commands were separated, and later in

1764 command of all the troops in the province was given to Burton who, as brigadier of the Northern Department, was responsible only to the commander-in-chief, by now Gage. Whether it was caused by Burton's jealousy of Murray's nomination as governor, or by Murray's resentment of Burton's independence as brigadier, or simply by the practical inseparability of the two offices, friction soon developed between these former friends and contributed to the recall of both in 1766. Murray was surely right to maintain that in Quebec, which was not only a conquered colony but one where the governor had always been the military chief, authority could not be shared; and the home authorities admitted as much when they granted both commands to Murray's successor, Guy [Carleton*](#), in 1766.

Another hindrance was the lack of qualified and dependable advisers. Fortunate in his civil secretary, Hector Theophilus [Cramahé](#), whom he appointed to the Council in 1764 and then sent as his representative to London, Murray had to rely principally on serving officers – notably Paulus [Æmilius Irving](#) and Samuel Jan [Holland*](#), both of whom became councillors – and on former military men, such as Adam [Mabane](#) (likewise a councillor), John Fraser, and John [Nairne*](#). He also came to trust a few merchants, particularly Thomas [Ainslie*](#), Hugh [Finlay*](#), Thomas [Dunn*](#), James Goldfrap, and Benjamin [Price*](#), the last three being Council members as well. However, the patronage system, under which many colonial offices were dispensed in England, saddled him with a number of difficult officials, headed by Chief Justice William Gregory and Attorney General George Suckling. Although he apparently changed his mind about the latter, Murray at first considered them both “needy lawyers,” not only “entirely ignorant of the Language of the Natives” and “ignorant of the World” but “readier to puzzle and Create Difficultys than to remove them.” Nor were they the exceptions: Murray had to contend with Coroner Williams Conyngham, whom he described as “the most thorough paced Villain who ever existed”; an assortment of British patentees, some of whom could not “read a word of French”; and so many inept justices of the peace that the office fell into disrepute and had to be rehabilitated by Carleton. In addition, he faced several unruly officers, such as Gabriel [Christie](#), deputy quartermaster general for the Northern Department, and Arthur Brown, who commanded the 28th Foot, as well as a pack of disgruntled traders led by George [Allsopp*](#), William [Grant*](#), Edward [Harrison](#), Eleazar Levy, James [Johnston](#), and the brothers Alexander and William Mackenzie.

As if that were not enough, the Southern Department, Board of Trade, War Office, and Treasury all meddled in colonial affairs, sometimes acting without consultation among themselves, sometimes avoiding issues altogether for want of clear-cut responsibility. Moreover, Murray enjoyed the confidence of only two of the four ministries that held office while he was in Quebec: those of the Duke of Newcastle and the Earl of Bute, which together lasted from June 1757 to April 1763. This support was lost with the advent of the Whigs, after which Murray seems to have encountered some discrimination because of his association with the “King's Friends.” Under the ministries of George Grenville and Lord Rockingham, he had to account to such politicians as Lord Halifax, Lord Shelburne, and Lord Dartmouth, who were at best unsympathetic; and if he was faithfully backed by the Duke of Argyll, Lord Egremont, Lord Mansfield, Lord North, Lord George

Sackville, Charles Jenkinson, William Pitt, and Charles Townshend, a list of his detractors, who included the Duke of Bedford, Lord Camden, Lord Northington, Isaac Barré, Welbore Ellis, Horace Walpole, and John Wilkes, indicates the odds against him.



Battle of Quebec 1759

Murray's primary concern throughout the military régime of 1760–63 was security, for neither the return of the French nor a revolt by the Canadians could be ruled out. Determined to "slip no Opportunity to keep up the dread of our Arms," he warned in November 1759 that reprisals would follow any aiding of the enemy; he also sanctioned the retributions exacted at Pointe-Lévy (Lauzon), Sorel, and Lorette in 1759 and 1760; and as late as July 1765 he advised the expulsion of the Acadians from Bonaventure and the stationing of troops at Gaspé and Baie des Chaleurs. On the other hand, he listened to complaints against his troops, punished any of them who exploited the inhabitants, urged Amherst to restrain the crews of ships putting in at Quebec, and encouraged both the merchants and the military to relieve the indigent. The strategic motive behind this policy of harshness and humanity was revealed even before the fall of Montreal: the Canadians, Murray reckoned, "hardly will hereafter be easi[ly] persuaded to take up Arms against a Nation they admire, and who will have it allways in their [power?] to burn or destroy." Indeed, he was soon hoping for more: "to cultivate close connections with such of them as hereafter may be of use to Us in case of another war."

It was obvious, however, that the new subjects could not be controlled, much less conciliated, if either their accustomed usages or their former officials were disregarded. Consequently, although the articles of capitulation had not guaranteed the preservation of French laws, customs, or institutions, Murray modelled the council for his district on the old Conseil Supérieur, permitted the use of French law in cases not referred to this council, gave the captains of militia new commissions, and appointed several Canadians (such as Jacques de [Lafontaine](#)* de Belcour, whom he named attorney general and commissary for the south shore) to administrative posts. But it must be admitted that these measures were neither unique nor entirely successful: Murray's arrangements were in accordance with Amherst's directives to all the governors, similar expedients were employed in Trois-Rivières and Montreal, and complaints of unjust imprisonments and ruined family affairs – often attributed to

ignorance of French usages and the French language did occur in the District of Quebec.

The church was another concern during the military régime. The articles of capitulation signed at Quebec guaranteed "the free exercise of the Roman religion," while specific safeguards, added at Montreal, covered the chapter, priests, curates, missionaries, and communities of nuns – though not the Jesuits, Recollets, or Sulpicians. Murray's wartime experience had not predisposed him towards the clergy: identifying them as "the source of all the mischiefs which have befallen the poor Canadians," he doubted whether much reliance could be placed on oaths when "the Conscience can be so easily quieted by the Absolution of a Priest." He accordingly intervened in the appointment of parish priests, whom he was determined to keep "in a state of necessary subjection," cautioned the home authorities against expatriate clerics such as Joseph-Marie [La Corne de Chaptes](#), and revealed a deep distrust of the religious orders, particularly the Jesuits.



Gradually, however, his attitude changed. Beginning with a promise to protect all parish priests who did not prove troublesome, Murray came to rely on them to maintain order in the parishes. In return he doled out aid: to the "charitable Priest" Jean-Baptiste-Laurent Morisseaux, who was awarded the benefit of Saint-Augustin in Labrador; to the parish priests of Saint-Laurent, Île d'Orléans, and Sainte-Foy, who received restoration grants; and to Jean-Olivier [Briand](#), vicar general of Quebec, who was presented with a gratuity of £480 for "his good behaviour." Similarly, Murray's gratitude to the nuns for their impartial nursing during the hostilities induced him to supply their communities with fuel and provisions, remunerate them for their services, support the claim of the Hôpital-Général to "a large sum" due from the king of France, and obtain the remission of debts owed to the French government by the Hôtel-Dieu and the Ursuline convent in Quebec [see Marie-Louise [Curot](#); Marie-Anne Migeon de Branssat]. Even the Jesuits became entitled to some consideration: rejecting a request to lay an attachment on their effects, Murray went so far as to recommend their being paid pensions if dismissed.

He also helped to resolve the problem of the episcopal succession. The death of Bishop Pontbriand [\[Dubreil*\]](#) in June 1760 raised the question of

how priests could be ordained without infringing British laws – which, as Lord Egremont, secretary of state for the Southern Department, enjoined, “prohibit absolutely all Popish Hierarchy in any of the Dominions belonging to the Crown.” Although opposed to the presence of a bishop in Quebec, Murray would accept a “Superintendent of the Romish Religion,” to be elected by the Quebec chapter and, following approval by the British government, consecrated by the pope. He balked, however, at the chapter’s initial choice of Étienne [Montgolfier](#), vicar general of Montreal and superior of the Sulpicians, and it was largely through his influence that in 1764 Briand was elected instead. With the consecration of the latter in March 1766, the continuance of the priesthood, and so of the church in Quebec, was secured.

As he acknowledged as early as July 1763, Murray’s change of attitude was fostered by Briand’s ability to act “with a Candour, Moderation, and a Delicacy in such circumstances, as deserve the highest Commendation, such indeed as I little expected from one of his Gown.” Well briefed on the need to conciliate the British authorities and acutely aware of the governor’s prejudices, Briand took care to obtain his approval of ecclesiastical appointments, to issue the numerous *mandements* and circular letters he requested, and, in general, to accept the same kind of governmental intervention that had occurred during the last century of French rule. A working concordat was the result: in exchange for toleration, some support, and – of special significance for the shaping of Canadian society – permission to continue its educational role, the church counselled not merely submission but cooperation. This collaboration was rewarded in the Quebec Act of 1774, which recognized the claims of the clergy to their accustomed dues, and then in the Constitutional Act of 1791, which effectively established Roman Catholicism in Lower Canada.

The last major concern during the military régime was the economy. With both the means of production and the importing agencies disrupted to such an extent that sufficient supplies could not be obtained, Murray was moved to issue the population with military stores. More fundamentally, an imbalance between supply and demand during the last years of French rule had resulted in a chronic shortage of cash, and so induced the authorities to issue more than a million *livres* of paper money. The French government’s decision in 1760 to suspend payment on this paper threatened not only to wipe out the savings and capital of many Canadians but to deprive Quebec of its principal means of exchange. And meanwhile, speculators were hoarding goods in order to force up prices. The immediate economic problems confronting Murray were thus how to solve the currency crisis and how to check an already rife inflation.

The first problem entailed two questions: what to do about the French paper money and how to obtain more specie. Finding that he could neither enforce the exclusive use of cash nor persuade the home government to substitute a British equivalent, Murray had to be content with registering the paper in circulation. He also tried to curb speculation on it by advising against its sale, at least until the rumours concerning its possible redemption were confirmed. But although he claimed that the result was a rise in market value – which benefited the Canadians at the cost of

alienating the British merchants in Quebec – speculation continued well into the period of civil government. Moreover, when the French authorities decided in 1764 to discharge the debt with bonds rather than cash, and then repudiated it altogether in 1771, those who had taken Murray's advice were caught out. It has been argued that their losses, which contributed to a series of bankruptcies between 1764 and 1771, placed the Canadians at a disadvantage in the contest for commercial dominance.



Quebec

To obtain specie, each of the governors resorted to the conventional palliative of overvaluing foreign currencies. Murray considered the Halifax standard of five shillings to the Spanish dollar the most suitable rate of exchange for Quebec; Gage and Burton, however, preferred the eight shilling rate applied in New York, with which their districts had close trading connections. Speculation naturally followed this difference, and once in charge of the whole province Murray decided to compromise on the New England standard of six shillings, which was convenient for the Canadians since it made the English shilling equivalent to the French livre. In practice, though, all three rates figured in business accounts till 1777, when Carleton reverted to Murray's original choice of the Halifax standard.

But the great hope was to increase exports, and although [Pontiac's](#) uprising hampered the restoration of the fur trade, the resources of the St Lawrence basin seemed propitious. Reporting in 1760 on its quantities of fish, seals, whales, hemp, flax, tar, pitch, and potash, and noting that the region contained "Iron enough to supply all Europe," Murray predicted that within a few years Canada would be exporting foodstuffs. In particular, he set out to popularize the potato, which was soon produced commercially on the Île d'Orléans, and encouraged the sowing of wheat, for which he expected to find a market in Britain. Most of his calculations were based only on potential development, however, and lack of capital, high freight rates, shortage of labour, and deficient techniques combined to delay economic expansion till the 1770s. Murray never saw the balance of trade that would have been the cure for Quebec's currency problem.

In contrast, the problem of inflation was handled rather successfully. Realizing that a principal cause was the hoarding practices and monopolistic arrangements derived from Joseph-Michel Cadet's Grande Société, Murray imposed a system of price controls reinforced with sales regulations: the justices of the peace were ordered to fix prices according to supply, bakers and butchers had to obtain permission to sell their products, and importers were supervised. It is difficult to assess the effect of such measures on the middlemen, who were the chief culprits in hoarding, but deflation must have

been at least expedited. In any event, prices did fall after 1760-by as much as 50 to 80 per cent during the next six years – and Murray may well be entitled to a share of the credit for this achievement.

He also continued some of the measures employed by the French to raise revenue. These included fines on the alienation of fiefs; a tax on houses in the town of Quebec (for which he substituted, as more equitable, a tax on horses in the parishes); proceeds from the lease of the fur-trading stations known as the “king’s posts”; and customs duties, which were by far the most lucrative, and contentious, source of income. Concluding that many of the French tariffs had been unfair and that the one on textiles would be unacceptable in a British colony, in 1761 Murray consolidated them all into a single duty on liquor, of which “The quantity the Canadians Consume is incredible.” Although this duty netted £8,725.8s. 1d. in a little over four years, objections from the British merchants in Quebec eventually forced its discontinuance, after which Murray had to manage with bills drawn on London. However, the home authorities not only tacitly admitted the legality of his imposition but approved Murray’s general aim of making Quebec contribute to its administrative costs when they later reproached him for not having resumed some of the other French duties as well.

On 10 Feb. 1763, by the treaty of Paris, France formally ceded Canada to Great Britain. To judge by the subsequent proclamation of 7 October, the original intention was to anglicize the new colony: British settlement was to be promoted through the offering of lands on a quitrent basis, while British usages were to be imposed by implementing English criminal and civil law and making provision for a house of assembly. Both Murray’s commission as governor and the accompanying instructions reflected this policy: “So soon as the Situation and circumstances” admitted, he was to summon an assembly, elected by “the Major Part of the Freeholders.” He was also to appoint a council, consisting of four ex officio members and eight persons chosen by him “from amongst the most considerable of the Inhabitants of, or Persons of Property in Our said Province”. Pending the making of laws “by & with the advice and Consent” of the assembly and council, rules and regulations were to be issued “by the Advice” of this council. And courts of justice were to be established with the council’s consent and advice, although the judges and law officers were to be appointed by the governor alone.

There was some doubt, however, concerning the ecclesiastical implications. The fourth article of the treaty of Paris granted Roman Catholics in Quebec religious liberty “as far as the laws of Great Britain permit.” But those laws included the Corporation Act of 1661 and the Test Acts of 1673 and 1678, by which Catholics were barred from all offices under the crown, disabled in the courts, deprived of the vote, and banned from both houses of parliament. Did this mean that Canadians would be prohibited from occupying civil offices, taking part in the administration of justice, and either electing to or sitting in the proposed assembly? If so, the government of Quebec would be not only a religious but a racial oligarchy, with a legislature in which the representatives of a handful of British Protestants – estimated by Murray in October 1764 as no more than 200

householders in the entire province – would make laws for some 70,000 Canadian Roman Catholics.

Once again, Murray tried to compromise. In his ordinance of 17 Sept. 1764, he established two districts, Quebec and Montreal, placing Trois-Rivières in the latter until it had enough Protestants to provide its own law officers. He then set up a three-tier system of civil courts. At the top was the Court of King's Bench, from which certain appeals lay to the governor in council and thence to the king in council; next was the Court of Common Pleas, from which certain appeals lay to the Court of King's Bench; at the bottom were the courts of the justices of the peace, from which certain appeals also lay to the Court of King's Bench. Only English law was applicable in the highest and lowest courts, only practitioners of that law were admitted to the Court of King's Bench, and only Protestants could become justices of the peace. However, in the Court of Common Pleas – which Murray designed "to please the Canadians & to prevent their being made a Prey to our upright Lawyers" – cases were determined "agreeable to Equity, having regard nevertheless to the laws of England"; French laws and customs were "allowed and admitted" (providing the cause of action was between Canadians and had arisen before 1 Oct. 1764); exponents of the civil law were permitted to practise; and either party might request a trial by jury, on which Canadians were eligible to serve. In addition, three men noted for their sympathy towards the Canadians – Adam Mabane, François [Mounier*](#), and John Fraser – were chosen as judges for the Court of Common Pleas; a prerogative court was created to facilitate testamentary business; the grants and rights of inheritance in force before the treaty of Paris were recognized, thereby "quieting people in their possessions"; and an alternative to the English law of primogeniture was provided by sanctioning the French custom of coparcenary, which, as Murray also maintained, "contributes to the better cultivating and peopling of the country."

Although they might have helped to conciliate the Canadians, these concessions had the opposite effect on many of the British. As each bulwark of privilege was breached, their disquiet increased, and when it became apparent that Murray had no intention of summoning an assembly, their specific and sporadic complaints gave way to a personal and unremitting campaign against the governor. Acquiring a permanent agent, Fowler Walker, in London and enlisting the support of business associates there, the British merchants in Quebec embarked on a heady series of presentments, remonstrances, and petitions.

Oddly enough, in view of what was happening in the American colonies, the home authorities do not appear to have been alarmed by either Murray's refusal to summon an assembly or the pretensions of the grand jury of 1764 – who, "as the only body Representative of the Colony," claimed the right to be consulted before any ordinances became law and to have public accounts laid before them at least once a year. Murray was questioned about his recalcitrance after his return to England in 1766; but by allowing Carleton to continue a conciliar form of administration, the British government implicitly sanctioned what was perhaps the most

significant departure from both the proclamation of 1763 and Murray's commission.

Another grievance of the British settlers concerned the social side of the anglicizing policy. With the dual object of promoting British immigration and converting the French, Murray was instructed to carry out a survey, advertise for settlers, make grants of land, and provide for a Protestant church and school in every district, township, and precinct. He accordingly carried out the surveying and advertising; recommended a reduction of the quitrents (to make crown lands more competitive with the seigneurial holdings offered for rent); and granted large tracts to two settlers, John Nairne and Malcolm [Fraser*](#). He also engaged a renegade Jesuit, Pierre-Joseph-Antoine [Roubaud](#), to act as a go-between in London, and solicited the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel for Bibles, prayer-books and French speaking "missionaries." He also hoped that his appointment of the Huguenot Mounier to both the Court of Common Pleas and the Council would "induce many to embrace our Religion, that they may be admitted to the like advantages."



British Merchants

As the British merchants complained, however, much of this activity seemed only dutiful, if not perfunctory. Evidently believing that it was even more important to reassure the Canadians, who were "uneasy on account of Apprehensions for the Future existance of their Religion," Murray continued to co-operate with their clergy, particularly Joseph-François Perrault, vicar general of Trois-Rivières, and Étienne Marchand, who replaced Montgolfier as vicar general of Montreal in late 1764. Similarly, his promotion of British settlement could scarcely be described as whole-hearted. Questioning the validity of grants acquired by British settlers during the military régime, he

was reluctant to make new ones, and by the end of 1764 had limited these to the pair awarded Nairne and Fraser. Moreover, he allowed seigneurial grants to be surveyed privately, with the result, according to the deputy surveyor of Quebec, John Collins, that many of those buildings were "Extended to a very considerable distance beyond the Real Boundaries," and the amount of land available for British settlement was proportionately reduced.

If he was criticized for not following the political and social guidelines of the proclamation of 1763 closely enough, Murray was castigated for enforcing its economic injunctions too strictly. A boundary line that isolated the western hinterland, including the Great Lakes and Ohio valley, gave the Indians their promised reserve but left the fur-traders from Quebec in an impossible position. Now required to obtain licences and furnish recognizances before entering the territory and then to conduct their business from within the military posts, they had to compete with traders from the Mississippi who were able to enter and move about freely. Murray could appreciate their difficulties and did recommend against the restrictions, which were finally removed in 1768. He was nonetheless subjected to numerous aspersions, which drew attention to the discord that generally characterized his relations with the merchants.

The fact is that Murray found it difficult to get along with people in trade, who in turn considered him incapable of understanding, let alone furthering, their interests. Duties, shipping, fisheries, posts, and wharfs were recurring subjects of dispute, and it was not enough for him to reply that he had helped on several occasions: as when he proposed an embargo on French commodities, or promoted British participation in the seal fishery, or backed some of the Canadian claims to seal-oil posts. What the merchants felt he lacked was a business sense; and what they coveted was something he was determined to withhold – political power. For although some businessmen were given administrative positions, including membership on the Council, they were carefully selected, had usually acquired land, and always remained in the minority. Above all, the governor would not summon an assembly.

The common explanation of Murray's behaviour is that he was prejudiced against the British merchants and captivated by the Canadians. He certainly made no effort to dissemble his contempt for the former: "the most cruel, Ignorant, rapacious Fanatics, who ever existed," these "birds of passage" were "chiefly adventurers of mean Education, either young beginners, or if old Traders, such as have failed in other Countrys, all have their Fortunes to make and little solicitous about the means, provided the end is obtained." In contrast, the Canadians, "soldiers to a man," were "perhaps, the best and bravest Race on the Globe, a Race, that have already got the better of every National Antipathy to their Conquerors, and could they be indulged with a very few Privileges, which the Laws of England do not allow to Catholics at home, must in a very short Time become the most faithful & useful Set of Men in this American Empire."

In the mean time, however, they had to be protected. "You know, Cramahe," Murray wrote in late 1764, "I love the Canadians but you cannot

conceive the uneasiness I feel on their Acc^t, to see them made the prey of the most abandoned of Men while I am at their head is too much for me to endure much longer." This was not empty rhetoric. When Gage decided to raise a force of Canadians during Pontiac's uprising, Murray advocated the calling of volunteers rather than a draft, was able to fill his quota for the District of Quebec without resorting to induction, and insisted that service conditions for the Canadians should be the same as those for the militiamen from New York. His objection to billeting without due payment, refusal to issue general warrants as a means of obtaining forced labour, opposition to the impressment of boatmen, and preference for contracts instead of the *corvée*, likewise illustrate his "infinite tenderness" for the "brave, Valuable Race" he had grown to "admire and love."



Proclamation line of 1763

But that is not the only way in which Murray's behaviour can be interpreted. Indeed, this essentially ethnic construction might be not only anachronistic but obscurantist. For, it is argued, the crucial distinction at the time was not between two races, but between two classes – "bourgeois" and "landed." Furthermore, from a modern perspective, it was the former that represented progress: whereas the British government was intent on fitting Quebec into the old colonial system and Atlantic triangle, the merchants were attempting to create a commercial empire inland; and North America was to be developed not by concentrating on the seaboard regions but by opening up the west. No matter how "Ignorant, factious, Licentious" they might have seemed, the merchants should have been supported because they alone possessed the initiative, energy, and skill required for that enterprise.

It is also argued that such support would not have been simply tantamount to siding with the British against the Canadians. Regardless of who they were and how effectively they managed, some Canadians did participate in business activities after the conquest. In fact, this event freed them from the mercantilist restrictions imposed by the French authorities; and not only was the British colonial system much more liberal, but the beginning of the industrial revolution and development of capitalism in England opened up limitless prospects. Integration into the British empire

should have provided Canadian business interests with an unprecedented opportunity for both economic and social advancement. If only they too had been encouraged, or at least left unhampered, the disadvantages under which they laboured might have been reduced, and relations between Canada's two founding peoples might have begun, and continued, on more harmonious lines.



Murray, however, would have denied that such a partnership was either actually or potentially possible. To him those Canadians – “the few exceptions” – who occasionally, and often inadvertently, abetted the British merchants were only “the little Dealers in the Towns of Quebec and Montreal who are at the mercy of the British Traders their Creditors.” At the same time, he would not have denied – if brought to think in such terms – that class was a potent, if not determining, factor in his behaviour. As he admitted, “It was a maxim of mine to shun Addresses from the Traders, they wanted to make themselves of Consequence by Addresses, presentm^t and Remonstrances; I discouraged such things from them, and upon all Occasions consulted the Men of property in the Colony.”

These consisted of two groups, who also crossed ethnic lines: the British governmental supporters and the Canadian seigneurs. The former, mostly military men but including a few merchants (such as Benjamin Price, who owned 20,000 acres), were supposed to shelter Quebec from that “turbulent, levelling spirit” which, according to Chief Justice William [Smith](#) after the American revolution, had caused the Thirteen Colonies to be

"abandoned to democracy." However, this "French party" came to uphold not only conciliar as opposed to representative government, but also those Canadian institutions, laws, and customs that seemed indispensable to the continuance of a hierarchical society. They accordingly found their natural allies not among members of their own race but in the other group that wished to "preserve" Quebec, the seigneurs [see Gaspard-Joseph Chaussegros de Léry; Charles-François Tarieu de La Naudière].

So long as security was his primary concern, Murray had been wary of the latter: "impecunious, haughty, tyrannical, contemptuous of trade and authority, attached to French rule," they were the one group of Canadians whose departure was "rather to be wished than regretted." Then he began to notice, or fancy, the "healthy" respect shown them by the peasantry, the forbearance with which they asserted their rights and privileges, and the order and stability that seemed to flow from the relationship. Before the end of 1763 he had decided that "I would not advise their expulsion, because I foresee they may become very useful to us if properly managed." Soon afterwards, he recommended the employment of former officers of the colonial regulars in the campaign against Pontiac, and in March 1764 offered the command of the Canadian corps to Pierre-Jean Baptiste-François-Xavier [Legardeur de Repentigny](#). By 1766 he was counselling the magistrates in Montreal not to billet soldiers on the seigneurs, since "This Distinction they had the right to Expect, decency and regard paid to People of Family in all Civilized Countries required it."

The incident that prompted Murray's recall occurred on 6 Dec. 1764 in Montreal. Relations between the military and the merchants had always been rancorous in that town, where billeting was particularly troublesome and where Burton had his headquarters. On the night in question a party of men from the 28th Foot, bent on teaching the tradesmen a lesson, broke into the house of one of the principal offenders, Thomas Walker, thrashed him soundly, and cut off one of his ears. The ensuing wrangle over where and by whom a trial should be held enabled Murray's critics to marshal their grievances, and this time their protest to the British government proved effective. In October 1765 Murray was told that he would have to account in London for both the disorders in Montreal and, in general, his administration of Quebec. He was ordered home the following April and left Canada on 28 June 1766.

Murray was accused of not merely obstructing the course of justice in the Walker affair but, among other malpractices, of improperly remitting fines imposed by the chief justice; wrongfully seizing and detaining ships and merchandise; billeting troops unnecessarily and unfairly; imposing duties and taxes contrary to law; establishing a special court for the Canadians; favouring the seigneurs; bolstering Roman Catholicism; issuing ordinances that were "Unconstitutional, Vexatious, Oppressive, Calculated to serve private purposes, Absurd and Unjust"; and instead of conciliating the two races, managing only "to kindle Animositys, and to raise Jealousies among them, and to keep them Disunited." Not one of these charges could be made to stick, however, and on 13 April 1767 the Lords of Committee of

Council dismissed them all as "groundless, scandalous and Derogatory to the Honor of the said Governor, who stood before the Committee unimpeached."

Murray could now have returned to Quebec, where he had often spoken of settling permanently and had obtained extensive properties across the river from the town, as well as on lakes Champlain and Saint-Pierre. But although he retained the nominal governorship of the province till 12 April 1768, he never did get back. Various explanations have been suggested, including a reluctance to leave his wife, who was disinclined to accompany him overseas; pressure from his brother Lord Elibank, who looked to his support in the House of Commons, for which Murray considered standing; apprehension that friction would recur, especially since Carleton, who had been made lieutenant governor in September 1766, was opposed to some of Murray's policies and several of his appointees; and a general feeling of disenchantment, possibly indicated by his reluctance to participate in the framing of the Quebec Act in 1773.

Whatever the reasons, Murray resumed his military career soon after returning to England. Serving on the Irish staff in 1766 and subsequently as an inspecting general of the Southern District, in December 1767 he exchanged his colonelcy in the 60th Foot for that of the 13th, and in May 1772 was promoted lieutenant-general. Two years later he began his second colonial assignment, an eight-year stint in Minorca. Since the titular governor, General John Mostyn, was not resident, Murray, although designated as only the lieutenant governor, was effectively in charge from the start. In April 1779 he was finally gazetted governor and was given a lieutenant governor of his own, Sir William Draper, the next month.

Between August 1781 and February 1782, when Fort St Philip was besieged by a Franco-Spanish army, Murray relived his defence of Quebec. Resisting this time any impulse to launch his men, reduced by the end of the siege from 2,000 to 600 combatants, against a force of 16,000, he bore himself so gallantly-to the extent of spurning a bribe of £1,000,000 to surrender-as to earn the honorific title of "Old Minorca" before being obliged to capitulate. A court of inquiry was afterwards convened to look into various charges brought by Draper, whom Murray had dismissed for insubordination and who was now retaliating with accusations of misconduct ranging from embezzlement to cruelty. Murray was not only acquitted on all except two trifling charges but had the satisfaction of being complimented by both the court and the king on his "zeal, courage and firmness" in defending Fort St Philip. He thereupon retired to his Sussex estate where, becoming a full general in February 1783 and acquiring the honours of colonel of the 21st Foot and governor of Hull, he passed his remaining 12 years.

Weaknesses of character, or personality, cannot be overlooked and go a long way to explain, if not entirely to account for, the antagonisms Murray encountered throughout his life. He was arrogant, irascible, authoritarian, and snobbish, and he could be harsh, impetuous, inconsistent, and intemperate. It is equally impossible to ignore his valour, resolution, fortitude, compassion, generosity, altruism, and code of honour. He was, in

short, very much a soldier and an aristocrat, and he reflected both the shortcomings and the qualities – perhaps not altogether inappropriate or unfortunate for Canada at that juncture – of the type. Admirers, especially among the Canadians, were not wanting and petitions begging for his return proclaimed that “he gained our hearts,” affirmed that his “clear-sightedness, Equity and wisdom continually afford him efficacious means for maintaining the people in tranquillity and obedience,” and lamented the loss of “Our protector, our father,” without whom “what will become of us?” But the epitaph that Murray might well have chosen himself is contained in his report to Shelburne of 20 Aug. 1766: “I glory in having been accused of warmth and firmness in protecting the King’s Canadian Subjects and of doing the utmost in my Power to gain to my Royal Master the affection of that brave hardy People; whose Emigration, if ever it shall happen, will be an irreparable Loss to this Empire, to prevent which I declare to your Lordship, I would cheerfully submit to greater Calumnies & Indignities if greater can be devised, than hitherto I have undergone.”

From a constitutional standpoint, Murray’s governorship is notable mainly because of the modifications he made in the anglicizing policy of 1763. His refusal to summon an assembly, and reliance on a council instead, provided Carleton with a precedent that was ratified in the Quebec Act of 1774. The form of administration established by this act in turn served as a prototype for the development of crown colony government, which became an alternative to representative government in the reorganization of the British empire after the American revolution. Murray’s incorporation of French principles and practices into the English legal system was another precedent on which Carleton could build, also received statutory recognition in 1774, and has persisted in Quebec to the present day. As illustrated by the retention of French laws and institutions in Santo Domingo and Martinique and of Romano-Dutch laws and institutions in British Guiana and Cape Colony, this “policy of continuation” became an alternative to the “policy of anglicization” in the second British empire.

From an economic standpoint, Murray left his mark by restraining the mercantile interests. The restrictions he enforced in the western hinterland, the “clogs of commerce” with which he burdened merchants within the province, and, most important, his thwarting of their efforts to gain political power through the acquisition of an assembly, all helped to transform Quebec from a fur-trading region, which might have become the heart of an inland commercial empire, into an agricultural belt that was principally concerned with the exploitation of its own resources and oriented towards the Atlantic. Murray has therefore been held at least partly responsible for both the perpetuation of Quebec as a quasi-feudal enclave and the delay in its attaining a capitalist economy.

Finally, from a social standpoint, Murray made his greatest impact through his efforts to counter the policy of anglicization. Whether or not the Canadians could have been thoroughly anglicized without a substantial British immigration, the possible effects of completely subordinating the Roman Catholic church, extensively promoting British settlement, establishing exclusively English laws and institutions, and firmly entrenching the British merchants as the dominant political force should not be

discounted. In any event, Murray's aversion to the bourgeoisie (British and Canadian alike), together with his partiality for their adversaries (the clergy, seigneurs, and French party), led him to champion the Canadian cause. And this is probably what lies behind much of the praise, and blame, that has been heaped upon him. During the years immediately following the conquest, a serious attempt might have been made to turn Quebec into an anglicized colony. Murray's ultimate achievement, or failure, was that he helped to impede this movement. His apology was that he thereby helped to prevent the total subjugation of the Canadians.

[G. P. Browne](#)

[Two portraits in oil of James Murray, by anonymous artists, are known to exist: one is in the National Portrait Gallery, London; the other is in the PAC. J. S. Neele published an engraving, ascribed to James Gillray, and S. A. Cumberlege another, by an anonymous artist; the BL holds copies of both and the PAC a copy of the latter. James Murray *is* the author of: "Journal of the siege of Quebec, 1759–60," *Literary and Hist. Soc. of Quebec, Hist. Docs.*, 3rd ser. (1871), no.5, 1–45, which also appeared as a separate publication under the title *Governor Murray's journal of Quebec, from 18th September, 1759, to 25th May, 1760: journal of the siege of Quebec, 1759–60* ([Quebec and Montreal, 1871]); *Report of the state of the government of Quebec in Canada, by General Murray, June 5, 1762 . . .* (Quebec, 1902); *The sentence of the court-martial . . . for the trial of the Hon. Lieut. Gen. James Murray . . .* (London, 1783). g.p.b.]

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


MONCKTON, ROBERT, army officer and colonial administrator; b. 24 June 1726 in Yorkshire, England, second son of John Monckton, later 1st Viscount Galway, and Lady Elizabeth Manners; d. 21 May 1782 in London, England. Although apparently never lawfully married, he raised and was survived by three sons and a daughter.

In 1741, at age 15, Robert Monckton was commissioned in the 3rd Foot Guards, which sailed to Flanders the following spring to serve in the War of the Austrian Succession. Monckton saw action at Dettingen (Federal Republic of Germany) and at Fontenoy (Belgium), staying on in Flanders after the British army was recalled to suppress the Jacobite rebellion in 1745. Commissioned captain in the 34th Foot on 27 June 1744, he was promoted major on 15 Feb. 1747/48 and lieutenant-colonel of the 47th Foot on 28 Feb. 1751/52. On his father's death later that year Monckton became member of parliament for the family-controlled seat of Pontefract but was soon posted to Nova Scotia.

Monckton's introduction to Canada was as commander of Fort Lawrence (near Amherst, N.S.), which faced the French Fort Beauséjour across the Missaguash River near Chignecto Bay. This military frontier was calm between his appointment in August 1752 and the following June; Monckton and Jean-Baptiste Mutigny de Vassan, his counterpart at Beauséjour, exchanged notes, deserters, and runaway horses. Undoubtedly both sides were also gathering intelligence and reinforcing prejudices. Called to Halifax in June 1753 to preside over a court martial, Monckton stayed on to accept membership in the colony's Council.

German settlers at the new south shore community of Lunenburg were restive that autumn, and when news of an armed confrontation between the settlers and the local garrison reached the Council on 18 Dec. 1753, Monckton volunteered to lead a 200-man force to restore peace. Lieutenant Governor Charles [Lawrence*](#) and his Council advocated a reasonable approach so that "afterwards the consequences will lye on themselves should you be obliged to proceed to Extremitys." Monckton was courteously received at Lunenburg and negotiated a return to order by what Lawrence called "moderate and most judicious measures" [see Jean [Pettrequin*](#) and Sebastian [Zouberbuhler](#)].



North View of fort Frederick

The aftermath, however, reveals the contrast between Monckton's humane perspective and the sterner views of his superior, Lawrence. Having disarmed the settlers peaceably and traced the source of the rumours that had caused the trouble, Monckton then advocated forgiveness. Lawrence would not accept this counsel and informed Monckton rather ominously: ". . . tho the merciful part is always the most agreeable (particularly with Foreigners unacquainted with our laws and Customs) in disturbances of this nature, yet it is seldom the most effectual." Though one of the participants in the troubles was imprisoned for crimes and misdemeanors after Lawrence tried but failed to obtain a charge of high treason against him, most of the lieutenant governor's suggestions for legal retribution were ignored.

Robert Monckton's most memorable independent military command in North America was the successful campaign against the Chignecto forts, Beauséjour and Gaspereau (near Port Elgin, N.B.), in June 1755. Lawrence

had joined Massachusetts Governor William Shirley in preparing the plan of operations during the preceding winter, based upon a general British order to counter French "encroachments." Monckton spent the winter in Boston using his knowledge of Fort Beauséjour in detailed preparation for the attack. Here he quarrelled with John Winslow, one of his subordinate commanders, and relations between the two men were poor throughout the campaign. A convoy of 31 transports and three warships left Boston on 19 May 1755, carrying nearly 2,000 New England provincial troops and 270 British regulars, and dropped anchor near the mouth of the Missaguash River on 2 June. Secrecy and careful planning resulted in an unopposed landing and relatively light resistance as Monckton's troops moved to invest Fort Beauséjour two days later. The garrison under Louis Du Pont Duchambon de Vergor, though outnumbered more than four to one, should have been able to resist longer than two weeks. Monckton's careful professional approach along a ridge northeast of the fort had hardly begun when the disheartened defenders proposed terms of capitulation on 16 June. Monckton granted the garrison passage to Louisbourg, Île Royale (Cape Breton Island), and pardoned Acadian irregulars who had taken up arms under threat of death. The next day Benjamin Rouer* de Villeray, the commander of Fort Gaspereau, accepted the same terms without a shot being fired. Monckton's success in the campaign was based upon surprise and good deployment of superior resources.

Precipitate collapse of the French defence of the Chignecto Isthmus left Monckton and Lawrence in command of an army of some 2,500 men, most of whom had volunteered for a whole year and all of whom were being paid and provisioned by the British government; in fact, unknown to the Treasury, the operation was being financed out of the annual parliamentary grant for the administration of Nova Scotia. Following supplementary orders, Monckton dispatched a small squadron to investigate the situation at the mouth of the Saint John River (N.B.), and by 2 July he had learned that the French garrison there had blown up its fort and retired. With his major responsibilities carried out so quickly, Monckton used his own men and hired Acadians to repair Fort Beauséjour (renamed Fort Cumberland) and to improve area roads. Many of the local inhabitants surrendered their arms, including the prominent partisan Joseph Brossard*, *dit* Beausoleil. But when the Acadian deputies negotiating with Lawrence refused the unqualified oath of allegiance, as they had done successfully for decades, Lawrence used his unprecedented military forces to respond with unprecedented severity: he ordered the expulsion of the Acadians. With characteristic efficiency but no apparent enthusiasm, Monckton carried out his orders to lure the inhabitants into custody, to burn their villages, and to supervise the deportation of the 1,100 people he collected in Chignecto.

Sole victor in a year of British defeats in North America, Monckton was made lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia in December 1755. During the next three years he acted as governor twice, both times handling preparations for the colony's first legislature. He was thus occupied in the summer of 1758 when Amherst captured Louisbourg. That autumn he was given command of an expedition to scourge the Saint John River country (N. B.). A force of nearly 2,300 men, including the 2nd battalion Royal American Regiment (60th Foot) of which Monckton was now colonel,

provided the base and advance troops for a cautious, deliberate expedition which destroyed houses, cattle, and crops for some 70 miles up the river. Few people were captured, but the expedition's purpose was to force any Acadians raiding British-held territory to retire to Quebec by spring. Begun on 11 September, the operation was completed on 21 November. Early in 1759 Amherst called Monckton south to New York, intending he should command the southern region. Monckton was still in New York when James [Wolfe*](#) chose him to be second in command in the campaign against Quebec that summer.



Monckton's role in the capture of Quebec was considerable. Shortly after the arrival of the British fleet at Quebec [see Sir Charles Saunders], Monckton led the four regiments that established control of the south shore of the St Lawrence River at Pointe-Lévy (Lauzon and Lévis). Initially intended to protect the fleet, this position was soon used by Wolfe to establish powerful batteries facing the city. Monckton commanded the unsuccessful attempt to land on the Beauport shore on 31 July, though he had been sceptical of the plan. As the summer wore on, Wolfe's frustration prompted harsh measures against vulnerable settlements. There is evidence that Monckton delayed and moderated the execution of these orders in his command on the south shore. Tension between Monckton and Wolfe appeared briefly, though it was not as serious as Wolfe's differences with the other senior members of his staff. At the end of August, Wolfe asked his brigadiers for their written opinion on three alternative battle plans, all focusing on the Beauport shore. Monckton, Murray, and George [Townshend*](#) rejected all three plans, and proposed attacking above

Quebec – a concept which proved successful. Monckton commanded the crucial landing at Anse au Foulon early on 13 September and the British right on the Plains of Abraham later that day, being wounded through the chest during the battle. He resented Townshend's excluding him from the negotiations for the capitulation of the city and recovered quickly enough to assume command of the city and its environs. In the month he served in this capacity Monckton displayed firmness in punishing soldiers who committed crimes and showed concern for the civilian population. One of his last orders, urging commanders not to allow their men to marry local girls, was a grudging admission that the army's relations with the Canadians were improving.

Monckton left Quebec for New York on 26 October. Honours were mixed with new responsibilities; he had been made colonel of the 17th Foot earlier that month and on 29 April 1760 became commander of the British troops in the southern provinces. In February 1761 he was promoted major-general and on 20 March became governor and commander-in-chief in the province of New York. Monckton crowned his successful military career the following winter as commander of the army that captured the West Indian island of Martinique. His overwhelming forces took the supposedly impregnable French position within three weeks of landing. The terms of capitulation, modelled on the surrender of Guadeloupe in 1759 with minor changes, suggest that Monckton was a careful and well-informed negotiator. By June 1762 he was back at his post in New York. Monckton left North America for England on 28 June 1763, though he retained the governorship of New York until 14 June 1765, and was subsequently regarded as a "friend of America." After exoneration by a court martial in 1764 on charges brought by a dismissed officer, Monckton became governor of Berwick-upon-Tweed on 14 June 1765 and was promoted lieutenant-general in 1770.

Luckless investment in the East India Company in this turbulent period of its history stimulated Monckton's interest in, and need for, a post in India. Though he first had royal support, and later had the company's nomination, he was not appointed commander-in-chief of the army there. He declined the government's alternative offer of the command of the army in America when that post became vacant but accepted a valuable land grant on the West Indian island of St Vincent. In 1774 he served briefly again as mp for Pontefract, but seems to have played no part in the Coercive Acts or the Quebec Act.

Governor of Portsmouth, England, from 1778, and mp for the town in the Admiralty interest, Monckton held these positions until his death in 1782. He was buried in St Mary Abbot's Church, Kensington (London).

[I. K. Steele](#)

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AMHERST, JEFFERY, 1st Baron AMHERST, army officer; b. 29 Jan. 1717 (N.S.?) at Riverhead, Sevenoaks, England; d. 3 Aug. 1797 at his house Montreal near Sevenoaks.

Jeffery Amherst was the son of another Jeffery Amherst, a prosperous barrister whose family had lived in Kent for centuries, and Elizabeth Kerrill. At the age of 12 young Jeffery became a page in the household of Lionel Cranfield Sackville, 1st Duke of Dorset, at Knole, his great house adjacent to Sevenoaks. The circumstances of his early military career are somewhat obscure. It has been asserted that Amherst entered the 1st Foot Guards as an ensign in 1731 (when he was in fact only 14), and a list of officers in that regiment's history shows him as becoming an ensign in November 1735. But the earliest printed *Army list*, that for 1740, makes no mention of him in connection with the Guards and shows him as a cornet, appointed 19 July 1735, in Major-General Ligonier's Regiment of Horse, then in Ireland (Dorset was lord lieutenant of Ireland 1730–37 and 1750–55). It seems well established that in July 1740 Ligonier recommended Cornet Amherst to be a lieutenant in his regiment. There is little doubt that Amherst's formative years as an officer were spent, not as a guardsman in London, as has been assumed, but in Ireland in a highly efficient cavalry regiment under the eye of one of the best British soldiers of the age. Dorset and Sir John (afterwards Lord) Ligonier were the patrons who set Amherst's feet on the road to eminence. Ligonier called him his "dear pupil."

Amherst saw his first active service as aide-de-camp to Ligonier in Germany during the War of the Austrian Succession. He was present at the battles of Dettingen (Federal Republic of Germany) in 1743 and Fontenoy (Belgium) in 1745. The 1st Foot Guards' records show that in December 1745 he was appointed captain in that regiment, a commission carrying with it the rank of lieutenant-colonel

in the army at large. In 1747 the Duke of Cumberland was appointed commander-in-chief of the allied forces in Europe and made Amherst one of his aides-de-camp. In this capacity he served in the battle of Laffeldt (Belgium) that year. The period of peace following the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) he spent in England, presumably with his regiment.



Battle of Dettingen

Amherst's first responsibility in the Seven Years' War was acting as "commissary" in charge of the administration of 8,000 Hessian troops taken into British pay at the beginning of 1756. He went to Germany in February to undertake this task, in which his functions seem to have been largely financial, but returned to England in May with part of the Hessian force as insurance against a possible French invasion. Soon after his return he was appointed colonel of the 15th Foot. This commission did not involve taking active command of the regiment, and he went back to Germany with the Hessian detachment in March 1757. Still responsible for the Hessians, he was present at the battle of Hastenbeck on 26 July 1757 when the Duke of Cumberland was defeated by the French.

In October Ligonier succeeded Cumberland as commander-in-chief, an office which gave him, under the crown, command of the

forces in Britain and a degree of direction over those in America, extending to the nomination of commanders. Lord Loudoun, in command in America, having failed to attack Louisbourg, Île Royale (Cape Breton Island), in 1757, Ligonier was determined to have the fortress taken in 1758, and it is clear that he saw Colonel Amherst, his former aide-de-camp, as the man for the task. The appointment to command the Louisbourg expedition was remarkable, not merely because Amherst was very junior in the army, but because so far as one can see all his operational experience had been on the staff; he had never commanded troops in action. Obtaining George II's sanction for the grant to Amherst of the local rank of "Major General in America" was a delicate operation, in which William Pitt, secretary of state for the Northern Department, and the Duke of Newcastle, the prime minister, seem to have sought the aid of the king's mistress, Lady Yarmouth. The king finally agreed at the end of 1757; the rank of "Brigadier in America" for James Wolfe*, one of Amherst's designated subordinates, was authorized at the same time.



Panoramic view of Louisbourg

Amherst sailed for America on 16 March 1758. It was a slow voyage. Pitt and Ligonier having issued detailed orders, including instructions that the expedition against Louisbourg sail before the end of May, Amherst's force was under way before he joined it. It left Halifax on 28 May, 157 sail of naval and transport vessels, and met Amherst just outside the harbour. The naval commander was Admiral Edward Boscawen*. The fleet anchored in Gabarus Bay, to the west of Louisbourg, on 2 June. The same day Amherst reconnoitred the shoreline with two of his brigadiers, Wolfe and Charles Lawrence*, the third, Edward Whitmore*, not having yet arrived. Before Amherst's arrival the plan had been to land to the east of Louisbourg. He decided to attack instead to the west of it. His first intention to


land at three different places was changed in favour of a single landing at Anse de la Cormorandière (Kennington Cove) with feints elsewhere. Since la Cormorandière was the place the French had entrenched most heavily, it was a questionable decision. Amherst seems to have been led to it by the observation that the surf was less severe there than elsewhere. Bad weather postponed the landing until the morning of 8 June. The dash and resolution of the advanced troops, and the leadership in particular of Wolfe and Major George Scott*, turned into success what might have been a disaster. Wolfe wrote afterwards, "Our landing was next to miraculous . . . I wouldn't recommend the Bay of Gabarouse for a descent, especially as we manag'd it."



Siege of Louisbourg

His army established ashore, Amherst undertook systematic European-style siege operations against Louisbourg. These were hampered in the beginning by continuing bad weather which interfered with landing guns. He used Wolfe as commander of a detached mobile force which was the most active element in the siege. On 12 June, hearing that the French had destroyed the Royal battery on the north side of the harbour and were calling in their outposts generally, he ordered Wolfe to move round the harbour and occupy Pointe à la Croix (Lighthouse Point), from which the Island battery and the French naval squadron in the harbour could be bombarded. Fire was opened from Pointe à la Croix on the 20th. (It appears that the surf had permitted the landing of guns east of the harbour, though on the main beach to the west none were landed until 18 June.) On the 26th, the Island battery having been silenced at least for the moment, Amherst asked Boscawen to provide guns to replace those at Pointe à la Croix so that Wolfe's force could come

back around the harbour, bringing their artillery, and both continue operations against the ships and "advance towards the West gate." From this time Wolfe directed the attack against the inner flank of the main fortifications of the town Amherst prepared his batteries with deliberate care, laboriously building an approach road to carry his guns across boggy ground and an epaulement to cover it from French fire. Wolfe's guns on the British left were firing early in July, but it appears that Amherst's main bombardment did not begin until the 22nd. Much damage was immediately done to the fortifications and the town. Amherst records that he ordered his artillery commander, Lieutenant-Colonel George Williamson, to direct his fire as much as possible at the defences, "that we might not destroy the Houses."



Ticonderoga attack plan


Relations between Amherst and Boscawen were excellent and the cooperation of army and navy left nothing to be desired. Wolfe wrote: "Mr. Boscawen has given all and even more than we cou'd ask of him . . ." (the contrast with his comments on the navy at Quebec the following year is marked). The French ships in the harbour were gradually worn down. The frigate *Aréthuse*, boldly handled by Jean Vauquelin, harassed Wolfe's force with her fire and interfered with the building of Amherst's epaulement, but on 9 July Wolfe's guns damaged her severely. On the night of the 14th–15th she got out of the harbour and away to France. On the 21st three naval vessels were burned. Two remained, *Prudent* and *Bienfaisant*. On the night of the 25th they were (to quote Wolfe again) "boarded by the boats of the [British] fleet with incredible audace and conduct, and taken

under the guns and within the reach of the musquetry of the ramparts." The end was now at hand. The Dauphin demi-bastion on Wolfe's flank had been breached and an assault was practicable. On 26 July the governor, Drucour [Boschenry*], asked for terms. Amherst and Boscawen replied that the garrison must become prisoners of war, and demanded an answer within an hour, failing which the town would be attacked by land and sea. After some painful discussion among the French officers, Drucour accepted, and the British occupied Louisbourg on 27 July. The French battalions, denied the honours of war, handed over their arms and colours. Drucour agreed that the French forces in Île Saint-Jean (Prince Edward Island) should be included in the capitulation.

Amherst's conduct of the siege was marked by the thoroughness and deliberation that became his trademarks. Wolfe, who in general respected Amherst, wrote, "our measures have been cautious and slow from the beginning to the end, except in landing where there was an appearance of temerity." Amherst wrote to Pitt on the day his troops entered Louisbourg, "If I can go to Quebeck I will," but there had never been much likelihood of attacking both Louisbourg and Quebec in one summer. Boscawen decided it was too late in the season, and the news of the reverse suffered by James Abercromby, the commander-in-chief in America, before Fort Carillon (Ticonderoga, N.Y.) on 8 July led Amherst to resolve to move to his assistance with five battalions. At the same time he sent detachments under Wolfe to destroy French settlements in the Gulf of St Lawrence and under Lord Rollo* to take over Île Saint-Jean; Colonel Robert Monckton was ordered to lay waste the communities in the Saint John valley (N.B.). Leaving a garrison at Louisbourg under Whitmore, Amherst sailed for Boston. There the grateful citizens attempted to make his whole force drunk,' and in great part succeeded. Amherst extricated his five battalions, marched them across country to Albany, New York, and himself reported to Abercromby at Lake George (Lac Saint-Sacrement). It was agreed that there could be no further action in that sector that year. Amherst made his way back to his own area of command at Halifax. There on 9 November he heard that Abercromby's defeat had led to that general's recall, while his own success at Louisbourg had made him commander-in-chief in America. He now went to New York, where he spent the winter making plans and logistic arrangements for the campaign of 1759.

It was clear to Amherst that there should be a double attack on Canada. It was necessary, he wrote to Lord George Sackville in January, "to lay the axe to the root, and there are but two roads to get to it, one up the River St Lawrence to Quebec, and the other to Ticonderoga and Montreal, we must go both to be sure of prospering

in one, and whichever of the two succeeds, the business is done." In London Pitt and Ligonier had already reached the same conclusion, and Wolfe, who had returned to England, was appointed to command the expedition up the St Lawrence. Although formally subordinated to Amherst, his command would in practice be independent, for



Oswego

communication with Amherst would be virtually impossible. On 29 Dec. 1758 Pitt sent detailed orders to Amherst. Much attention was given to Wolfe's enterprise and the measures to be taken in preparation for it. Amherst was also directed to invade Canada from the south with an army of regular and provincial troops: "by the Way of Crown Point [Fort Saint-Frédéric] or La Galette [at the head of the St Lawrence rapids], or both, according as you shall judge practicable, and proceed, if practicable, and attack Montreal or Quebec, or both of the said places successively," by a unified operation or with separate forces as he might see fit. His attention was directed to the importance of re-establishing the port of Oswego (Chouaguen) on Lake Ontario, and capturing Fort Niagara (near Youngstown, N.Y.). Before these orders reached him, Amherst was already "getting everything ready for a successful campaign." "I can't stay any longer for orders from England," he wrote Sackville, "if I do I shan't have time for preparing the necessary things, they will cost, but I hope I shall buy the country by it" He busied himself with obtaining from the various colonies the provincial troops that Pitt had asked them for, and with this purpose in mind made a quick visit in April 1759 to Philadelphia in an unsuccessful attempt to gain the cooperation of the Pennsylvania assembly. On 3 May he was at Albany preparing to open the campaign.

Amherst had succeeded in mobilizing a force of some 16,000 regular and provincial troops. Of these 5,000 were allotted to

Brigadier-General John Prideaux for the Oswego and Fort Niagara tasks; the rest, under Amherst himself, were to be employed in invading Canada by the Lake Champlain line. On 21 June he arrived at the head of Lake George with a large part of his army. Further advance would depend on water transport, and on sufficient naval power to overcome the French armed vessels on Lake Champlain. Large numbers of boats had been prepared, and these were dragged overland from the upper Hudson to Lake George, "batteaus on waggons and whaleboats on mens shoulders, 15 to a boat." On 21 July the army moved down the lake in boats formed in columns, and the following day landed close to Fort Carillon. The French commander, François-Charles de Bourlamaque*, withdrew his main force from the fort, leaving a small garrison; no attempt was made to defend the advanced lines which had defeated Abercromby. Amherst began a siege in form, but on 26 July the French retreated by water, blowing up the fort. The British boats were dragged around the falls above Carillon and launched on Lake Champlain. On 4 August the army moved up the narrow south arm of the lake to Fort Saint-Frédéric, where they found that Bourlamaque had blown up the post and withdrawn to Fort Île aux Noix in the Rivière Richelieu. Amherst, who seems to have been hypnotized by the Crown Point position, began to build an elaborate fortress here (its ditches, cut out of the solid rock, are still to be seen). "This is a great Post gained," he wrote, "secures entirely all the country behind it [i.e. to the south], and the situation and country about it is better than anything I have seen." Yet the fortress had little relevance in existing circumstances; the French had lost the initiative in North America. Information that Bourlamaque had four armed vessels at the north end of Lake Champlain led Amherst in September to enlarge his plans for a flotilla of his own. His naval assistant, Captain Joshua Loring, was already building a brig; now a large *radeau* or raft, capable of mounting heavy guns, was undertaken. An attempt to burn a new French vessel at Île aux Noix was unsuccessful, and it was decided to build a 16-gun sloop as soon as the brig was completed. Progress with this building program was slowed by repeated breakdowns of the one available sawmill. Finally, on 11 October, the imposing formation of craft carrying Amherst's army started down the lake, with the *radeau*, *Ligonier*, leading. Loring with the brig, *Duke of Cumberland*, and the sloop, *Boscawen*, went in search of the enemy's ships; on the 13th the French commander, Joannis-Galand d'Olabaratz, sank two of these to avoid capture and ran a third ashore. But on the 18th Amherst heard of the fall of Quebec a month before. He wrote in his journal, "This will of course bring Mons de Vaudreuil [Rigaud] & the whole Army to Montreal so that I shall decline my intended operations & get back to Crown Point." On this somewhat inglorious note his year's campaign ended.

The vital importance of naval control of Lake Champlain is of course beyond doubt, and the long process of building vessels was clearly the reason for the failure to obtain better results. Nevertheless, it is difficult not to feel that during the long summer of 1759 Amherst did not keep sufficiently before him what should have been his main object, assisting Wolfe's operations at Quebec. The capture of Fort Niagara – effected on 25 July, after Prideaux had been killed, by Sir William Johnson – immediately led Montcalm* to weaken his army at Quebec by sending troops west. Amherst's own cautious and ponderous operations had no such effect. More energy and more effective improvisation on his part might well have ended the war in Canada in 1759. As it was, another year's campaign was necessary.



William Pitt

Pitt's orders for 1760 indicated the capture of Montreal as "the great and essential object," and Amherst was instructed to invade Canada "according as you shall, from your knowledge of the Countries, thro' which the War is to be carried, and from emergent circumstances not to be known here, judge the same to be most expedient." He decided on a three-pronged attack: James Murray with the Quebec garrison moving up the St Lawrence, Brigadier-General William Haviland proceeding from Crown Point up Lake Champlain, and Amherst himself moving down the St Lawrence from Lake Ontario. The French would thus be obliged to divide their limited forces, and would be denied any possibility of retreat into the interior such as they had made after the battle of the Plains of Abraham. Again large forces were requisitioned from the colonies. Amherst's own army, over 10,000 strong, was by far the largest. As in 1759, the winter and spring were devoted to logistic planning and preparation. Large numbers of bateaux and whale boats were built. The late arrival of the provincial troops, who provided the labour to

move the boats and supplies, delayed the opening of the campaign, but from mid May great quantities of provisions were moving up the waterways and over the portages to Lake Champlain and Amherst's advanced base at Oswego.

On 9 July Amherst himself arrived at Oswego, and on the 14th two armed snows built by Loring at Niagara during the winter were sent east in the hope of capturing two French vessels similarly constructed. On 10 August Amherst embarked his army in boats and began the movement against Montreal. After the French vessel the *Outaouaise* was captured on the 17th by "rowgalleys" manned by the Royal Artillery under Colonel Williamson, the one man-made obstacle impeding the advance was Fort Lévis (east of Prescott, Ont.), on an island at the head of the rapids. Amherst besieged it formally, landing his artillery to bombard it. Captain Pierre Pouchot*, the French commander, made a determined defence, but the fort was battered into surrender on 25 August. The advance on Montreal now continued. Amherst lost 84 men drowned in the rapids on 4 September, but effective human resistance was at an end. On the 6th his army landed at Lachine on the island of Montreal and encamped before the city. Haviland had occupied Île aux Noix on 28 August and was now on the south shore of the St Lawrence opposite Montreal; Murray, having moved up the river without meeting serious opposition, was in position just below the city. Amherst wrote, "I believe never three Armys, setting out from different & very distant Parts from each other joyned in the Center, as was intended, better than we did." Striking it was; but it must be said that the precision of the junction owed something to luck.

The French defenders of Montreal were in an impossible situation. The Canadian militia had virtually all deserted, and the army at Vaudreuil's and Lévis's disposal had shrunk to little more than 2,000 men. The British forces amounted to 17,000. Vaudreuil asked for a suspension of operations, pending news from Europe. Amherst "said I was come to take Canada and I did not intend to take anything less." As at Louisbourg, he refused the French the honours of war, on the ground of the atrocities committed by their Indian allies. The French battalions burned their colours rather than give them up. Montreal, and with it Canada, was surrendered to Amherst on 8 Sept. 1760. The conquering general visited Quebec, with its already famous battlefields, before returning to his headquarters at New York.

Though the fighting with France in North America was virtually over, the war was not. Amherst as commander-in-chief was concerned with organizing expeditions against Dominica and Martinique in 1761 and in 1762 he sent a contingent to take part in

the attack on Havana, Cuba. In August 1762 he dispatched his younger brother William with a hastily collected force to recover St John's, Newfoundland, from the French under Charles-Henri-Louis d'Arsac de Ternay. News of peace in Europe came early in 1763. Almost immediately, however, Amherst began to receive from the west reports of Indian attacks which were the opening shots of Pontiac*'s uprising.



Robert Griffing Pontiac war

Amherst's dislike and contempt for the Indians are amply reflected in his journals and correspondence, though it may perhaps be doubted whether he was more bigoted than the average official of his time. As soon as active hostilities with France were over, he had begun to economize on presents to the tribes, though people closer to the problem (notably Sir William Johnson) believed that continued generosity would be better policy. Amherst wrote Johnson that he did not believe in "purchasing the good behavior, either of Indians, or any others"; "When Men of What race soever, behave ill they must be punished but not bribed." As commander-in-chief Amherst was responsible for Indian policy, and his attitude doubtless contributed to producing the outbreak of 1763. He was slow to believe that the trouble could be really serious; he underestimated the Indians' capacity for military action. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that these views in any way delayed measures to deal with the rising. The moment he heard reports of "bad designs" among the tribes he put the inadequate force of regulars available in the east on the road to

the threatened areas; when on 21 June he heard of Pontiac's blockade of Detroit [see Henry Gladwin] he wrote, "As I have made all preparations I am able to do, I had nothing remaining to be done on the receipt of this news." He did however make to Colonel Henry Bouquet the "detestable suggestion" (Francis Parkman's phrase) that smallpox might be introduced among the dissident Indians. Bouquet cheerfully offered to try to infect them with blankets, and perhaps as a result of Bouquet's orders an attempt was indeed made to do so with infected blankets and handkerchiefs. Early in August Bouquet's column marching to relieve Fort Pitt (Pittsburgh, Pa) inflicted a serious reverse on the Indians at Bushy Run. Amherst had thought of taking the field himself in 1764, but in fact he embarked for England, after over five years in North America, in November 1763. He wrote to a friend in the following February, "I may tell you for your own information only, that I have no thought of returning to America." And indeed, though he was to have many opportunities, he never again visited the continent where his name was made.



His successes in America had won Amherst honours, though these honours were not extravagant by the standards of those days. In September 1759 he had been made governor of Virginia. He never functioned actively in this office, and it was well understood that the position was a mere sinecure, worth some £1,500 a year. The appointment of commander-in-chief in America brought him the office of colonel-in-chief of the Royal Americans (60th Foot), in addition to the colonelcy of the 15th Foot which he retained. He was made a

substantive major-general in 1759 and a lieutenant-general in 1761. In the latter year he was made a knight of the Bath. After the death of his elder brother Sackville in 1763 he built a new country house, which he named Montreal, on the family estate near Sevenoaks. He does not seem to have been actively employed in the army at this period, but he declined successively the office of master general of the Ordnance in Ireland and the command of the forces there. In 1768 growing colonial discontent led King George III to the conclusion that there should be an active governor in Virginia, and Amherst was given the choice of going there or resigning the governorship and accepting an annuity instead. He took offence, rather unnecessarily it seems, and resigned his colonelcies. He was shortly reappointed to them, being given the 3rd Foot, a more lucrative appointment, instead of the 15th, but the rift with the king was fully closed only when he was made governor of Guernsey (1770) and lieutenant-general of the Ordnance (1772). In the absence of a commander-in-chief, this latter office seems to have made him in effect the king's chief military adviser.

In 1769 it was suggested to Amherst that he try to obtain a grant of the Jesuits' estates in Canada. The Jesuit order had been suppressed in France in 1762–64, and was in a state of suspended animation in Canada until 1775 when it was finally suppressed there too and its estates vested in the crown. Amherst had applied for a grant in 1769, and in 1770 an order in council directed the preparation of a legal instrument for it. No action was taken, however, supposedly for want of a precise description of the estates. Amherst raised the question again from time to time, and in 1787 the governor of Canada, Lord Dorchester [Guy Carleton*], was instructed to make a full inquiry into the status of the lands. Some agitation followed, both English and French speaking inhabitants of the colony arguing that the estates should be devoted to the support of education. The matter remained in abeyance. Since, however, it appeared that an undertaking had been given to Amherst, the British parliament in 1803, after his death, authorized an annuity of £3,000 to be paid to his heirs in lieu of the lands he had never received.

In January 1775 the king pressed Amherst to take the command in America, where war with the colonists was threatening. He declined, for reasons that remain uncertain. The following year he was raised to the peerage as Baron Amherst of Holmesdale. In 1778, on the urging of his ministers, the king again asked Amherst to take the American command, and again he refused. Later that year he was appointed in effect commander-in-chief, although it appears his actual title was general-on-the-staff; the *Army list* shows his rank of general as dating from 19 March 1778. In June 1780 he had the task of restoring order when London was devastated by the Gordon riots. He was dismissed from his command when Lord North's ministry

went out of office in 1782. At the beginning of 1793, when war with France was approaching, Amherst, though now 76 years of age, was recalled and appointed commander-in-chief with a seat in the cabinet. He retired again two years later, being succeeded by the Duke of York. Promoted field marshal as of 30 July 1796, he died on 3 Aug. 1797, and was buried in the parish church of Sevenoaks.

In May 1753 Amherst had married his second cousin, Jane Dalison. The marriage was childless. Jane appears to have had neurotic tendencies and Amherst probably was not an ideal husband. The fact that he had an illegitimate son, apparently born shortly before his marriage, of a mother whose identity is uncertain, may have contributed to estrange them. This son, also called Jeffery Amherst, rose to the rank of major-general and seems to have died in 1815. In 1760 Amherst told Pitt that while passing through England en route to Louisbourg in 1758, he had "made a promise" that no inducement would keep him in America willingly once the war was over; this promise was clearly made to his wife. When he returned in 1763, however, her depression had deepened into derangement, and she died in 1765. In 1767 Amherst married again, his second wife being Elizabeth, daughter of General George Cary. This marriage too was childless. Amherst's heir was his nephew, William Pitt Amherst, the son of his brother William. In 1788, after William's death, Amherst obtained from the crown the title of Baron Amherst of Montreal, Kent, with remainder to his nephew. William Pitt Amherst accordingly inherited the title. After a mission to China and a period as governor general of India he was created Earl Amherst of Arracan in 1826. In 1835 he was appointed governor of Canada, but as a result of the fall of the Peel ministry in England he never took up the appointment.

Jeffery Amherst sat for his portrait several times. Sir Joshua Reynolds' picture of him with the St Lawrence rapids in the background, the more conventional Reynolds portrait now in the National Gallery of Canada, and the Thomas Gainsborough portrait in the National Portrait Gallery of Great Britain have often been reproduced. His appearance accords with Sir Nathaniel William Wraxall's description of him: "His manners were grave, formal and cold."

Amherst had an unbroken record of success as a commander, but he was a solid rather than a brilliant soldier. He never conducted a battle; the successful siege of Louisbourg is the nearest thing to it. His style was slow and heavy, as the campaign of 1759 amply showed. But he was an organizer of victory, who left nothing to chance in the fields of supply and transport, and this thoroughness was what the war in America mainly required. Sir John Fortescue said of him, "He was the greatest military administrator produced by


England since the death of Marlborough, and remained the greatest until the rise of Wellington." That judgement may well be accepted.

C.P.Stacey

[There are two biographies of Amherst, neither completely satisfactory: L. S. Mayo, *Jeffery Amherst; a biography* (New York, 1916), and J. C. Long, *Lord Jeffery Amherst: a soldier of the king* (New York, 1933). Mayo's is in some ways the better book, though written without benefit of the Amherst papers, which did not come to light until 1925. Louis Des Cognets, *Amherst and Canada* (Princeton, N.J., 1962), is of limited value, but publishes letters not available elsewhere. Rex Whitworth, *Field Marshal Lord Ligonier: a story of the British army, 1702-1770* (Oxford, 1958), is very useful. Other printed sources of value are: *Correspondence of William Pitt* (Kimball); *Gentleman's Magazine*, 1765, 46; 1815, 91; G.B., Hist. mss Commission, *Report on the manuscripts of Mrs. Stopford-Sackville* . . . (2v., London, 1904-10); House of Commons, *Journals* (London), 58 (1802-3); *Burke's peerage* (1963); *DAB*; *DNB*; G.B., WO, *Army list*; Burt, *Old prov. of Que.*; R. C. Dalton, *The Jesuits' estates question, 1760-1888: a study of the background for the agitation of 1889* (Toronto, 1968); J. P. De Castro, *The Gordon riots* (London, 1926); J. W. Fortescue, *A history of the British army* (13v. in 14, London, 1899-1930), II; F. W. Hamilton, *The origin and history of the First or Grenadier Guards* . . . (3v., London, 1874); Francis Parkman, *The conspiracy of Pontiac and the Indian war after the conquest of Canada* (2v., Boston, 1910), and *Montcalm and Wolfe* (2v., Boston, 1884; repr. New York, 1962); Shy, *Toward Lexington*; Stacey, *Quebec, 1759*; [H.] B. Willson, *The life and letters of James Wolfe* (London, 1909); J. M. Hitsman and C. C. J. Bond, "The assault landing at Louisbourg, 1758," *CHR*, XXXV (1954), 314-30; Bernhard Knollenberg, "General Amherst and germ warfare," *Mississippi Valley Hist. Rev.* (Cedar Rapids, Iowa), XLI (1954-55), 489-94 (see also 762-63); Rex Whitworth, "Field-Marshal Lord Amherst, a military enigma," *History Today* (London), IX (1959), 132-37.

The voluminous Amherst papers are in great part available at the PAC. Amherst's military papers are in the PRO as WO 34; the PAC has microfilms. Large portions of Amherst's more private papers are in the PAC in the form of transcripts, gathered in MG 18, L4. Among these private papers are Amherst's invaluable journals for the years 1756-63. The journals from 14 Jan. 1758 to the end are published in Amherst, *Journal* (Webster). A more limited version intended for contemporary publication forms app. 1 to vol. III of Knox, *Hist. journal* (Doughty); the originals are in PRO, CO 5/54-63. See also [William Amherst], *Journal of William Amherst in America, 1758-1760*, intro. J. C. Webster (London and Frome, Eng., 1927). The Bouquet papers, containing a good deal of correspondence with

Amherst, are in BL, Add. mss 21631–60 (transcripts in PAC, MG 21, G1); the notorious reference to infecting the Indians with smallpox is in Add. mss 21634 (vol. 4 of the PAC transcripts). c.p.s.]



FORBES (fforbes), JOHN, army officer; b. 5 Sept. 1707 (o.s.) in Edinburgh, Scotland, son of Elizabeth Graham and posthumous son of Lieutenant-Colonel John Forbes of Pittencrief, Fifeshire; d. unmarried 11 March 1759 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

John Forbes began his military career, after abandoning a medical one, by purchasing a cornet's commission in the Scots Greys, dated 16 July 1735. At the battle of Fontenoy (Belgium) in May 1745 he served as captain and aide-de-camp to Sir James Campbell, commander of the British cavalry. The same year he was promoted major and lieutenant-colonel in the army, and saw service in the suppression of the 1745 rising in Scotland, including action at Culloden. Again in Flanders, he served as aide-de-camp to Sir John Ligonier in the disastrous defeat at Laffeldt, 2 July 1747. The following year he became quartermaster-general on the Duke of Cumberland's own staff, and in 1750 was made lieutenant-colonel in the Scots Greys.

Forbes came to Halifax in the summer of 1757, as colonel of the 17th Regiment of Foot and adjutant-general to Lord Loudoun [John Campbell], in which capacity he supervised the arrest of Lord Charles Hay. Forbes was promoted brigadier-general 28 December, and the following March, probably on Ligonier's recommendation, was given his first independent command, the expedition against Fort Duquesne (Pittsburgh, Pa.). This same assignment had lured a 2,500-man army under veteran Major-General Edward Braddock to disaster three years earlier.

Much of the spring and summer of 1758 Forbes spent in Philadelphia, gathering men and means for the expedition. Difficulties in obtaining colonial troops, supplies, and wagons, together with the onset of his own fatal illness, brought irritating delays. Intercolonial trade and land rivalries flared over the route: should Forbes follow Braddock's road, as favoured by the Virginians, or cut a new road west from Raystown (Bedford),

Pennsylvania, as that colony urged? Distance, forage and supply considerations, and dangers of flooding at several points on Braddock's road led Forbes to choose the new road, and hold firmly to his decision. When finally gathered, his force consisted of about 5,000 colonial militia, 1,400 Montgomery's Highlanders, 400 Royal Americans, and 40 artillerymen.

Convinced that Braddock's supply system in 1755 had been so weak that a withdrawal would have been necessary even after victory, Forbes was determined to build a supply road marked by defensible stockades and forts no more than 40 miles apart. He claimed to have learned this strategy from Turpin de Crissé's *Essai sur l'art de la guerre* but must have come to appreciate it from experience in Scotland and as quartermaster-general in Flanders. Forbes' fortified road was a clear and eminently successful application of the theory. His attack was not to be a raid but a permanent conquest, and, as the Virginians feared, the road proved to be an enduring route to the Ohio country from Pennsylvania.

Supervision of road construction and forward positions fell to the able Colonel Henry Bouquet, as Forbes' "bloody flux" continued. By September, when he reported that his health was improved, Forbes could travel only in a litter slung between two horses. Without his order, first contact was made with the defenders of Fort Duquesne on 14 September when an 800-man advance party under Major James Grant was defeated. For ten weeks this victory seemed to the French to have secured the fort, and the garrison under François-Marie Le Marchand de Lignery was reduced for the winter.

Harassed by bad weather and the unending claims that Braddock's road would have been quicker, Forbes nevertheless made good use of time. Aside from Grant's adventure, no contact with Fort Duquesne was made until a conference between colonial officials and Indians at Easton, Pennsylvania, in October 1758, encouraged by Forbes, had won the neutrality of the Delawares, Shawnees, and Mingos. Although late autumn brought problems for the advancing English, it weakened the French by reducing cover for raiding parties and urging their remaining Indian allies to their winter hunting grounds. By out-waiting his opponents, Forbes achieved a bloodless conquest. On 24 November, when his force was within a day's march of the fort, the garrison blew it up and retreated. Forbes took possession of the smouldering site, which he renamed Pittsburgh, 193 miles and five months from the beginning of his road, and five days before the expiry of service of his colonial troops.


In fortifying his road, Forbes intended it to be defensible against Indian and Canadian raiding parties, and the raids attempted the following winter all failed. The road was safe, and so were the frontier settlements that had been terrorized by incursions from Fort Duquesne since Braddock's defeat. The Indians of the upper Ohio had made their peace with the victors. Forbes' caution, thoroughness, and tenacity had succeeded; he had delivered the upper Ohio to British control.

Forbes returned to Philadelphia in January 1759, bearing visible evidence of the progress of his illness. He died on 11 March, aged 51, and

the colony afforded him a funeral befitting one of their own heroes. He was buried in the chancel of Christ Church, Philadelphia.

I. K. Steele

BM, Add. mss, 21630–60 (Bouquet papers). Henry E. Huntington Library (San Marino, Calif.), Abercromby papers, Loudoun papers. PRO, CO 5/50; WO 34/44, 34/76. Scottish Record Office (Edinburgh), Dalhousie Muniments, GD 45/2. [Henry Bouquet], *The papers of Col. Henry Bouquet, II: the Forbes expedition*, ed. S. K. Stevens et al. (Harrisburg, 1951). [John Forbes], *Writings of General John Forbes*, ed. A. P. James (Menasha, Wis., 1938). Knox, *Historical journal* (Doughty). *Pennsylvania Gazette* (Philadelphia), 15 March 1759. DAB. DNB. J. W. Fortescue, *History of the British army* (13v., London, 1899–1930), II. D. S. Freeman, *George Washington: a biography* (7v., New York, 1948–57), II. Gipson, *British empire before the American revolution*, VII. A. B. Hulbert, *Historic highways of America* (16v., Cleveland, Ohio, 1902–5), V. Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, II. Lancelot Turpin de Crissé, *Essai sur l'art de la guerre* (2v., Paris, 1754).



GAGE, THOMAS, army officer and colonial administrator; b. 1719 or 1720, the second son of Thomas Gage, 1st Viscount Gage in the Irish peerage, and his first wife, Benedicta Maria Theresa Hall; d. 2 April 1787 in London, England.

The Gages of Firlie in Sussex were an old Catholic family. Thomas Gage's parents found it expedient to convert to the Church of England in 1715, but though they resumed the old faith before their deaths, their son was raised and remained an Anglican. He attended Westminster School in London and subsequently entered military service; by 1743 he was a captain in the 62nd Foot. In 1745 he was aide-de-camp to the Earl of Albemarle at Fontenoy (Belgium), fought at Culloden the next year, and in 1747–48 was again aide-de-camp to Albemarle in Flanders. He was stationed in Ireland from 1748 to 1755 with the 44th Foot, becoming its lieutenant-colonel by purchase on 2 March 1750/51.

Gage's career to this point had been of no particular distinction. When Major-General Edward Braddock was sent to America in 1755 with the 44th and 48th Foot to halt French advances in the Ohio country, James [Wolfe*](#) observed a little condescendingly that "My honest friend Gage is to be of the Ohio party." Gage's part in the disaster that overtook Braddock's force near the forks of the Ohio on 9 July aroused some controversy, it being claimed that as commander of the advance party he should have stopped the rout of the head of the column, which caused the disorganization of the main force. Gage displayed personal bravery in the encounter; one witness (possibly Gabriel [Christie](#)) stated that he "distinguish'd himself by Encouraging the men as much as he Could and after they were broke, in rallying them." It is equally clear that he failed to take possession of the high ground from

which the French and Indians launched their attack, perhaps because, as he later claimed, he lacked irregular forces.

In his subsequent career in America, Gage earned a reputation as a sound officer and an effective administrator. In 1757 Lord Loudoun, then commander-in-chief, thought the 44th one of his two best regiments because Gage "keeps up Discipline Strictly; the Regt is in Rags but look like Soldiers." Gage saw little active service under Loudoun, although he did accompany him to Halifax, Nova Scotia, on the "cabbage planting expedition" of 1757, when plans to attack Louisbourg, Île Royale (Cape Breton Island), went awry. Gage was convinced that Braddock would not have been defeated had he possessed regular troops trained for forest war and in December 1757, taking advantage of Loudoun's displeasure with the conduct of Robert Rogers' ranger companies, he proposed to raise a regular regiment of light troops, provided the government met the costs and appointed him its colonel. The regiment so raised was the 80th, the first in the British army to be trained in both regular and irregular tactics. In 1758 it served in Abercromby's assault upon Fort Carillon (Ticonderoga, N.Y.), where Gage, second in command after the death of Viscount Howe (George Augustus Howe), was slightly wounded. He had recruited the regiment in New Jersey, and found a wife there as well. On 8 Dec. 1758 he married Margaret, the daughter of Peter Kemble, a wealthy New Jersey merchant and politician, and Gertrude Bayard, who was connected with the important Schuyler, De Lancey, and Van Cortlandt families of New York. Five daughters and six sons were to be born to the couple. By the time of his marriage Gage had become a brigadier-general in America.

In July 1759 Gage got his first independent command. Amherst ordered him to take the French post at La Galette (near Ogdensburg, N.Y.) to help Wolfe's siege of Quebec and to "make a frontier" along with Crown Point (N.Y.), Oswego, and Niagara (near Youngstown) in case Wolfe was defeated. Before he reached Oswego to take over from Sir William Johnson, Amherst further directed him to advance toward Montreal after capturing La Galette. Gage's subsequent conduct disclosed his shortcomings as a commander. Doubts assailed him even as he reached Oswego; he told Johnson that he did not believe in "running his head against a wall, or attempting impossibilities." Rather than viewing his command as a chance to achieve strategic results by applying pressure from the west, he saw only problems. The Oswego defences needed strengthening, supplies were short, French vessels controlled the St Lawrence, and La Galette, if taken, would prove vulnerable to counter-attack during the winter. In a "long discourse" with Johnson on 6 September, he argued that Amherst had left his assistance to Wolfe too late, and that unless a concerted movement was made upon Montreal, "an expedition this way would be of no service." Four days later he wrote to Amherst informing him of his decision not to attack the French post or move on Montreal. But Johnson's scouts inconveniently reported La Galette to be lightly held, and Gage thereupon consulted his senior officers. Finding them divided, he decided to stick to his original decision. A furious Amherst upbraided Gage for missing a great opportunity, charging that he and his officers had "found out difficulties where there are none." This criticism was not altogether fair, but certainly Gage's chief virtues as a soldier were caution and a diligent attention to details, not

boldness and the urge to battle. Where another man might have seen a golden opportunity to end the war in 1759, he saw only obstacles. It is noteworthy that when Amherst took Montreal in 1760, Gage commanded the rearguard.



Despite their differences, Amherst respected Gage's administrative capacities and in September 1760 appointed him military governor of Montreal, along with Ralph [Burton](#)* at Trois-Rivières; James [Murray](#) was already military governor at Quebec. Gage was the senior officer of the three, and in 1761 was promoted major-general, but he never claimed authority over the others, and indeed referred to the military governors collectively as "the Three Kings." Characteristically, he thought of himself "in no other light, than as a Military Governor," appointed by Amherst, responsible only to him, and under his orders and direction. Thus in May 1763, when the Board of Trade sent him a series of questions about Canada, he told Amherst that since "I know of no general Governor thereof (but yourself as Commander in Chief)," he had sent duplicates of the questionnaire to Murray and Burton.

There is no full account of Gage as military governor of Montreal, although his biographer John Alden has a short chapter on the subject and brief references are to be found in Alfred Leroy Burt*, *The old province of Quebec* (2v., Toronto and Minneapolis, Minn., 1933; repr. Toronto, 1968), and in Hilda Neatby*, *Quebec: the revolutionary age, 1760-1791* (Toronto, 1966). That the three governments were separate jurisdictions and their governors responsible to Amherst seems either to have been missed or to have been treated perfunctorily by most historians. Burt was certainly aware of the situation, and indeed draws attention to Gage's distinctive policy with respect to the administration of justice, while Neatby mentions specific actions taken by Gage within his jurisdiction. But quite naturally their attention, and that of other historians, focussed on Murray, since he was governor of Quebec, the capital of the colony and its traditional centre. Gage's work at Montreal merits more attention than it can be given here, in part because of his special responsibility for the fur trade and the interior.

Since Amherst chose never to intervene significantly in the administration of Canada, the three governors were virtually supreme within their territories, and since they consulted one another infrequently, their administrations in some respects took different paths. It is true that Murray and Burton came to Montreal in early 1762 to discuss, among other things, the danger of famine in the District of Quebec, and also that during the period when Frederick [Haldimand](#) replaced Burton at Trois-Rivières, Gage had some influence on him, as their correspondence shows. Since there was so little interchange among the governors it was scarcely surprising that Gage should note, "I don't find, in many Particulars, that we have all acted alike." Nevertheless, there were no radical divergences; for the most part Gage, like his colleagues, was content to discover and apply the laws and customs of New France. Thus he enforced the king's right to feudal dues upon the sale or transfer of seigneuries and obliged all new seigneurs "to do Homage for their Manors, according to Custom." On the whole he seems to have favoured the seigneurs in their disputes with tenants; he supported them in deciding against those to whom land had been conceded but who had failed to take occupancy, and in ruling that tenants must pay their dues in "current money" rather than in the discredited paper of the former régime. In his ordinances regulating such varied matters as snow removal, garbage disposal, and the maintenance of roads, bridges, and ferries he conformed to the traditional procedures of the intendancy. In the same vein were his ordinances against forestalling and coin-clipping, and his regulation of the prices of such necessities as bread and firewood, in the latter case because high prices were "to the great prejudice of the poor, and caused solely by the avidity of the owners."

In important respects Gage departed from previous practice. He made innovative use, for example, of the captains of militia in their judicial capacity. Instead of retaining the courts of individual captains, as Murray did, one of his first acts in Montreal was to constitute all the captains of the town as a single court, to meet weekly to "settle all disputes of private individuals." He found that this system worked well, telling Amherst that the captains had "acted with so much uprightness and Justice in their Decisions, as to gain great Reputation to themselves, & to ease me of a great deal of Trouble." As a result, in 1761 he extended the arrangement to the rest of his territory, in order to make justice "more prompt and easy and less expensive to those who are obliged to have recourse to it." Haldimand copied the system in Trois-Rivières, and in both governances it remained unchanged until the commencement of civil rule.

Gage was also innovative in his attitude toward trade. The French policy of granting monopolies for the interior fur trade was not "Worthy our Imitations," he thought, and in an ordinance of 1 April 1761 he declared that "the trade is free for everybody" though subject to a passport system. He believed that the interior trade should be controlled by restricting the number of posts and placing them under the surveillance of military detachments in order to prevent trouble with the Indians, a policy he was later to promote as commander in chief, in collaboration with Sir William Johnson. He was nevertheless generally sympathetic towards merchants, whether French or English, and feared what he termed the "heavy hand" of the Board of Trade. Unless the Board cramped Canada's

trade, he thought the province would become a rich and flourishing one, attractive to people of property, and a place where "many branches of Trade will be struck out, which the French never thought of, or were prevented from pursuing." He was encouraged in 1762 when some of the Canadian merchants began to trade their furs on the London market.



French Surrender in Montreal

While in Montreal Gage was regarded as an honest, fair, and conscientious administrator, a reputation he was to enjoy in the southern colonies as well. There is no reason to doubt his assertion that he had endeavoured to treat the Canadians with kindness and humanity, and had made it his business to protect them in their laws, religion, and property, despite the fact that his private feelings for some elements of the population were unfriendly. He cared little for the seigneurs, especially the officers among them; "the sooner these Croix de S^t. Louis, with the rest of the idle Noblesse, leave the Country, the better it will be for it." As for the priests, "those black Gentry," he distrusted them all as the hidden promoters of French influence.

By 1763 Gage was ready to give up his command and return to England; as he told Amherst, it was not that he was tired of America, but "very much of this cursed Climate, and I must be bribed very high to stay here any longer." He was. In October he left Montreal for New York, where he became acting commander-in-chief on Amherst's departure the next month. Confirmed in this appointment in 1764, he remained in it until his recall in 1775. His work in this post touched the northern colonies in many ways, not only with respect to their military establishments but also in such

matters as Indian affairs. But his chief concerns were with the thirteen southern colonies, especially as politics there grew more turbulent.

Gage's advice to the home government on the situation in America was invariably cautious. Yet while on leave in England in 1774 he encouraged George III to believe that strong measures would curb the Americans, a point of view he had expressed in private letters for some years. Summarizing Gage's views, the king told Lord North, the prime minister, that Gage "says they will be Lyons, whilst we are Lambs but if we take the resolute part they will undoubtedly prove very meek." He returned to America in May 1774 with the additional post of governor of Massachusetts, and his early dispatches led the home government to believe that the crisis was passing. Subsequently, however, the situation worsened; Gage transferred the bulk of his forces to Boston, where they were to be effectually locked up; and during September and October gave such bleak accounts to Lord Dartmouth, secretary of state for the American Colonies, that he lost all credit at home. On receipt of Dartmouth's instructions "to take a more active & determined part," he ordered the seizure of rebel stores at Concord on 19 April 1775 that inaugurated hostilities in the revolutionary war.

Gage has been held responsible by a number of American historians for encouraging the use of Indians against the rebels. As early as 4 Sept. 1774, when withdrawing two regiments from Quebec to reinforce the Boston garrison, he asked Governor Guy [Carleton*](#) whether it would be possible to raise "a Body of Canadians and Indians" for service outside the province "should matters come to Extremities." He waited, however, until some Stockbridge Indians had been identified among the American forces investing Boston before telling Dartmouth, on 12 June 1775, that "we need not be tender of calling upon the Savages, as the Rebels have shewn us the Example." As his critics have suggested, this was something of a pretext; Gage himself admitted to Carleton that the Stockbridges were scarcely the formidable Indians of the frontiers but rather "what the French would call Domiciliés, and not of great worth." But Gage cannot be saddled with major responsibility for the Indian participation in the revolution. Indian peoples such as the Six Nations had good reason to enter the war, and it was inevitable that most Indian tribes would side with the British.

By mid 1775 Gage's days in America were numbered. In June Lord George Germain, the new secretary of state for the American Colonies, anticipated his removal when he observed that despite his good qualities, Gage was "in a situation of too great importance for his talents." Though a capable administrator, Gage had never shown high military abilities and indeed had lost the confidence of his troops and senior officers [see John [Burgoyne](#)]. He was recalled in August, ostensibly for consultations, and sailed from Boston on 10 October. His only further military appointment was to command the defence forces of Kent in 1781. In 1782 he was made a full general.

Thomas Gage was a representative product of the 18th-century British army. His family and political connections, the system of purchase, and his own solid administrative abilities had helped him rise to positions of

responsibility. His personal reputation as a fair-minded commander, a devoted family man, and an amiable and charming host remained unblemished. In Montreal all these qualities won him a reputation as a just and competent governor. As a soldier, however, his record in actual operations was not distinguished. Neither in the La Galette affair nor during the far more complex crisis in Boston in 1774–75 did he display the political and strategic grasp which those situations demanded.

[S. F. Wise](#)

[The volume of documents relating to Thomas Gage is immense. The largest collections are in the Clements Library, University of Michigan, and in the PRO, CO 5 series. Selections from these collections are printed in *Correspondence of General Thomas Gage* (Carter). Gage's correspondence with Amherst from 1758 to 1760 can be found in PAC, MG 11, which contains transcripts of CO 5/56–59, and his correspondence with Amherst during his governorship of Montreal in PAC, MG 13, which contains transcripts of PRO, WO 34/5. His correspondence with Frederick Haldimand from 1758 to 1763 is in PAC, MG 21, which contains transcripts of BL, Add. mss 21661.

J. R. Alden, *General Gage in America; being principally a history of his role in the American revolution* (Baton Rouge, La., 1948), is a scholarly and sympathetic biography. Much less favourable are two studies by John Shy, *Toward Lexington*, and "Thomas Gage, weak link of empire," in *George Washington's opponents: British generals and admirals in the American revolution*, ed. G. A. Billias (New York, 1969). Short biographies are included in the *DAB* and the *DNB*.

Sources for particular episodes in Gage's career are as follows: for the Braddock expedition, *Military affairs in North America, 1748–65* (Pargellis) and *Correspondence of William Shirley* (Lincoln), II. Captain Robert Orme of Braddock's staff attributed the disaster to the collapse of Gage's advance party, and to "a manner of fighting" to which the troops were unused (*Correspondence of William Shirley*, II, 208). In response to an inquiry instituted by Shirley, the new commander-in-chief, Gage and Thomas Dunbar, the two regimental commanders, claimed that the morale of the troops was low, partly because of the influence of "the Provincial Troops and Country People," who had told them that "if they engaged the Indians in their European manner of fighting, they would be beat." They also drew attention to the shortage of light troops – only "three or four" scouts were in front of the column – and to "the Novelty of an invisible Enemy and the Nature of the Country, which was entirely a Forest" (*Correspondence of William Shirley*, II, 313). Shirley did not accept this response. He blamed Gage for failing to occupy the high ground and for losing control of the vanguard, but agreed that the French should be imitated in their use of screens of irregulars to protect regular forces. Alden (pp.24–27) argues that Gage lacked the requisite authority to occupy the high ground, while Shy (*Toward Lexington*) and L. H. Gipson (*The British empire before the American revolution* (15v., Caldwell, Idaho, and New York, 1936–70), VI, chap.4) take the view that he should have displayed more initiative. Contemporary descriptions of the action are found in *Military affairs*, 96–

117. For Loudoun, see Pargellis, *Lord Loudoun*, 234, 299–305. Sir William Johnson's revealing account of Gage's hesitations in 1759 is in Knox, *Hist. journal* (Doughty), III, 187–232; see also Amherst, *Journal* (Webster).

There is no full account of Gage as military governor of Montreal, though brief references are in Burt, *Old prov. of Que.*, and Nearby, *Quebec*. Gage's ordinances as governor are printed in PAC *Report*, 1918, app.B, 21–77, and his "Report of the state of the Government of Montreal" of 20 March 1762 in *Docs. relating to constitutional history, 1759–91* (Shortt and Doughty; 1918), I, 91–95. Excerpts from his correspondence with Carleton in 1774–75 are in *ibid.*, II, 583–84, and 661–62.

Indictments of Gage for encouraging the use of the Indians can be found, in descending order of vehemence, in Allen French, *The first year of the American revolution* (Boston, 1934; repr. New York, 1968), 403–10; J. M. Sosin, "The use of Indians in the war of the American revolution: a re-assessment of responsibility," *CHR*, XLVI (1965), 101–21; and D. [R.] Higginbotham, *The war of American independence: military attitudes, policies, and practice, 1763–1789* (New York, 1971), 319–22. The inevitability of Indian participation is argued in S. F. Wise, "The American revolution and Indian history," *Character and circumstance: essays in honour of Donald Grant Creighton*, ed. J. S. Moir (Toronto, 1970), 182–200. s.f.w.]



WOLFE, JAMES, army officer, commander of the British expedition that took Quebec in 1759; b. 2 Jan. 1727 (n.s.) at Westerham, England; d. 13 Sept. 1759 of wounds received in the battle of the Plains of Abraham. He was the son of Lieutenant-General Edward Wolfe, a respectable but not particularly distinguished officer, and Henrietta Thompson.

James Wolfe was educated in schools at Westerham and at Greenwich, to which the family moved in 1738; in 1740 he was prevented by illness from taking part as a volunteer in the expedition against Cartagena (Colombia), in which his father was a staff officer; and in 1741 he received his first military appointment, as second lieutenant in the 1st Regiment of Marines, of which Edward Wolfe was colonel. He never actually served with the marines, however, and in 1742 exchanged into the 12th Foot as an ensign and went with that regiment to Belgium. The following year, at the age of 16, he underwent his baptism of fire in Bavaria at the battle of Dettingen, and thereafter was promoted lieutenant. In 1744 he was appointed captain in the 4th Foot and in 1745 he returned to England with the army withdrawn to deal with Prince Charles Edward's invasion. In January 1746 he was present at the British defeat at Falkirk, Scotland. He was shortly afterwards made aide-de-camp to Lieutenant-General Henry Hawley. In this capacity he took part in the battle of Culloden (16 April 1746), and may or may not have refused to obey an order from William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland, to shoot a wounded Highlander. In January 1747 he returned to the continent, where the 4th Foot was serving, and on 2 July was wounded in the battle of Laffeldt (Belgium). Following a period on leave in England he was sent back to the Low Countries as a brigade major. When in 1748 the War of the Austrian Succession ended, he was appointed major in the 20th Foot, then stationed in Scotland. He became acting lieutenant-colonel and in practice commander of the

regiment as a result of Edward [Cornwallis*](#)' appointment to the governorship of Nova Scotia. While stationed at Glasgow Wolfe studied Latin and mathematics. Most of the next few years he spent in Scotland, the regiment being part of the time engaged in road-building. He was confirmed as lieutenant colonel in 1750. In 1752 he visited Ireland and that autumn went to Paris, where he stayed six months. Thereafter he rejoined the 20th Foot in Scotland and subsequently moved with it to the south of England.



Rochefort

Wolfe's first active service in the Seven Years' War was as quartermaster-general to the expedition of 1757 against Rochefort on the French Biscay coast. This was a fiasco, nothing effective being even attempted. Wolfe's own part in the affair is not so clear as his biographers indicate; but he seems to have made a reconnaissance and suggested an offensive plan. His evidence before the subsequent inquiry into the conduct of his friend Sir John Mordaunt, the military commander, was naturally restrained; privately he wrote scathingly of the failure to make an attack. His own reputation seems to have profited rather than suffered; immediately after the failure the 2nd battalion of the 20th Foot was converted into a new regiment, the 67th, and he was appointed its colonel. This was the highest substantive rank he was to achieve.

In January 1758 came further evidence that Wolfe was regarded as a particularly valuable soldier. A comparatively junior officer, Colonel Jeffery [Amherst*](#), was promoted major-general and placed in command of an expedition to proceed against Louisbourg, Île Royale (Cape Breton Island). Wolfe was given local rank as "Brigadier in America" and made one of Amherst's three brigade commanders, the others being Charles Lawrence, the governor of Nova Scotia, and Edward [Whitmore](#), who was also already

in the American theatre. In February he embarked in Admiral Edward Boscawen's flagship *Princess Amelia*, which reached Halifax only on 9 May. Amherst had not yet arrived. While the force waited for him, training exercises were carried out, and Boscawen and the brigadiers made plans for the landing at Louisbourg. On 28 May the expedition sailed from Halifax without the military commander, but luckily met him just outside the harbour. The fleet and transports anchored in Gabarus Bay, close to Louisbourg, on 2 and 3 June. On the evening of the 2nd, Amherst with Lawrence and Wolfe "reconnoitred the shore as near as we could." Amherst, dissenting from the plan made before his arrival, which provided for landings east of Louisbourg, had decided instead to land to the west of it. According to the author of the anonymous "Journal of the expedition against Louisburg" in Robert [Monckton](#)*'s papers – Monckton himself was not present – Wolfe "opposed this Attack in Council"; he nevertheless played a leading part in executing it.

Bad weather postponed the landing until 8 June. Wolfe, with the grenadier companies of the army, the improvised light infantry battalion commanded by Major George Scott, the ranger companies, and Fraser's Highlanders, was to make the genuine attack on the left in the Anse de la Cormorandière (Kennington Cove) while Lawrence's brigade made one feint farther east at Pointe Platte (Simon Point) and Whitmore's another, still closer to the town, at White Point. The French had in fact entrenched themselves above the chosen beach, and as soon as the boats came close they opened heavy musketry and artillery fire upon them. Wolfe is said to have signalled the boats to sheer off. A few of them carrying the light infantry nevertheless reached the shore and landed their men in a rocky area just east of the beach, and in spite of the rocks and the surf which damaged or wrecked many boats they were quickly reinforced, Wolfe himself setting a bold example. Seized with panic, the French, led by Jean [Masle](#) de Saint-Julhien, abandoned their position, and Lawrence's and Whitmore's brigades, moving in behind Wolfe's, landed in their turn. The British force thus got ashore with relatively little loss and was ready to begin siege operations, though these were delayed by continuing bad weather which prevented landing guns and stores.

During the weeks of the siege Wolfe did not command a brigade in the usual sense. The force under him was an *ad hoc* grouping of élite troops, especially light infantry and grenadiers; Amherst at first used this force for a detached task, while Whitmore and Lawrence (who are scarcely mentioned in Amherst's journal or other contemporary accounts) held the line at large. On 12 June Amherst found that the French had evacuated and destroyed the Grand or Royal battery on the north side of the harbour, and the Lighthouse battery on the east side of the entrance. He ordered Wolfe with (according to one version) 1,200 men of the line, four companies of grenadiers, three ranger companies, and some light infantry to move round the harbour to the Lighthouse Point, with a view to setting up batteries there to silence the Island battery in the harbour mouth and destroy the enemy ships in the harbour; the necessary guns were sent by sea. Wolfe's batteries opened fire against the Island battery and the ships on the night of 19 June, and had silenced the battery by the evening of the 25th. Amherst then instructed Wolfe to come back around the harbour with his

artillery (which was replaced in the Lighthouse batteries by naval guns) and to "try to destroy the shipping, and to advance towards the west-gate." From this time Wolfe may be said to have commanded the left or northernmost attack against the fortress. A reference in the contemporaneously published version of Amherst's journal for 3 July to Wolfe "making an advanced work on the right" has misled various writers; Amherst's personal version edited by [J. C. Webster*](#) indicates that this was actually done by the engineer Major Patrick [Mackellar*](#). By this time Wolfe's new batteries were firing actively at the ships, and on 6 July the frigate *Aréthuse*, commanded by Jean [Vauquelin*](#), which had greatly impeded the besiegers' progress with her own fire, was forced to leave her position off the lagoon called the Barachois. Wolfe continued to push his batteries closer to the town defences and increasing damage was done to them as well as to the vessels. On 21 July one of his shot set a French ship on fire; the fire spread to two others and all three were destroyed. In the early morning of the 26th a British naval cutting-out force entered the harbour and captured the two remaining French ships. Plans for moving the British ships into the harbour and undertaking a joint assault by army and navy were forestalled when on the same day Governor Drucour [\[Boschenry\]](#) surrendered. Wolfe had undoubtedly shown himself throughout the siege to be an unusually efficient and active officer, and his merits were forcibly brought to the attention of the British government and people by the prompt publication of Amherst's journal and other accounts.



Admiral Boscawen

Admiral Boscawen decided, probably wisely, that it was too late in the season to push on the campaign to Quebec. Wolfe had favoured this bold measure, and on 8 August, in a letter to Amherst that seems to verge on the insolent, he urged that in its place "we might make an offensive and a destructive war in the Bay of Fundy and in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. I beg pardon for this freedom, but I cannot look coolly upon the bloody inroads of those hell-hounds the Canadians; and if nothing further is to be done, I must desire leave to quit the army." Perhaps as a result of this suggestion,

Monckton (who had sat out the siege of Louisbourg at Halifax) was sent to destroy the French settlements in the Saint John valley; [Lieutenant-Colonel Lord Rollo](#) to take possession of Île Saint-Jean (Prince Edward Island); and Wolfe, with three battalions convoyed by a naval squadron of nine sail under Sir Charles Hardy, to lay waste the settlements and fishery in the Gulf of St Lawrence. Leaving Louisbourg on 29 August, the squadron anchored off Grande-Grève in Gaspé Bay on 4 September. The affair is described in some detail in the journal of Captain Thomas Bell*, who was evidently already acting as an aide-de-camp to Wolfe and who held this appointment in the Quebec campaign the following year. Most inhabitants of the region had fled into the woods, but some were taken prisoner and attempts were made to use them to negotiate with the fugitives. A detachment in boats was sent to destroy the settlements along the Gulf shore to the southwest and the Baie des Chaleurs. Another made a difficult march along the shore of the St Lawrence to do the same at Mont-Louis. Still another force under Colonel James [Murray*](#) was sent to lay waste the settlements on the Miramichi River. Bell claims that much unnecessary suffering was inflicted on the inhabitants of these outlying communities as the result of the navy's extreme anxiety to get out of those waters as quickly as possible, and the seamen's "accustomed rage for plundering." But even at Gaspé, where Wolfe himself was present, "the General gave orders for every thing being burnt," and this was done on 10 and 11 September. At the Miramichi Murray "destroy'd all the Houses & c. & a good Stone Church." Large numbers of "shaloupes" and quantities of supplies of various sorts were burned. Wolfe's force re-embarked on 25 and 26 September and arrived at Louisbourg on the 30th. On that day Wolfe reported to Amherst that his task had been accomplished, writing in terms that might suggest that he had forgotten that he had proposed it: "We have done a great deal of mischief, – spread the terror of His Majesty's arms through the whole gulf; but have added nothing to the reputation of them."

Bell recorded that Wolfe "as soon as he found what a small Game he had to play wanted Sir C. Hardy to go to Quebec, if not so high as that, to go some way up in order to destroy their Settlements." Hardy, however, had made difficulties. Bell added to his text at a later time the comment, "Had Sir Charles Hardy pursued Gen. Wolfe's advice, Quebec must certainly have fallen." In fact, Wolfe's idea seems to have been extremely rash, and it is more than doubtful whether the very small force at his disposal could have taken Quebec.

Wolfe at once went back to England; he had understood his return to be the intention of the British army's commander-in-chief, Lord Ligonier, and the state of his health "and other circumstances" made him desire to comply. On arriving in London, however, he found that orders had been sent for him to remain in America. In a letter to William Pitt dated 22 Nov. 1758 he made his apologies and wrote further, "I take the freedom to acquaint you that I have no objection to serving in America, and particularly in the river St. Lawrence, if any operations are carried on there." Whether the mention of the St Lawrence was his own idea, or whether some suggestion had already been made to him on the subject, remains uncertain. A letter he wrote to Amherst (who had now been appointed commander-in-chief in America) on 29 December describes, not

too explicitly, the process by which his own share in the next year's campaign was decided. In his first interview with Ligonier, on a date not given, he learned that the plan was to attack on two lines, one by Lake George (Lac Saint-Sacrement), the other by the St Lawrence against Quebec. Wolfe says, "I express'd my desire to go up the River, but to be excused from taking the chief direction of such a weighty enterprise." He then went to Bath, but "in about a week" was called back to London to attend a meeting of "some of the principal Officers of State." During his absence, he says, "Mr. Pitt had named me to the King for the command in the River." It seems quite likely that Ligonier had recommended him. A commission dated 12 Jan. 1759 appointed Wolfe major-general and commander-in-chief of the land forces for the expedition against Quebec. The king's secret instructions dated 5 February directed him at the conclusion of the campaign to put himself "as Brigadier General in North America" under Amherst's command.



Wolfe wrote to his uncle, Major Walter Wolfe, "I am to act a greater part in this business than I wished or desired. The backwardness of some of the older officers has in some measure forced the Government to come down so low." Service in America was not popular. If a junior officer was to get the command, the golden opinions won by Wolfe at Louisbourg made him an obvious choice. In appointing him, however, Pitt was making a considerable gamble; for the young general had never attempted to plan and conduct an independent campaign. And although at Quebec he would technically be under Amherst, he would in fact be an independent commander and Amherst would be unable to assist or advise him. He was given an excellent army, whose core consisted of ten battalions of British regular infantry, all already serving in America. They were below establishment, and Wolfe's force amounted overall to only some 8,500 instead of the 12,000 for which Pitt had planned, but the quality was high.

Wolfe moreover was apparently allowed to a large extent to choose his own officers, a point he had tried to insist upon in his dealings with Ligonier. From Louisbourg he had written, "If his Majesty had thought proper to let Carleton come with us as engineer and DeLaune and 2 or 3 more for the light Foot, it would have cut the matter much shorter." In 1759 George II was prevailed upon to allow Guy [Carleton*](#) to accompany him as deputy quartermaster-general, and Captain William DeLaune of Wolfe's 67th Foot was also in his army. In one important appointment, nevertheless, Wolfe did not get his way. The original intention was that his three brigadiers should be Monckton, Murray, and Ralph [Burton](#), a selection with which he appears to have been happy. At a late stage, however, Burton, a special friend of Wolfe's, was put aside in favour of the Hon. George [Townshend*](#), the eldest son of the 3rd Viscount Townshend. The circumstances remain obscure, but the episode contained the seeds of later trouble. The naval commander was Vice-Admiral Charles [Saunders*](#), an able, self-effacing officer, whose second-in-command was Rear-Admiral Philip [Durell](#) (for whom Wolfe seems to have acquired a dislike at Louisbourg), the third naval officer being Rear-Admiral Charles Holmes. The naval force numbered 49 sail, 22 being ships of 50 guns or more.

At the time when Wolfe undertook this great enterprise he was in poor health. He had written in December 1758, "I am in a very bad condition, both with the gravel & Rheumatism, but I had much rather die than decline any kind of service that offers." This combination of disorders, almost certain to render a person irritable and difficult, doubtless contributed to the deterioration of Wolfe's relations with his subordinates as the campaign proceeded. Despite ill health, however, he had been paying his addresses to Katherine Lowther, the daughter of Robert Lowther and afterwards Duchess of Bolton. No letters that passed between them have survived, and it seems uncertain whether there was a formal engagement; but the reference to the lady in Wolfe's will, and one of her own letters after his death, suggest that they intended to marry.

Wolfe sailed from Portsmouth in mid February 1759 in Saunders' flagship *Neptune*. They had a slow passage, and when they arrived off Louisbourg, their planned destination, ice prevented the fleet from entering. They sailed on to Halifax, where they arrived on 30 April. Here, to Wolfe's indignation, they found Durell's squadron still at anchor, though he had been ordered to enter the St Lawrence as early as possible to prevent supplies or reinforcements reaching Quebec. The ice had kept him from acting, but had not kept some 20 vessels from France, almost all supply ships, from getting up the St Lawrence. Without the supplies thus obtained the French would probably not have been able to hold out through the summer. Durell finally sailed from Halifax on 5 May. The army, having been concentrated at Louisbourg, sailed thence for Quebec on 4 June. Durell's force pushed rapidly up the St Lawrence, neither it nor the main body coming on in the rear being seriously delayed by the difficulties of the channel which had been widely feared. Wolfe himself, full of eagerness, went forward as fast as the navy could take him; and on 27 June he landed on the south shore of the Île d'Orléans with the main body of his army and proceeded to reconnoitre the French positions from the west point of the island.


Although there is no evidence that Wolfe had studied Sir William [Phips*](#)' campaign of 1690, his intention had evidently been to follow much the same plan used by Phips: to land and encamp on the north shore of the St Lawrence near Beauport, east of Quebec, cross the Saint-Charles River, and attack the city from its weak land side. He also proposed to establish posts on the south side of the St Lawrence opposite Quebec, and suggested in addition that it might be possible to "steal a detachment," land it some miles above the town, and entrench there. His first reconnaissance showed him that the idea of landing on the Beauport shore was impracticable; the French had anticipated [him. Montcalm](#), the French commander, had occupied and fortified that area, and the main French force was encamped there. The first of many tactical reassessments was thus forced upon Wolfe.



Montcalm

Montcalm's army was, in the beginning, nearly twice as large as Wolfe's but in quality it was far inferior, being in great part composed of untrained militia. Wolfe's object throughout was to bring the French to action in the open, and he never had any doubt of the result if he succeeded in doing so. The victory won on the Plains of Abraham is evidence of the soundness of his calculations. The nature of his strategic problem is nowhere better stated than in Wolfe's last letter to his mother (31 Aug. 1759): "My antagonist has wisely shut himself up in inaccessible entrenchments, so that I cant get at him without spilling a torrent of blood, and that perhaps to little purpose. The Marquiss de Montcalm is at the head of a great number of bad soldiers, and I am at the head of a small number of good ones, that wish for nothing so much as to fight him – but the wary old fellow avoids an action doubtful of the behaviour of his army. People must be of the profession to understand the disadvantages and difficulties we labour under arising from the uncommon natural strength of the country." For success Montcalm had only to hold his position through the short campaigning season until the approach of winter would drive the British fleet out of the river. The soundness of his cautious tactics is attested by the frustration which they caused Wolfe. Nevertheless, there was in the French situation an element of weakness that ultimately proved fatal. The orders from the court at Versailles had emphasized the importance of holding at least part of the colony even if Quebec were lost. This meant keeping the army in being, and it could not exist without food. Accordingly the decision had been taken not to store the available supplies in the city; the supply ships that had arrived from France were taken far up the St Lawrence to Batiscan, and the city and the army were provisioned by regular boat or cart convoys from there. Wolfe had only to cut this essential line of communication above Quebec to force Montcalm to come out of his defences and fight to reopen it. It is not

to the credit of the British general that he took so long to discover this situation and exploit it.



For two months, while the summer ran away, Wolfe struggled with the problem of bringing the French to battle; his health plagued him ("Sad attack of dysentery," he notes on 4 July) and his relations with his senior subordinates got worse and worse. During July there was increasing tension with Townshend; and in the course of the campaign Murray acquired a hatred for Wolfe which he continued to nourish long after the object of it was dead. About Monckton, the second in command, we know less. In August Wolfe was writing him apologizing for what Monckton evidently considered a slight. Monckton's letters to Wolfe seem to have perished. But it is interesting that Monckton was the only one of the three brigadiers who allowed himself to be included in Benjamin West's famous (and highly inaccurate) painting *The death of Wolfe* (1771); and the Monckton family commissioned West to paint a copy of it. These incidents suggest that Monckton was at least less hostile to Wolfe than the other brigadiers. There was trouble also with Guy Carleton, for whom Wolfe had had particular regard; on 31 July Bell, the general's aide de-camp, wrote in his diary, "Colonel Carlton's abominable behaviour to ye General." What Carleton had done is unknown.

The progress of Wolfe's planning cannot be described in detail. What seems evident is that he had great difficulty in making up his mind, and that he frequently changed it. On 29 and 30 June he occupied Pointe-Lévy (Lauzon) and on 2 July ordered the construction of batteries opposite Quebec. Thereafter he considered landing a detachment above the city while also putting a brigade ashore just east of the Montmorency River,

close to the left flank of the French fortified position, to draw the enemy's attention in that direction. This scheme he shortly abandoned, and on 10 July the troops intended for the upper landing joined the brigade at Montmorency, where the main body of the army was now assembled. On the night of 12 July the guns on the south shore opened fire on Quebec. In the middle of the month Wolfe was actively considering an attack on the Beauport lines; but on the night of the 18th several British vessels got past the city into the upper river, and his attention was diverted to that sector. The 20th was a day of great activity, Wolfe contemplating an attack that night in the area of Saint-Michel, near Sillery. He cancelled it in the afternoon, probably because of visible French reactions to the movement of the ships. Within a few days he was again planning action on the Beauport side. On 31 July, for the first time, he attempted a major attack, just west of the Montmorency. His scheme – which all the brigadiers seem to have disliked – was to seize a small redoubt near the shore in the hope that Montcalm would come out of his entrenchments and attack in the open to recover it. As soon as the operation began it became evident that the redoubt was closer to the entrenchments than Wolfe had thought; it would not be tenable under their fire. On the spot he changed his plan to a frontal assault on the lofty entrenchments. This broke down in a bloody reverse, partly perhaps because the grenadiers who led the attack got out of hand, partly because a tremendous thunderstorm burst at the critical moment, and partly because Wolfe had attacked the French under the only circumstances in which the Canadian militia were formidable. He wisely called off the enterprise after losing over 200 men killed. Characteristically, he had exposed himself recklessly to the French fire, and he was with the rearguard of Murray's and Townshend's brigades as they retired to their camp east of the Montmorency, just before the tide made the ford impassable.

The defeat on 31 July put an end for the moment to Wolfe's feverish planning activity. He sent Murray up the river with a detachment to get at the French ships if possible and to open communications with Amherst; Murray did not succeed in either object, but did a certain amount of damage and compelled Montcalm to dispatch a force under [Colonel Bougainville*](#) to watch the upper river. Wolfe also began to apply a policy of terror against the outlying parishes, in part it appears in reprisal for attacks on British detachments, in part with a view to bringing pressure on Montcalm "to try the Event of a Battle to prevent the Ravage." Early in September a large party under Major George Scott (who had had a similar command at Louisbourg), including all six of the American ranger companies in the army, was sent to lay waste the south shore from Kamouraska to Pointe-Lévy. Scott later reported that he had burned 998 "good buildings." Before the campaign was over the communities on both shores of the river below Quebec, and on the south shore for some distance above, had been largely destroyed, only churches being spared. Quebec itself had been laid in ruins by the bombardment from the Lévis heights. This policy of devastation had long been in Wolfe's mind. He had written to Amherst during his voyage in the *Neptune*, "If . . . we find, that Quebec is not likely to fall into our hands (persevering however to the last moment), I propose to set the Town on fire with Shells, to destroy the Harvest, Houses, and Cattle, both above and below, to send off as many Canadians as possible to Europe, and to leave

famine and desolation behind me; belle resolution, and tres chrétienne! but we must teach these scoundrels to make war in a more gentlemanlike manner." If this letter is to be taken literally, Wolfe by September, at least, was seriously contemplating the likelihood that he was not going to take Quebec.



Montmorency Falls

About 19 August Wolfe became so ill that he was forced to take to his bed in his quarters in Montmorency. He was not able to resume his usual activities until nearly the end of the month. On or about 27 August (the document is not dated) he wrote a famous letter to the three brigadiers, asking them in the light of his indisposition to "consult together" and to "consider of the best method of attacking the Enemy." He noted the absence of provisions in Quebec but did not mention the desirability of severing the French supply line. He thought that the army rather than the city should be attacked, and he suggested three possible methods. All were variants of the attack on the Beauport lines which had already failed. One proposed a combination of a frontal attack with a turning movement up the Montmorency, intended to strike the Beauport entrenchments in the rear; a ranger captain and a French deserter had reconnoitred the route. Wolfe's admirers have put strained interpretations upon these projects, suggesting that the general did not really mean them seriously; but there is no evidence whatever that they were not the best plans that Wolfe (who, it must be remembered, was a sick man) was able to produce. The three brigadiers wrote an able and polite reply. They thought the chances of success in an attack on the Beauport side slight, and pointed out that even if it were successful Montcalm would still be able to withdraw across the Saint-Charles and provision Quebec from the ships and magazines above. "We therefore are of Opinion that the most probable method of striking an effectual blow, is to bring the Troops [from Montmorency] to the South Shore, and to direct the Operations above the Town: When we establish


ourselves on the North Shore, the French General must fight us on our own Terms; We shall be betwixt him and his provisions, and betwixt him and their Army opposing General Amherst." This paper was supported by a detailed plan for the proposed movements. The brigadiers are known to have had prolonged consultations with Admiral Saunders while drafting these memoranda.

For the first time, it appears, the basic strategic factors, had now been stated on paper. The brigadiers' logic was really unanswerable, and Wolfe accepted it. Orders were given for the evacuation of the Montmorency camp. The British army, except for a small force on Île d'Orléans, was concentrated on the south shore, and on 5 and 6 September the main body embarked in the British ships above the town. It apparently would have landed on 9 September in the area on the north shore favoured by the brigadiers, between Saint-Augustin (now Saint-Augustin-de-Québec) and Pointe-aux-Trembles (Neuville), if the weather had not broken; heavy rain caused the operation to be cancelled. And on the 8th or the 9th, or perhaps both, Wolfe "went a reconnoitering down the River." For reasons that are still obscure – the decision may well have been based simply on his own observations – he decided to abandon the plan for a descent in the Pointe-aux-Trembles area (which had many advantages, including distance from the main French force and a low and accessible shore). He adopted a far riskier plan, a landing much nearer the town, at the Anse au Foulon (later also called Wolfe's Cove) where a track led up the cliffs. For the oft-repeated story that this track had been pointed out by a French traitor no evidence has ever been adduced.

Although he took Monckton and Townshend with him on another reconnaissance on the 10th, he evidently did not take them fully into his confidence, and on the 12th there was a rather sharp exchange of notes between him and the three brigadiers, in which they complained of being insufficiently informed. It is recorded that after an interview with Monckton that day "Mr. Wolfe said to his own family [his personal staff] that the Brigadiers had brought him up the River and now flinch'd: He did not hesitate to say that two of them were Cowards and one a Villain."

That night the decisive operation was launched, the boats carrying the first "flight" of British troops dropping down with the tide from the ships off Cap-Rouge. Everything depended on achieving surprise, for in the face of serious opposition a landing at the Foulon would be quite impossible. But surprise was achieved. Montcalm's attention was fixed on the Beauport shore, where the boats from the British ships lying in the Quebec Basin staged an effective feint. Bougainville, who was responsible for the whole area above Quebec, was at Cap-Rouge and apparently did not realize what was going on until too late. The French were expecting a provision convoy (though it had in fact been cancelled) and were too easily deceived into believing that the British boats were their own. Wolfe's intention had apparently been to have a picked detachment of men under Captain DeLaune rush the path leading up the cliff; but the tide carried the boats beyond the point planned for the landing, and Lieutenant-Colonel William Howe, commanding Wolfe's provisional light infantry battalion, led several companies of his unit straight up the cliff (an action

which seems to have been improvised). They dislodged Louis [Du Pont*](#) Duchambon de Vergor's party guarding the path, which offered only slight opposition. This was about four in the morning of 13 September. Wolfe, who had lately written several dispatches and letters reflecting a mood of black pessimism, seems to have found it hard to believe in his own good luck; there is evidence that he sent his adjutant-general, Major Isaac Barré, to stop the landing of the second flight of troops until he was sure that the French were actually not present in strength. Barré, finding the troops ready to land, refrained from delivering the order. Cooperation between the army and navy was admirable throughout the affair, which deserves to be regarded as a classic amphibious operation.



Battle of the Plains of Abraham, 1759

From the time of the landing Wolfe made no mistakes. He chose his ground, formed his battle-line, and confidently awaited the French attack which was certain to come. The mistakes on the Plains of Abraham were Montcalm's. The French general had to attack to open his line of communications; but he should have waited for Bougainville, who was belatedly moving towards the scene of action. Instead he launched his mixed force of Canadians and Frenchmen against Wolfe's solid line of regulars about ten in the morning. His senior artillery officer, Captain Fiacre-François [Potot*](#) de Montbeillard, records him as saying, "If we give him [the enemy] time to establish himself, we shall never be able to attack him with the sort of troops we have." The British let the French come close and then with a succession of volleys blew them into ruin and retreat. Montcalm himself was mortally wounded.

Wolfe had again exposed himself, perhaps actually courting death. He first suffered a wound in the hand or wrist, which he disregarded; then, as the British line began to move forward to pursue the French, the general,

leading the right, was struck again in the body, many accounts say by two bullets. This injury was fatal, and he lived only a short time. The log of *hms Lowestoft* records that his body was brought on board at 11 a.m. Though the French army was routed, it was not destroyed. Had Wolfe lived, the victory might have been more complete. As it was, there was a period of uncertainty before Townshend took command (Monckton having been wounded), and most of the French force got away across the Saint-Charles to the Beauport camp. That night it marched around the British and withdrew towards Montreal leaving Quebec to surrender on 18 September. The final conquest of Canada required another year's campaign. Wolfe's body was taken to England accompanied by Captains Bell and DeLaune. He was buried in the family vault at Greenwich alongside his father, who had died in March 1759.



Death of Wolfe

James Wolfe was an excellent regimental officer, a splendidly brave fighting soldier, and so far as one can judge from his short career a competent battlefield commander. He has had many admirers and a great historical reputation. That reputation is not supported, however, by his performance before Quebec, the only occasion when he conducted a campaign as commander-in-chief. He was an ineffective planner, vacillating and uncertain; the campaign is a story of plans made only to be cast aside.

He could not get on with his senior subordinates, and the fact that his diary is full of abuse of the navy suggests that he was not a good cooperator. His unpleasant policy of terror and devastation did little to advance his campaign. The one attack undertaken on Wolfe's own motion (that at Montmorency on 31 July) was a costly failure. The final plan which succeeded was basically the brigadiers'; Wolfe's contribution, the actual place of landing, merely added an element of unnecessary risk to the conception and placed the whole operation at the mercy of luck. As it turned out, his luck was extraordinarily good; and this, combined with the efficiency of the British army and navy and the marked inefficiency of the French, produced a famous victory which has remained identified with the name of Wolfe.

[C. P. Stacey](#)

[The happenings at Quebec in 1759 were, one might say without exaggeration, stranger than fiction. The final episode – the descent of the dark river, the climb up the cliff, the deaths of the two opposing leaders – had an irresistible appeal to the popular imagination. The result was that from the very beginning the history of the campaign was written in romantic terms, particularly the treatment of the two central figures, who have both been depicted as rather larger than life. Wolfe and Montcalm, neither of whom was really better than a second-rate commander, were raised to the level of legend. There are a good many biographies of Wolfe, all of them in varying degrees works of uncritical laudation. Not all will be mentioned here. The earliest full-length treatment was Robert Wright, *The life of Major-General James Wolfe* . . . (London, 1864). It is still useful, and has served later biographers well. The most valuable of the biographies is Beckles Willson, *The life and letters of James Wolfe* . . . (London, 1909), simply for the documents it contains, even though their text is not always reliable. Of the books called forth by the bicentenary in 1959, Robin Reilly, *The rest to fortune: the life of Major-General James Wolfe* (London, 1960), uses a wider range of sources than some others, including Wolfe's letters to Monckton which were long neglected, but the interpretation is the usual one. *Wolfe: portraiture & genealogy* (Westerham, Eng., 1959) contains J. F. Kerslake, "The likeness of Wolfe," A. R. Wagner, "The genealogy of James Wolfe," and W. W. Shaw-Zambra, "James Wolfe: a chronology." A more critical assessment than the biographers' was that of J. W. Fortescue, who wrote in his *History of the British army* (13v., London, New York, 1899–1930), II, "a brilliant success, however fortunate, is rightly held to cover all errors." E. R. Adair's important and striking paper, "The military reputation of Major-General James Wolfe," *CHA Report*, 1936, 7–31, is somewhat overdone but is damaging to Wolfe. Its interpretation is in curious contrast with that of a book by Professor Adair's late McGill colleague, W. T. Waugh, *James Wolfe, man and soldier* (Montreal, 1928). The writings of W. C. H. Wood, amateur soldier and amateur historian, have had more influence than they deserve; see particularly *The fight for Canada* ("definitive ed.," London, 1905). Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, still has much value, though Parkman takes liberties with documents and is sometimes over-romantic. Stacey, *Quebec, 1759*, is an attempt at producing a version without preconceptions, based on the contemporary documents; see also the same author's "Generals and generalship before

Quebec, 1759–1760," *CHA Report, 1959*, 1–15. J. M. Hitsman with C. C. J. Bond, "The assault landing at Louisbourg, 1758," *CHR*, XXXV (1954), 314–30, is very useful. A monumental Canadian contribution is Doughty and Parmelee, *Siege of Quebec*. It is partly history, partly documentary collection, and is much more important in the latter than in the former respect; even some of the documents, however, are incomplete. *Correspondence of William Pitt* (Kimball) contains many fundamental documents in accurate texts; enclosures, often more important than the covering letters, are not included. Doughty's edition of Knox, *Historical journal*, is valuable, as is another Champlain Society publication, *Logs of the conquest* (Wood).

Important printed sources for the siege of Louisbourg are the "Journal of the expedition against Louisburg," *Northcliffe coll.*; Jeffery Amherst, *Journal* (Webster); and the contemporary published versions of the Amherst journal (e.g., *Gentleman's Magazine*, 1758, pp.384–89). The contemporary plan of the siege by Samuel Holland, reproduced in [William Amherst], *Journal of William Amherst in America, 1758–1760*, ed. J. C. Webster (Frome and London, Eng., 1927) is enlightening.

Only a selection of manuscript sources can be listed here. Wolfe's personal journal of the Quebec campaign came to light only in 1910. Three versions of it are known; all are in PAC as originals or photocopies. One is a transcript by Captain Thomas Bell, included in his own series of journals (PAC, MG 18, M3, 24). Unfortunately Wolfe destroyed his journal for the period after 16 Aug. 1759. The Bell journal is one of the items in the enormously valuable Northcliffe coll. (PAC, MG 18, M). Others include large groups of Townshend and Monckton papers; among the latter are many letters by Wolfe which are not in Willson. Also in the collection are various important miscellaneous items, including George II's instructions to Wolfe for the Quebec expedition. There are letters from Wolfe in PRO, WO 34/46b, pt.ii. Wolfe's dispatches from Quebec are in PRO, CO 5/51. Various important documents are in PRO 30/8, particularly bundles 33, 49, 50, and 98, vol.7.

A significant anonymous narrative of the events at Quebec which internal evidence suggests may have been written by one of Wolfe's aides-de-camp is in Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (Belfast), D.162/77. (See C. P. Stacey, "Quebec, 1759: some new documents," *CHR*, XLVII (1966), 344–55, which also discusses some other papers on the campaign that have come to light in recent years.) A source of great value for the whole Quebec campaign is the large map signed by Major Patrick Mackellar, "Plan of the town of Quebec the capital of Canada . . . showing the principal encampments and works of the British army commanded by Major General Wolfe and those of the French army commanded by Lieu^t. General the Marquis of Montcalm . . .," PAC, National Map coll. In general, it may be said that all the most vital known records of Wolfe's Canadian campaigns are available in the PAC either as originals or as copies.

In the interest of avoiding duplication, sources in French are omitted from this bibliographical note. They will be found listed in the note in the present volume appended to the biography of the Marquis de Montcalm.

A good deal has been written on the portraiture of Wolfe. See particularly the article by Kerslake, above; J. C. Webster, *Wolfe and the artists . . .* (Toronto, 1930); and A. E. Wolfe-Aylward, *The pictorial life of Wolfe* (Plymouth, Eng., n.d.). These writers devote much attention to posthumous pictures and the few which may or may not have been painted from life, including that attributed to Joseph Highmore which the PAC acquired in 1932. It is surprising that they make so little of the most striking and most authentic portrait in existence, the watercolour signed by George Townshend which, though unfortunately not dated, was presumably painted during the 1759 campaign. It is in the McCord Museum (Montreal) and has frequently been reproduced. On the most famous picture concerning Wolfe, see C. P. Stacey, "Benjamin West and 'The death of Wolfe'," National Gallery of Canada *Bull.* (Ottawa), IV (1966), 1-5. Statues of Wolfe have been erected in England at Westerham and in Greenwich Park. c.p.s.]